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Abstract
Individuals do not always follow the rules at work, yet it is not entirely clear what
conditions generally contribute to higher rates of misbehaviour. Much of the research on
organizational misbehaviour is ethnographic or based on limited sample populations
(single organization, single industry, etc.), so there remains a gap in the literature for
findings representative of a wider population and comparison across occupational classes.
Additionally, there has been an over-emphasis on the study of misbehaviour by
employees, while employer misbehaviour remains relatively unexplored within the
literature. Organizational misbehaviour is also often treated as an objective act with little
recognition for how individual attitudes and structural position shape perceptions of what
constitutes ‘proper’ behavior and, in turn, misbehaviour. This dissertation reconnects the
study of organizational misbehaviour with Marxist class analysis and examines the
connection between the structural conditions of work and employee and employer
misbehaviour, also incorporating a study of how individual reporting of misbehaviour
frequency is influenced by respondent class consciousness. Each integrated chapter uses
nationally representative data for Canada from the 2016 Changing Workplaces in a
Knowledge Economy (CWKE) survey (N=3007). Methods utilized include chi-square,
gamma and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Findings contribute to a growing
section of the literature focused on identifying the structural determinants of
organizational misbehaviour, examine the link between individual subjectivity and
perceptions of misbehaviour frequency and provide unique initial exploratory research
into the phenomenon of employer misbehaviour.

Keywords
Organizational misbehaviour; Occupational class; Employer misbehaviour; Class
consciousness; Perceptions of misbehaviour; Structural predictors of misbehaviour;
Quantitative methods
i

Co-Authorship Statement
There are no co-authors to declare.

Acknowledgments
Foremost, I would like to thank my supervisors Dr. Tracey Adams and Dr. David
Livingstone for their extraordinary support through this lengthy (and often difficult)
project. Their constant encouragement, willingness to read numerous drafts and
readiness with additional perspective has at every stage of this process helped me
broaden my perspective and refine my approach. Without their guidance and persistent
aid, this dissertation would not have been possible.
Special acknowledgement to my examination committee members, Dr. Kim Shuey, Dr.
David Calnitsky, Dr. Johanna Weststar and Dr. Harvey Krahn, for their valuable time,
attention and thoughtful suggestions. They have helped challenge my work and elevate it
to a higher level
I would also like to thank Dr. Michael Gardiner for his early guidance and assistance with
the initial steps of this endeavour.
To my loving partner, thank you for your endless patience, support and belief in my
ability to complete this undertaking. To my family and friends, thank you for your
welcome distractions and reminders of life outside the writing process.

ii

Table of Contents
Abstract ................................................................................................................................ i
Co-Authorship Statement.................................................................................................... ii
Acknowledgments............................................................................................................... ii
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................... iii
List of Tables .................................................................................................................... vii
List of Appendices .............................................................................................................. x
Chapter 1 ............................................................................................................................. 1
1 Literature Review and Theoretical Foundations ............................................................ 1
1.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1
1.1.1

Outline of the Study .................................................................................... 2

1.2 Theoretical Framework ........................................................................................... 3
1.2.1

Defining Organizational Misbehaviour ...................................................... 3

1.2.2

The Enduring Relevance of Marx ............................................................... 5

1.2.3

Pitfalls in Misbehaviour Research .............................................................. 7

1.2.4

Neo-Marxist Lessons on Contemporary Work ......................................... 10

1.2.5

Basis for a Structural Perspective on Misbehaviour ................................. 13

1.2.6

For Justice and Autonomy ........................................................................ 14

1.2.7

Innovation and the Dialectic of Employee Misbehaviour and
Managerial Control ................................................................................... 16

1.2.8

The Missing Phenomenon of Employer Misbehaviour ............................ 18

1.2.9

Corporate Crime and Employer Misbehaviour ......................................... 22

1.2.10 The Ambiguous Position of Managers ..................................................... 24
1.2.11 Misbehaviour and Resistance ................................................................... 25
1.3 General Methodological Notes ............................................................................. 28
iii

1.3.1

Data ........................................................................................................... 28

1.3.2

Practical Issues Related to the Study of Organizational Misbehaviour .... 30

1.3.3

Key Misbehaviour Variables .................................................................... 31

1.3.4

Conceptualization of Misbehaviour .......................................................... 32

1.4 The Path Forward .................................................................................................. 33
1.5 References ............................................................................................................. 33
Chapter 2 ........................................................................................................................... 51
2 Canadian Workers Misbehaving .................................................................................. 51
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 51
2.2 Background ........................................................................................................... 52
2.2.1

Autonomy ................................................................................................. 54

2.2.2

Injustice ..................................................................................................... 54

2.2.3

Occupational Class.................................................................................... 55

2.2.4

Social Class ............................................................................................... 57

2.3 Methodology ......................................................................................................... 57
2.3.1

Data ........................................................................................................... 57

2.4 Measures ............................................................................................................... 58
2.4.1

Dependent Variable .................................................................................. 58

2.4.2

Independent Variables .............................................................................. 58

2.5 Analytical Approach ............................................................................................. 63
2.6 Results ................................................................................................................... 66
2.6.1

Bivariate Analysis ..................................................................................... 66

2.6.2

Multivariate Analysis ................................................................................ 72

2.6.3

Supplementary Analysis for Managerial Employees ................................ 75

2.7 Discussion ............................................................................................................. 77
iv

2.8 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 82
2.9 References ............................................................................................................. 83
Chapter 3 ........................................................................................................................... 97
3 Exploring the Neglected Phenomenon of Employer Misbehaviour ............................ 97
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 97
3.2 Background ........................................................................................................... 98
3.3 Methodology ....................................................................................................... 103
3.3.1

Data ......................................................................................................... 103

3.3.2

Analytical Approach ............................................................................... 103

3.4 Measures ............................................................................................................. 106
3.4.1

Dependent Variables ............................................................................... 106

3.4.2

Independent Variables ............................................................................ 107

3.4.3

Control Variables .................................................................................... 110

3.4.4

A Note on Multicollinearity .................................................................... 110

3.5 Results ................................................................................................................. 111
3.5.1

Module 1: Reported Misbehaviour by Occupational Class .................... 111

3.5.2

Module 2: Key Factors Associated with Employer Misbehaviour ......... 114

3.6 Discussion ........................................................................................................... 120
3.7 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 128
3.8 References ........................................................................................................... 128
Chapter 4 ......................................................................................................................... 142
4 Class Consciousness and Perceptions of Organizational Misbehaviour .................... 142
4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 142
4.2 Background ......................................................................................................... 142
4.3 Methodology ....................................................................................................... 149
v

4.3.1

Data ......................................................................................................... 149

4.3.2

Measures ................................................................................................. 150

4.3.3

Dependent Variables ............................................................................... 150

4.3.4

Independent Variables ............................................................................ 151

4.3.5

Control Variables .................................................................................... 153

4.3.6

A Note on Multicollinearity .................................................................... 154

4.4 Analytical Approach ........................................................................................... 154
4.5 Results ................................................................................................................. 155
4.5.1

Bivariate Results ..................................................................................... 155

4.5.2

Multivariate Results ................................................................................ 162

4.6 Discussion ........................................................................................................... 166
4.7 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 172
4.8 References ........................................................................................................... 173
Chapter 5 ......................................................................................................................... 182
5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 182
5.1 Contributions....................................................................................................... 182
5.2 Summary of and links between findings ............................................................. 184
5.3 Limitations and Future Directions ...................................................................... 187
5.4 Concluding Thoughts .......................................................................................... 191
5.5 References ........................................................................................................... 192
Appendices ...................................................................................................................... 200
Curriculum Vitae ............................................................................................................ 215

vi

List of Tables
Table 2.1 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Demographic Variables 62
Table 2.2 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Employee Occupational
Class .................................................................................................................................. 66
Table 2.3 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Employee Social Class . 67
Table 2.4 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Employee Personal Class
Identification ..................................................................................................................... 67
Table 2.5 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by How Often Plan or Design
Own Work......................................................................................................................... 68
Table 2.6 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Want More Say in
Organizational Decisions .................................................................................................. 68
Table 2.7 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Fairness of Compensation
........................................................................................................................................... 69
Table 2.8 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Experienced
Discrimination at Work..................................................................................................... 69
Table 2.9 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Job Safety ..................... 70
Table 2.10 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Job Security ................ 70
Table 2.11 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Size of Work
Organization ...................................................................................................................... 71
Table 2.12 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Organizational Industry
........................................................................................................................................... 72
Table 2.13 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Organizational Sector . 72

vii

Table 2.14 Multivariate Models of Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour
(Non-Managerial Workers) ............................................................................................... 74
Table 2.15 Multivariate Models of Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour
(Managerial Workers) ....................................................................................................... 76
Table 3.1 Perceived Frequency of Misbehaviour (Employee and Employer) by
Occupational Class.......................................................................................................... 113
Table 3.2 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Employer Wealth ........ 114
Table 3.3 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Appropriateness of
Compensation ................................................................................................................. 115
Table 3.4 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Likelihood of Business
Loss ................................................................................................................................. 116
Table 3.5 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Union Presence ........... 117
Table 3.6 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Greater Reliance on NonPermanent Workers ......................................................................................................... 117
Table 3.7 Multivariate Models of Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour .... 118
Table 4.1 Perceptions of Employer Misbehaviour by Class Identity ............................. 156
Table 4.2 Perceptions of Employee Misbehaviour by Class Identity ............................. 157
Table 4.3 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Support for Right to Strike
......................................................................................................................................... 158
Table 4.4 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Recognition of Class
Antagonism ..................................................................................................................... 158
Table 4.5 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Support for Right to Strike
......................................................................................................................................... 159
viii

Table 4.6 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Recognition of Class
Antagonism ..................................................................................................................... 159
Table 4.7 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Believe Non-Profit
Economy Possible ........................................................................................................... 160
Table 4.8 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Support for Employee-Run
Organizations .................................................................................................................. 161
Table 4.9 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Believe Non-Profit
Economy Possible ........................................................................................................... 161
Table 4.10 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Support for EmployeeRun Organizations .......................................................................................................... 161
Table 4.11 Multivariate Models of Perceptions of Employer Misbehaviour ................. 163
Table 4.12 Multivariate Models of Perceptions of Employee Misbehaviour ................. 165

ix

List of Appendices
Appendix 1 Technical Report on Response Rate of Canada-wide Sample for the CWKE
Survey ............................................................................................................................. 200
Appendix 2 Non-Response Analysis of Key Misbehaviour Variables ........................... 201
Appendix 3 Construction Logic for Occupational Class ................................................ 202
Appendix 4 Correlation Matrix for Chapter 2 Independent Variables and Controls (nonmanagerial employee analysis) ....................................................................................... 204
Appendix 5 Correlation Matrix for Chapter 2 Independent Variables and Controls
(managerial employee analysis) ...................................................................................... 206
Appendix 6 Correlation Matrix for Chapter 3 Independent Variables and Controls
(employer analysis) ......................................................................................................... 208
Appendix 7 Correlation Matrix for Chapter 4 Independent Variables and Controls (all
employed individuals) ..................................................................................................... 209
Appendix 8 Work Sector by Gender ............................................................................... 210
Appendix 9 Combined Models of Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour (NonManagerial Workers) ...................................................................................................... 211
Appendix 10 Combined Models of Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour
(Non-Managerial Workers) ............................................................................................. 212
Appendix 11 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Union Membership
(non-managerial workers) ............................................................................................... 213
Appendix 12 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Union Membership
(non-managerial workers) ............................................................................................... 213

x

Appendix 13 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Employment Status
(non-managerial workers) ............................................................................................... 213
Appendix 14 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Employment Status
(non-managerial workers) ............................................................................................... 214

xi

1

Chapter 1

1

Literature Review and Theoretical Foundations

1.1 Introduction
The practice of workplace misbehaviour – for example loafing on the job, vandalism,
absenteeism, sabotage and theft – is at least as old as the experience of wage labour, and
likely much older. Though one might be inclined to focus on the early days of
industrialism, organizational misbehaviour remains widespread in modern times. Some
scholars have estimated that 33% to 75% of employees engage in at least one of the
practices of misbehaviour outlined above (Harper, 1990; Lawrence et al., 2007), but even
these figures might be conservative: Several notable studies have suggested that – at
least in the case of service sabotage – more than 90% of informants believe misbehaviour
to be an everyday occurrence in their workplace (Harris & Ogbonna, 2002, 2006; Lee &
Ok, 2014; Slora, 1989). The figures differ somewhat based on one’s definition of what
misbehaviour entails, but the phenomenon is clearly widespread. It is also evident that
this abundance of organizational misbehaviour can be quite costly, with some parties
estimating annual business losses due to misbehaviour as high as two-hundred billion
dollars in the United States alone (Lee & Ok, 2014; Murphy, 1993). These figures,
which at first might seem surprising, seem a lot more reasonable with the knowledge that
the average worker spends approximately two hours of their workday engaging in
activities which are not related to their paid work (Paulsen, 2014). However, it is not just
because of profit-loss that we should be concerned with the study of misbehaviour: The
prevalence of these behaviours suggests widespread discontent and enduring conflicts of
interest within the contemporary workplace.
With these figures in mind, the study of workplace misbehaviour should be of utmost
priority to any who concern themselves with the study of organizational behaviour
because it has become increasingly clear that most individuals do not blindly follow the
rules at work (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Burawoy, 1979).
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However, there is still much to be learned about the phenomenon of organizational
misbehaviour: The literature has rarely touched on misbehaviour in Canada or
considered misbehaviour engaged in by anyone other than non-managerial employees.
Additionally, while qualitative methods have taught us much about misbehaviour, there
remains a gap in the literature for quantitative and nationally representative results. This
dissertation is positioned to address each of these current limitations of the literature.

1.1.1

Outline of the Study

This dissertation will explore multiple dimensions of organizational misbehavior in
Canada, many of which have not received attention in the past. In particular, our decision
to examine employer misbehaviour and include class as a key explanatory variable
represents a unique approach to the study of organizational misbehaviour.
This chapter (chapter 1) provides a review of the literature, describes the theoretical
framework which later chapters build upon and outlines our general methodological
notes.
Paper 1 (chapter 2) advances the study of employee misbehavior within Canadian
workplaces, focusing on the structural determinants of employee misbehavior for nonmanagerial employees. Taking our cue from the organizational misbehavior literature,
we examined the relationships between worker autonomy and injustice and the perceived
frequency of employee misbehavior. Additionally, we incorporated occupational class in
our analysis as a key explanatory variable – one which has been left out of previous
studies on organizational misbehavior. Paper 1 also contains a supplementary
multivariate analysis of managerial employees to compare with our primary results for
non-managerial employees.
Paper 2 (chapter 3) explores the often-overlooked phenomenon of employer misbehavior.
First, we consider how the reported frequency of misbehavior varies by the occupational
class of the respondent – and compare the perceived frequency of employee versus
employer misbehavior. Second, we explore whether economic pressures on employers
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and the vulnerability of their workforce relate to the amount of employer misbehavior
reported by employers.
Paper 3 (chapter 4) examines the relationship between the class consciousness of the
individual and their perception of the frequency of both employee and employer
misbehaviour in the workplace. Here, we suggest that the perception of organizational
misbehavior as a more frequent phenomenon is incompatible with ideological
assumptions about harmonious industrial relations and unity of interest between workers,
managers and employers and hypothesized that those who were more critical of the
capitalist system would perceive misbehavior as more frequent.
The final chapter (5) summarizes the results of the previous chapters, discusses their
significance and suggests directions for future research.

1.2 Theoretical Framework
1.2.1

Defining Organizational Misbehaviour

There are several definitions of organizational misbehaviour – many of which are
coloured by the interests of stakeholders – but we believe the best working definition is
one which is quite general, allowing for the comparison of a diversity of behaviours
which might not seem immediately comparable and reminding us that misbehaviour is
always shaped by prevailing expectations of proper behaviour. Therefore, we chose to
adapt the definition outlined by Sprouse (1992) and Ackroyd and Thompson (1999) of
organizational misbehaviour as ‘anything at work that you are not supposed to do’
(Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999, p. 7).
To some extent, misbehaviour should be understood as inevitable. There will always be a
limited number of pathological cases and interpersonal conflicts that will contribute to
our statistics on workplace misbehaviour. However, there is evidence to suggest that
many cases of misbehaviour are instead linked to conditions of structural inequality and
conflict of interests within the workplace: Analoui observed that ‘65 percent of all acts
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of unconventional practice [sabotage] stemmed from the discontent experienced in the
workplace, with management and its behaviour at the heart of the dispute’ (Analoui,
1995).
Understanding that misbehaviour is often connected to structural factors and unequal
power relations in the workplace also raises the question of when organizational
misbehaviour is more properly understood as an act of resistance against capitalist
relations of production. In a later section, we will explore this question in greater detail.
However, it is advantageous here to outline our specific focus in the study of
organizational misbehaviour and clarify this phenomenon’s relationship with worker
resistance in the context of alienating and exploitative working conditions and the
struggle for greater autonomy for workers.
It is clear to us that not all employee misbehaviour should be understood as authentic
resistance: The range of activities properly understood as misbehaviour is far too vast for
such a conclusion. Additionally, resistance is also not necessarily a form of
misbehaviour, as certain avenues for disaffected workers to advance their interests will be
permitted or even encouraged – though the effectiveness of any sanctioned resistance
should always be questioned.
Clearly, not all misbehaviour is resistance and not all resistance is misbehaviour, but we
are most interested in when these two activities may coincide – and how they may both
be provoked by the alienation and exploitation experienced by the worker under the
capitalist mode of economic production. Correspondingly, our treatment of employee
misbehaviour emphasizes those activities that are best understood as a reaction to the
enduring contradictions of the capitalist system and the ability of the phenomenon to act
as an indirect measure of the class conflict present under the surface of most modern
work organizations.

5

1.2.2

The Enduring Relevance of Marx

The theoretical work that is most foundational for our understanding of organizational
misbehaviour is that put forth by Karl Marx and many of the ideas he originally outlined
remain important to our contemporary understanding of the social world. In a study of
Marx, one is continually reminded of possible motives for why a worker might choose to
misbehave at work and what follows hereafter is a limited summary of only those
concepts most central to our theoretical understanding of organizational misbehaviour.
Marx recognized exploitation in the wage relationship between owners and workers as a
prerequisite for the production of profit under the capitalist system. In his theory of
surplus value, Marx outlined how profit is extracted from the labour process through the
exploitation of the worker – paying her a wage which is lower than the true value of her
labour (1867). Without this exploitation, it is usually not possible for the capitalist to
maintain profitability and – because the driving motivation towards production under the
capitalist system is to increase profit and further concentrate capital – exploitation
remains present in the standard wage relationship to this day.
However, wage work under capitalism is damaging to the worker not only because she is
systematically underpaid, but also because of the alienation that she feels because of the
degraded circumstances under which she must labour. Correspondingly, Marx argued
that workers were bound to become increasingly dissatisfied as they came to recognize
how the structure of capitalist production rendered them separate from the product they
create, any meaningful control of the work process, their human counterparts – both
capitalists and workers – and their very species-being (1844).
The concepts of surplus value and the exploitation and alienation of the worker are
important because they demonstrate how the economic interests of the owner and the
worker are always in opposition to one another within a capitalist system of production:
The former always striving to create surplus value by paying wages that are less than the
true value of the labour derived while the latter seeks to regain control over her labour
and the value she produces. Marx’s observations were based on capitalism at an earlier
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stage of development, but his account of this essential class conflict remains relevant to
this day.
This point on the enduring role of class antagonism within the contemporary workplace is
particularly important to our understanding of misbehaviour in two specific ways. First,
if we accept that much of Marx’s critique of capitalism remains relevant and that class
conflict endures, we can recognize that contemporary workers are also alienated and
exploited and could reasonably be expected to be motivated towards engaging in
misbehaviour in the face of a system of production which does not serve their best
interests. Second, if one were to instead argue that class conflict no longer exists – or is
at least greatly diminished – one might be inclined to perceive alienation and exploitation
as being in decline and individuals’ dissatisfaction with work largely traceable to external
factors unrelated to class – such as bureaucracy, mass production or poor management
(Adler, 1999; Ashforth, 1994; Matheson, 2007; Sanders, 1997; Sarros et al., 2002).
From this second perspective, a decrease in direct confrontation in the workplace, and the
conspicuous lack of the revolution predicted by Marx, might be portrayed as evidence of
a new alignment of worker and owner interests within the capitalist workplace. We can
understand this perspective as being generally in line with the premature declaration of
the end of class conflict, the triumph of the capitalist model of progress and the rise of the
classless society – viewpoints which came to political prominence with the Thatcherism
of 1990s and Fukuyama’s declaration of the end of history (Blair, 1999; Fukuyama, 1989,
1992A, 1992B; Kingston, 2000; Oakley, 1990; Thatcher, 1992).
However, in response to general acceptance – or habituation – to the ideologies of
capitalism and sustained efforts to discredit class as a useful unit for social analysis,
numerous scholars have illustrated how the line of exploitation and alienation – originally
outlined by Marx – has continued unbroken into the present – and perhaps even
intensified (Adonis & Pollard, 1997; McGlynn, 2016; O’Donohue & Nelson, 2014; Rosa,
2010).
Even with the expansion in popularity of the human resource style of management and
various participatory and enculturation schemes, the alienation and exploitation of
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workers remains prevalent. Many workers still find themselves confronted by more
traditional managerial regimes and – even for those who do find themselves invited into a
more participatory role in the organization of production – the reality is often
underwhelming: Worker input is too often restricted to a limited range of topics or
perspectives predetermined by management to be complementary of established
organizational goals (Talwar, 2002; Vallas, 2003, 2006). Even where participatory
strategies appear successful and employees come to identify with their work organization,
it does not automatically follow that this extra commitment is always in the worker’s best
interest – external exploitation can easily be replaced with self-exploitation, overwork
and peer-pressure (Hodson, 2001; Rinehart, 2006). Now, this is not to say that all worker
participation programs must necessarily result in failure or further intensification of
alienation and exploitation – where a rhetoric of empowerment or inclusion is backed up
by substantive structural changes, workers may come to see significant improvement in
working conditions (Poole, 1978).
The body of literature critiquing the popular narratives of the classless society and the
new harmonious work relations of advanced capitalism is extensive – we have cited only
a portion of it above – but it should be clear that the study of workplace misbehaviour has
been greatly informed by this scholarly work.

1.2.3

Pitfalls in Misbehaviour Research

The study of misbehaviour as a structurally-derived phenomenon is in part a
contradiction of perspectives like the following: ‘[v]irtually all available evidence
indicates that actual behaviour is orderly and purposeful, and appears to support the goals
of the organization’ (Luthans, 1972). This normative assumption of compliance is
widespread, to the extent that the common admonishment ‘to behave one’s self’ is
synonymous with being told to obey (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999). Working from the
assumption of general employee compliance has led some to pathologize workplace
misbehaviour as originating from a small group made up of staunch anti-authoritarians
(Leavitt, 1973) and the unreasonable or criminal (Wilson & Rosenfield, 1990).
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There is a well-established history within the literature of looking toward individual
deficiency and weakness of character as explanations for employee misbehaviour. This
perspective persists in the academic realm but thrives within the workplace as a popular
assumption among managers and employers that the misbehaving individual is
necessarily ignorant, undeveloped or undisciplined in some manner (Analoui, 1995;
Edwards et al., 1995). There is much talk of a lack of discipline, but some authors have
added additional layers to the pathological theory of misbehaviour by incorporating
explanatory concepts like “emotional intelligence” (Lee & Ok, 2014). The implication of
this research being that the misbehaving employee is underdeveloped or perhaps less
evolved in a manner that makes it difficult for them to engage in harmonious work
relations (Bibi, 2013). Still others have discussed misbehaviour as the result of moral
failings and ‘ethical misconduct’ on the part of the employee (Henle et al., 2010).
In more extreme accounts, misbehaviour is sometimes even defined as anti-social and a
manifestation of destructive, aggressive and violent impulses born out of unconscious
mental disturbances (Giacalone & Rosenfield, 1987; Kets de Vries, 2017). This view of
misbehaviour as violence has been widely publicized in the past, and Giesberg (2001)
explains how American media coverage of sabotage as a form of violence has served to
discredit it as a legitimate tactic that could be used by organized labour. Finally, while
some have gone as far as to compare sabotage to homicide (Laabs et al., 1999), it will not
surprise the reader to hear that this perspective represents only a fringe element within the
literature on organizational misbehaviour.
Those familiar with the counterproductive work behaviour (CWB) literature may already
be familiar with efforts to explain the phenomenon of organizational misbehavior through
the individual characteristics of the employees who engage in it. A major current within
the CWB literature makes use of the Five-Factor Model of Personality to document how
the individual characteristics of conscientiousness, agreeableness and emotional stability
correspond with a lower likelihood of counterproductive work behavior (Berry et al.,
2007; Berry et al., 2012; Jensen & Patell, 2011) – counterproductive work behavior here
being defined as ‘deliberate actions that harm the organization or its members’ (O’Boyle
et al., 2011). Much of this work is valuable and interesting and a number of the studies in
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this area provide us with useful quantitative results for identifying individual
predisposition towards counterproductive work behavior which – considering the
similarity between the phenomena of CWB and organizational misbehavior – can also
contribute to a more complete scientific understanding of the latter. However, the main
weakness in the CWB literature surrounds its characteristic focus on only individual
explanations, with very limited effort to include structural factors. Contemporary
additions to the CWB literature suggest this trend is likely to continue, with recent
explorations of the phenomenon focusing on either the interactional and mediational
effects of Five-Factor Model personality traits (Hofstee et al., 1992; Hogan et al., 1996;
Jensen & Patel, 2011; Sackett & DeVore, 2001; Witt, 2002; Zaccario, 2007) or
incorporating other individual psychological concepts – such as the dark triad of
Machiavellianism, narcissism and psychopathy – into the CWB literature (Cohen, 2016;
Kish-Gephart et al., 2010; O’Boyle et al., 2012). This primary emphasis on individuallevel explanations – though not exclusive (Hershcovis et al., 2007; O’Boyle et al., 2011;
O’Boyle et al., 2012) – can be easily understood in the context of the traditional scientific
purview of psychology. However, the general failure to control for relevant structural
measures makes for significant validity issues and provides little indication of the actual
explanatory power of the personality traits predictors favored by CWB researchers
compared to any other potential motivators. Until this field of scientific research
incorporates a greater awareness of the structural motivators towards CWB, it is likely
that the chief contributions of this work will be limited to the provision of new employeescreening techniques for interested managers/employers.
Now, while many, unlike those referenced above, succeed at avoiding the trap of
individualizing and pathologizing misbehaviour, another theoretical misstep to be
avoided concerns the overestimation of the effectiveness of new managerial initiatives
aimed at incorporating the modern worker into the work organization and rendering her
compliant to its aims.
A particularly popular turn in the human resource and organizational behaviour literature
is to focus on developing corporate culture in such a way as to foster high commitment
from employees towards organizational interests (Barker, 1999; Casey, 1999). It is
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common within this literature to argue that employee misbehaviour and resistance have
largely been eliminated through the process of corporate enculturation (Frenkel et al.,
1998). Combining this focus on fostering organizational commitment with more
traditional management techniques is thought to have resulted in the rise of a successful
new managerial regime based on the twin pillars of ‘fun and surveillance’ (Kinnie et al.,
2000). Under this ‘fun and surveillance’ model of management, the typical worker is
portrayed as primarily content with her lot and comfortably invested in organizational
interests, while the misbehaving worker is cast as an exception explained either by
pathological deviance or by a breakdown in effective communication between
management and employees (DiBattista, 1991, 1996; Giesberg, 2001).
Perspectives on misbehaviour such as those above rest heavily on the assumption that the
workplaces of today are generally free of class antagonism, alienation and exploitation,
so we should remain suspicious of any premature celebration of modern working
conditions.

1.2.4

Neo-Marxist Lessons on Contemporary Work

Though the realities of the contemporary workplace are very different to those
experienced by the factory workers of the 1800s, the structural foundations of class
inequality and derived motivations toward misbehaviour endure into the present. It has
been the constant task of more than the few referenced here to remind the wider
community of the relevance of a structural approach informed by Marxist theory to the
study of contemporary workplace phenomena (Ackroyd, 2015; Ackroyd & Thompson,
1999; Braverman, 1974; Burawoy, 1979; Hodson, 1995, 2001; Rinehart, 2006;
Thompson, 2016). What follows is an outline of some of the major contributions of a
neo-Marxist approach towards improving our theoretical understanding of contemporary
work.
Faced by the popular conflation of technological innovation in production with the
liberation of the worker, it is necessary to remind ourselves that technological
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development should never be understood as taking place within a vacuum and that the
direction and pace of technological development is determined by the dominant social
currents of the time. If we do not keep this social-technological connection in mind, we
risk technological determination and the denial of human agency.
In any social system, substantial technological development will make the labour process
more efficient but, under capitalism, machinery is also set to the task of exploiting the
worker and separating her from control over her own labour – except in those
circumstances where expanding worker discretion will result in increased profitability
and productivity (Braverman, 1974; Noble, 1986; Rinehart, 2006).
Technology, as a tool which is developed in concert with human society, contains a wide
range of possibilities. However, technological development as the actual process by
which a potential technology is brought into reality is not neutral and is guided by
dominant interests. In contemporary times, the general direction of technological
development is determined by the imperatives of the capitalist organization of society and
is directed towards further improving the position of the economic elite and other
powerful interest groups (Braverman, 1974; Chun et al., 2010; Goldhaber, 1986; Kraemer
& King, 2006; Mergel et al., 2009).
Instead of granting the labourer a shorter work day or freedom from drudgery,
advancements in efficiency are channeled into efforts to increase the amount of surplus
value that can be extracted from her and divesting her of what little control she has over
the production process. In this context, it is not hard to understand why workers of the
past and present have sometimes expressed their discontent with degraded working
conditions by attacking the very machinery which is instrumental to their exploitation –
the Luddites are probably the most famous example of this behaviour (Fox, 2002; Sale,
1996). In the future, it may be possible to harness the latent possibilities within human
technology in the service of the true liberation of the worker – or to aid in combatting the
threat of climate change – but this moment in history yet eludes us and cannot be
expected to arrive spontaneously.
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Continuing our comparison of the capitalist production of today with that of the past, it
behooves us to emphasize that – while the typical workplace of the advanced capitalist
world is often assumed to be qualitatively different from the shop floors central to Marx’s
original critique – the assembly lines have not disappeared. Corporations have extended
assembly-line labour processes into the service sector and moved manufacturing plants
overseas, in order to exploit new pools of cheap and insecure labour power provided by a
global labour force fragmented by the national boundaries which capital crosses with
relative ease (Bieler et al, 2008; Robin-Olivier, 2012).
While the character of modern capitalism is distinctly international, it has primarily been
the labourers residing within the wealthiest nations which have benefited from any
improvement to working conditions derived from the advent of late capitalism. In
addition, even these limited advantages gained by the privileged workers of advanced
industrialized nations may have been overstated: While the turn towards office work at
first appeared to offer knowledge workers a sanctuary from the alienation and
exploitation of the shop floor, this new reality of work was only temporary, as further
rationalization of the office quickly reversed these circumstances (Braverman, 1974).
The distinction between the mental work of the office and the manual work of the factory
has broken down as management increasingly takes on the role of administrating all
intellectual processes required for production and office workers are increasingly
confronted by routinized, rationalized and alienating work (Braverman, 1974;
Livingstone & Watts, 2018; Rinehart, 2006). It is worth remembering the revulsion
displayed by the workers of the past when confronted by the reality of a life working on
the assembly line: Their reaction was a natural resentment towards the alienation of work
under capitalism. This resentment remains present, even as the advance of capitalist
hegemony casts any alternative methods for organizing human production as unrealistic
pipe dreams and can reappear wherever it finds traction – often in the form of employee
misbehaviour (Braverman, 1974).
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1.2.5

Basis for a Structural Perspective on Misbehaviour

As outlined above, treating the misbehaving worker as deviant, criminal or at least
atypical can lead to major theoretical oversights – such as the mistaken assumptions that
misbehaviour is not widespread or that it is only engaged in by a minority. Such a
perspective on misbehaviour offers little more than the dismissal of misbehaving workers
and the adoption of new surveillance and social control strategies. There is no
recognition of – or effort to rectify – the structural circumstances which contribute
toward an individual’s decision to misbehave.
It is only by reconnecting our study of misbehaviour with an appreciation of the
structurally-derived conflicts of interest present within the workplace that we can move
forward to a better understanding of the phenomenon: “Recent attempts to unravel the
nature of sabotage have taken a broader and more realistic view – one which sees conflict
as related to clashes of interests and values at work and which is an important index of
underlying industrial conflict…a contemporary example of neglected grass roots action”
(Analoui, 1995, p. 3).
By acknowledging the fundamental conflict of interests between employees and
employers, we emphasize the important structural determinants of misbehaviour and
develop a frame through which misbehaviour might come to be recognized as a potential
form of resistance. More than a few authors have characterized misbehaviour in the
workplace in this manner, demonstrating how workplace conflict continues to be located
surrounding issues of the employment relationship – the amount of pay, the amount and
intensity of work – the effort bargain – or control over the labour process (Ackroyd &
Thompson, 1999; Analoui, 1995; Courpasson, 2016; Dundon & van den Broek, 2015;
Edwards & Scullion, 1982; Hodson, 1995, 2001; Karlsson, 2012; Lawrence & Robinson,
2007; Mulholland, 2004; Thompson, 2015). This developing focus on misbehaviour for
its potential as worker resistance runs the gamut of a variety of types of misbehaviour,
from cynical joking and withholding effort to destruction of company property and
sabotage. Whether each of these forms of misbehaviour is equally deserving of an
association with resistance is a question examined in a later section, but it is sufficient
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here to note that much of misbehaviour will function as resistance – by undermining
efforts to organize work in a way that violates worker interests and by reducing the
absolute effort expended in the production of profit for the owner (Hodson, 1995;
Mulholland, 2004).

1.2.6

For Justice and Autonomy

Even from a recognition of the association between class conflict and misbehaviour, the
task remains of determining the specific conditions under which misbehaviour is likely to
take place. Correspondingly, much of the literature on misbehaviour has been committed
to narrowing down the circumstances which are most likely to give rise to it.
DiBattista (1996) focuses on how the hierarchical structure of many organizations
facilitates a culture whereby thinking is done by those at the top and those at the bottom
are expected only to follow orders. Others have emphasized how the particular form of
power that is exercised within an organization (influence, force, discipline or domination)
can help to predict the amount and type of misbehaviour engaged in by employees
(political, personal aggression, work limitation or theft) (Lawrence & Robinson, 2007).
Still others have highlighted the importance of looking at the presence (or absence) of a
union in the workplace and its relative strength and influence (Dundon & van den Broek,
2015; Fleming & Sewell, 2002; Hartt, Mills & Mills, 2015). However, the most relevant
current within the misbehaviour literature – at least for our purposes – is concerned with
how the phenomenon of misbehaviour is linked to worker autonomy and the injustice
experienced by them within the workplace.
Worker autonomy is a variable included in much of the research on employee
misbehaviour and is frequently identified as a – if not the – central variable for
understanding the prevalence of misbehaviour within any given organization (Ackroyd &
Thompson, 1999; Ambrose et al., 2002; Analoui, 1995; Ang & Koslow, 2015; DiBattista,
1996; Fleming & Sewell, 2002; Lawrence & Robinson, 2007; Paulson, 2014). These
theorists identify autonomy as an important requirement for an individual to experience
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their work as meaningful and misbehaviour as a likely result whenever autonomy is
threatened or managerial control is perceived as excessive. The desire of the worker to
be meaningfully engaged in the labour process as an active agent runs deep and cannot be
satisfied by the relatively shallow employee-engagement strategies often encouraged by
the human resource style of management – for example, employee feedback systems
functionally limited to topics of relative insignificance or those deemed appropriate by
management (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1995; DiBattisita, 1996; Edwards et al., 1995;
Mulholland, 2004).
The second most important motivation towards misbehaviour is the experience of
injustice in the workplace (Edwards et al., 1995; Folger, 1993; Sheppard et al., 1992).
The theory here goes that ‘the motivation to redress violations of moral norms indeed
triggers retaliatory tendencies… [towards misbehaviour]’ (Skarlicki et al., 2008). In this
way, misbehaviour functions as a method of retaking one’s dignity in the face of
whatever source of injustice is present within the workplace (Skarlicki et al., 1999;
Skarlicki et al., 2008). And it appears that employees are mostly accurate in directing
their misbehaviour only towards the source of the perceived injustice: Collateral damage
would undermine the legitimacy of the act of misbehaviour (Paulsen, 2014) or increase
the psychological cost of performing the retaliatory action for the individual – who most
often prefers to act positively at work (Hodson, 2001).
Some amount of the injustice experienced within the workplace is a result of
interpersonal conflict not necessarily related to the unequal exercise of power. The poor
treatment of service personnel by belligerent customers is one good example of such nonstructural interpersonal injustice. In these cases, employees will be more inclined
towards retaliatory misbehaviour directed towards a specific offending customer – though
this misbehaviour may become endemic if mistreatment by customers is routine (Ang &
Koslow, 2015; Ferris, 2012; Harris & Ogbonna, 2006; Skarlicki et al., 2008).
On the other hand, much of the injustice experienced by workers is linked to the exercise
of power over them and it follows that much of the retaliatory misbehaviour undertaken
by employees will be directed towards management and employers (Hodson, 1995;

16

Karlsson, 2012; Lawrence & Robinson, 2007; Skarlicki et al., 1999). In fact, some of the
most commonly cited sources of injustice are bad bosses, unethical companies and hostile
work environments (Paulsen, 2014).
In a fascinating study of sabotage by Ambrose, Seabright and Schminke (2002), the
authors provide evidence for several important claims about retaliatory misbehaviour in
general – and sabotage more specifically. First, it was discovered that perceived injustice
wields considerable explanatory power with regards to employee misbehaviour and is
perhaps the most common cause of sabotage (Ambrose et al., 2002). Second, the source
of injustice and the target of sabotage is most frequently the same, but the type of
misbehaviour – retaliatory or equity focused – may differ based on the source of
unfairness (interactional or distributive injustice) (Ambrose et al., 2002). Finally,
Ambrose and colleagues determined that sabotage increased in intensity in situations of
greater organizational injustice and that a combination of different forms of injustice
increased the intensity of sabotage even further (2002).
So far, we have discussed autonomy and justice separately in terms of their relationship
with employee misbehaviour, but these variables are frequently brought together as
primary prerequisites of meaningful labour or the ability to work with dignity (Hodson,
2001; Karlsson, 2012; Marx, 1844; Rinehart, 2006). Employees’ need for autonomy and
fairness are of central importance in attaining a more complete understanding of
workplace misbehaviour, and the frustration of either of the former should be expected to
consistently lead to an increase in the latter (Lawrence & Robinson, 2007).

1.2.7

Innovation and the Dialectic of Employee Misbehaviour and
Managerial Control

In the previous section, we have explored how the need for autonomy and fairness relates
to employee misbehaviour, but this section introduces the dynamic interaction between
the actions of management and the misbehaviour of employees.
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In any work organization, managers have numerous options of how to deal with
misbehaviour and their chosen strategy for doing so will shape how employees decide to
misbehave. Because misbehaviour does not take place in a vacuum, it should not come
as a surprise that the sort of misbehaviour expressed in a particular organization can be
related to the character of the managerial regime: Every organization features a set of
unique strengths, weaknesses and organizational contradictions which incentivise the
deployment of particular types of misbehaviour (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Edwards,
1979; Hodson, 2001; Mulholland, 2004). For example, it has been argued that where the
managerial strategy of technical control exists, misbehaviour will tend to take forms such
as playing dumb, restricting output, being late or absent and work avoidance to best
challenge management’s efforts to regulate work intensity and duration (Hodson, 1995).
However, it is important not to overstate the influence of management in determining the
expression of misbehaviour: Workers are creative and always capable of innovating new
methods of misbehaving which cannot effectively be contained or controlled by the
established managerial regime (Ackroyd, 2015; Burawoy, 1979; Mulholland, 2004; Vaz,
1984). A typical managerial response to employee misbehaviour is the implementation
of new policies to crack down on the particular form of misbehaviour which has become
most threatening but, once again, employees are ever capable of innovating new ways of
misbehaving which evade the controls put forth by the new strategies of management. In
workplaces where employees are particularly skilled at finding new ways to misbehave or
where past managerial initiatives have been unsuccessful, management can seem almost
schizophrenic in its attempts to control misbehaviour – jumping back and forth from
coercive strategies to those of seduction or enculturation (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999;
Edwards et al, 1995).
Now, it is not a necessity that management move against every form of misbehaviour and
often it is tolerated for a time – particularly if it is not challenging managerial authority,
reducing productivity or if the costs of curtailing the misbehaviour are considered
prohibitive (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999). However, management, in its controlling role
over the labour process, decision-making, organizational initiatives and general working
conditions, will be inclined to move against any misbehaviour that weakens its authority
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or damages profitability sufficiently to raise the ire of the owners. And so, with these
processes, we can perceive a dialectic emerge in the actions and reactions of employees
and managers as both groups act to advance their interests – or undermine those of the
other group (Ackroyd, 2015; Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Dundon & van den Broek,
2015; Edwards et al., 1995; Thompson, 2015).

1.2.8

The Missing Phenomenon of Employer Misbehaviour

Until this point, we have focused primarily on the misbehaviour of employees, with some
mention of how customers and managers can misbehave. But what remains absent from
our discussion – and from the literature at large – is an examination of employer
misbehaviour.
One area in which the misbehaviour literature is expanding to include employers is by
recent attempts to merge the misbehaviour and entrepreneurship literatures (Barnes &
Taksa, 2012; Lundmark & Westelius, 2015; Webb et al., 2009). This work has linked the
two concepts by focusing on misbehaviour as the violation of normative expectations in
the pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunity. Entrepreneurial activity is not fully restrained
by the boundaries of normative or legal institutions and employers will often cross these
boundaries in the pursuit of their “vision” – usually personal or organizational gain
(Lundmark & Westelius, 2015; Robinson & Bennett, 1995). This work is very
promising, but the topic of employer misbehaviour still remains relatively unexplored.
Below, we attempt to provide some explanation for this gap in the literature.
We should start here by acknowledging how the hegemony of capitalist logic influences
perceptions of misbehaviour in such a manner that the resistant actions of employees
against injustice and to expand autonomy (working with dignity) comes to be discredited
as anti-social, irrational or criminal, while efforts by management and employers that
intensify exploitation and alienation – typically in the guise of organizational efficiency –
is perceived as normal and appropriate organizational behaviour. The normalization of
capitalist imperatives towards profit maximization and competition presents the
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degradation of work life as a necessary component of the production process – regrettable
perhaps, but with no viable alternatives. It will likely come as no surprise to the reader
that the character of the dominant ideology will significantly influence the popular
determination of what constitutes misbehaviour (Contu, 2008; Fleming & Sewell, 2002;
Hartt et al, 2015), nor is it surprising that those who are economically dominant also
wield considerable ideological influence and political clout (Braverman, 1974; Burawoy,
1979; Marx & Engels, 1846). And so, the actions of employers are already less likely to
be defined as misbehaviour because of the privileges of their ownership and the unity of
their actions with wider capitalist norms.
One particularly obvious example of the relationship between ideology and misbehaviour
comes in the discussion of time theft or time banditry – defined as the unethical or
counterproductive involvement of the individual in non-work activities during paid work
time (Atkinson, 2006; Brock et al., 2013; Brock Baskin et al., 2017; Henle et al., 2010).
This type of misbehaviour is particularly reviled by employers and managers and doing
personal work on company time is sometimes viewed as tantamount to sabotage – in fact,
Ron DiBattista (1996) included personal work on his sabotage event list. What is left
unsaid – and taken-for-granted – in this conceptualization of time theft is the capitalist
definition of a fair day’s work as the maximum amount of effort that a labourer is capable
of outputting during her shift (Braverman, 1974; Taylor, 1911). Though it makes just as
much sense to define a fair day’s work as the amount of effort required to add value to
the product equivalent to the worker’s wages, accommodation to the logic of capital
accumulation and the primacy of the profit motive will cause many to instinctually recoil
at such a suggested alternative. Therefore, the ideological definition of misbehaviour
results in the questionable acts of employers being less likely to be defined as
misbehaviour. However, there are at least two additional reasons why employer
misbehaviour is difficult to detect.
First, many employers are not physically present within the modern workplace. By
contrast, in the early days of capitalism, the role of manager and owner were most often
located within the same person (Braverman, 1974; Zeitlin, 1989). In those
circumstances, it was much easier to assign blame and connect the actions of the
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individual misbehaving owner to the resulting outcome. However, in advanced capitalist
society, the corporation has taken over the role of capitalist from the individual owner,
while managerial duties are now primarily fulfilled by a new labour elite (Braverman,
1974; Fleming & Sewell, 2002; Zeitlin, 1989). In contemporary times, even if the results
of employer misbehaviour are felt within the workplace, it is rare to assign blame to
absent owners – instead, on-site hired management are routinely scapegoated (Ackroyd,
2015; Lundmark & Westelius, 2015). Additionally, the advantages of ownership are
such that employees might even be perceived to be engaging in sabotage by reporting the
misbehaviour of their employers to their occupational health and safety or union
representative – as it is not uncommon for the act of whistleblowing to be regarded
negatively as a form of misbehaviour (Ackroyd, 2015; Bigoni et al., 2012; DiBattista,
1996; Jackall, 2010).
In this manner, the structure of contemporary capitalist production protects employers
from having their actions defined as misbehaviour, but this protection also extends into
the legal realm: The nature of the limited liability corporation makes it difficult to assign
culpability to any of the – possibly thousands of – shareholders who may have little
individual input on organizational decisions (Gilson & Gordon, 2003; Gobert & Punch,
2003; Lamb, 2012; Peston, 2012; Punch, 1995). However, the corporation also benefits
from unique legal protections not afforded to most human individuals which make the
punishment of employer misbehaviour incredibly difficult.
First, criminal law tends to focus on the prerequisites of individual responsibility and
intent to commit the crime – both of which are made harder to prove due to the protection
from liability that the corporate entity provides for its controlling executives and large
shareholders (Dominoes Pizza, 2006; Edwards et al., 2014; Fisse & Braithwaite, 1993;
Greenfield, 2006; Lamb, 2012; Wells, 2001).
Second, companies are regulated by a separate set of laws and enforcement agents as
compared to those of criminal law and police enforcement. Instead, they are regulated by
civil and administrative law and civilian inspectors, many of whom have a close
relationship with the industries they are expected to keep watch on and the tendency to
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see themselves more as advisors or educators, rather than serious investigators (Barkan,
2013; Gobert & Punch, 2003; Greenfield, 2006).
Third, the complicated nature of a corporate prosecution makes it harder to find jury
members capable of following every legal intricacy – a difficulty compounded by the fact
that many judges come to be generalists because of the practical demands of their
position (Gobert & Punch, 2003).
Fourth, due to the concentration of capital within them, individual corporations and
coalitions of corporations are capable of mustering incredible resources to their defence.
As a result, they can effectively lobby against legislation that threatens their interests and,
if they are brought to court, they can often outmatch any prosecution in the courtroom
with a team of high-powered and specialized attorneys (Healy, 2014; Punch, 1995).
And finally, corporations have the option of voluntarily dissolving themselves,
significantly complicating the matters of effective prosecution, enforcement of
reparations or establishing ongoing liability (Lamb, 2012; Okla, 1927; Rice, 2010).
For all the reasons outlined above, it is difficult to detect and define the misbehaviour of
employers or hold them responsible for it – even when this misbehaviour is also illegal.
In this context, it is not difficult to understand why employers’ actions are frequently
excluded from the general misbehaviour literature or characterized as managerial
misbehaviour (Biggerstaff et al., 2015; Fisse & Braithwaite, 1993; Jackling et al., 2007;
Pacces, 2011; Shaban et al., 2017). Either way, serious discussion of the structural
factors related to employer misbehaviour remains almost entirely underdeveloped within
the organizational misbehaviour literature.
However, the literature on white-collar and corporate crime seems to offer a way back
into this discussion – by connecting instances of particularly egregious corporate violence
with the ruthless pursuit of profit characteristic of capitalism, a space can sometimes open
in the popular consciousness to discuss how employers are also capable of misbehaviour.
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1.2.9

Corporate Crime and Employer Misbehaviour

The destructive potential of systematic employer misbehaviour is considerable, and it is
people in the highest positions of power who cause the largest number of avoidable
injuries and deaths (Box, 1983; Punch, 1995). If we compare the statistics for victims of
street crime and corporate crime, the differences are staggering – and worth reproducing
here:
If we take the 19,000 deaths related to street crimes recorded by the
FBI in 1985, then we can compare that to the yearly total of victims of
'corporate crime and violence' in the USA…. Almost 800 Americans
die every day from cigarette-induced disease. Over the next 30 years,
240,000 people - 8,000 per year, one every hour - will die from
asbestos cancer. An estimated 85,000 American cotton textile workers
suffer breathing impairments due to cotton dust (brown lung) disease.
100,000 miners have been killed and 265,000 disabled due to coal-dust
(black lung) disease. Product-related accidents are said to cause
28,000 deaths and 130,000 serious injuries; there are annually 5.5
million injuries in the work place (of which 3.5 million require hospital
treatment); and some 100,000 deaths have been related to exposure to
dangerous chemicals and 390,000 deaths to occupational diseases. The
figures are staggering, and shocking, and these are only for one
country. On a world-wide scale, the amount of suffering and damage,
partly unavoidable but also partly avoidable, is immense, virtually
beyond measurement, and almost beyond comprehension (Punch, 1995,
p. 95).
Injury is endemic in Canadian workplaces. In 2012, there were
245,365 accepted workers’ compensation claims for injuries that
required time away from work as well as 977 claims for workplace
fatalities. These statistics significantly underreport the true level of
workplace injury by excluding injuries that did not require time away
from work, injuries to those outside the workers’ compensation system,
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and unreported injuries—which some studies put at 40 percent of all
injuries (Foster & Barnetson, 2017, p. 612).
Unfortunately, and despite the established historical record of corporate capacity for
violent crime, these tragedies of employer misbehaviour rarely result in a serious critique
of how the structure of the capitalist system gives rise to such destruction. However,
when a moment of corporate crime is well publicized – usually a result of extensive
damage to human life – and there is an obvious connection to profit-maximization and
corporate disregard for human life or the health of the environment, the true character of
employer misbehaviour is rendered clear.
A useful case study can be perceived in the sinking of the ferryboat Herald of Free
Enterprise in 1986, when the front-loading doors were left open upon departure from
port, resulting in the taking on of water, destabilization of the ship and the deaths of 197
passengers and crew. Though initial blame was placed at the feet of the crew member
who had forgotten to close the ferry doors, subsequent inquest revealed a culture of
corporate negligence where safety was regularly sacrificed for speed, convenience and
profit – in fact, requests by ferry captains for a device which would notify those on the
bridge about the status of the bow doors were repeatedly dismissed as too costly (Clarke,
1990; Pontell & Geis, 2007; Sheen, 1996). The calamity aboard the Herald of Free
Enterprise may have resulted in new maritime safety regulations, but the prosecution of
Townsend Thoresen for corporate manslaughter never went anywhere and the rebranding
of the organization as P&O European Ferries was quickly accomplished (Punch, 1995).
Instances of employer misbehaviour featuring a death toll are not necessarily the only
ones which receive media attention: The more common forms of employer misbehaviour
characterized by a failure to pay workers their earned wages or pensions are also
periodically covered – usually in the context of a large organization going under and
leaving numerous employees in the lurch. Several recent Canadian examples of this sort
of employer misbehaviour can be perceived in the 2016 closure of Ontario Goodwill
locations or the declaration of bankruptcy and liquidation of Sears Canada (Kopun, 2017;
McFarland & Gray, 2016).
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Conspicuous instances of employer misbehaviour provide for moments of awareness of
the existence of corporate malfeasance, but the fact that much of this misbehaviour comes
about as the result of the regular functioning of the capitalist organization is a point rarely
highlighted outside of the academic literature – with notable exceptions such as Bakan’s
The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Power and Profit (2004) and Nader’s
Unsafe at any speed: The designed-in dangers of the American automobile.
Nevertheless, there is a significant body of literature which challenges corporate
sovereignty and questions the professed ability of corporations to autonomously selfregulate and act ethically (Fisse & Braithwaite, 1993; Foster & Barnetson, 2017;
Mokhiber, 1988; Rhodes, 2016). These works are most important to understanding how
the structure of the for-profit corporation and its organizational priority of advancing the
economic interests of owners will often result in misbehaviour by employers.
What should now be clear is that there is an asymmetry between employee and employer
misbehaviour. This asymmetry is obvious in the motives of the different parties
involved, the perception of how common misbehaviour is, the character of the
misbehaviour engaged in, and the scale of disruption or destruction that can result. While
this asymmetry offers some obvious challenges in comparison between these types of
misbehaviour, the present situation whereby the study of employer misbehaviour is
largely forsaken represents a dangerous oversight.

1.2.10

The Ambiguous Position of Managers

At this point, we have focused on the difference between employee and employer
misbehaviour, but how do managers misbehave in the work organization? It is obvious
that managers also misbehave at work, but the general character of this misbehaviour can
be ambiguous. Often, the misbehaviour of managers can be understood as an extension
of employer misbehaviour performed as part of the manager’s duty to uphold the interests
of the owners. In this way, managers are often party to employer misbehaviour as the
latter’s agent within the workplace (Ackroyd, 2015; Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999;
Jackall, 2010). It is because of their role as the owner’s representative, that managers
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will often find themselves engaged with non-managerial employees in the dialectic of
misbehaviour and control explained in an earlier section.
However, managers do not always act as good stewards of the employer’s capital and can
also misbehave in a way that advances their own interests at the expense of both workers
and owners – for example, drawing wages unrelated to productivity, promoting
individuals unfairly or dividing work unfairly (Ackroyd, 2015; Barnes & Taksa, 2012;
DiBattista, 1996; Sayles & Smith, 2005).
Additionally, some managerial misbehaviour is probably better understood as an
extension of employee misbehaviour: Managers have the same need for autonomy and
dignity at work and may react similarly to employees when these are threatened
(Karlsson, 2012). This is particularly likely to be the case for those lower and middle
managers who are better understood as clerical workers engaged in the routine
administrative processes of organizational management and without significant personal
authority over organizational direction or policy-making (Braverman, 1974).
Unsurprisingly, this last type of managerial misbehaviour – which is very similar in
character to employee misbehaviour – is less likely to be engaged in by those managers
who identify strongly with employers or have a real chance of breaking into the upper
class – only true for a select few of the managerial elite (Zeitlin, 1989). However, it
could be that managerial misbehaviour will increasingly come to resemble that of nonmanagerial employees as the total number of managers continues to increase – diluting
their previously privileged control over the labour process – or if they begin to portray
economic attitudes similar to those of non-managerial employees (Livingstone & Watts,
2018).

1.2.11

Misbehaviour and Resistance

Multiple scholars of misbehaviour have suggested that there is an emerging trend away
from organized or formal resistance towards routine and informal resistance in the form
of covert misbehaviour by employees in the work organization (Ackroyd & Thompson,
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1999; Edwards et al., 1995; Fleming & Sewell, 2002; Hodson, 2001; Muholland, 2004;
Prasad, 2000; Thompson, 2016). The decline in influence of more formalized forms of
resistance – such as unions – is due to a variety of factors such as the decline in union
membership in the private sector, disagreements over the primary purpose of the union
and who should be included in the membership, and the added difficulties of reasserting a
discourse of workers’ rights perceived by many to be in ideological association with the
Soviet Union (Hartt et al, 2015). In reaction to the obstacles faced by traditional
formalized and organized resistance, employee misbehaviour has received greater focus
because of its potential to function as a more subtle and individual resistance against the
enduring contradictions of the capitalist system and new managerial initiatives of
normative control and enculturation.
Against the backdrop of a modern workplace commonly assumed to be characterized by
relatively harmonious industrial relations, we see that workers are engaging in a wide
variety of forms of misbehaviour – but how much of this misbehaviour should be
understood as resistance?
There are those who are very optimistic about the possibility for resistance contained
within misbehaviour. Not just focusing on the forms of misbehaviour most obviously
containing a component of resistance – like sabotage or output limitation – these scholars
have examined how even smaller acts of misbehaviour such as feigning ignorance,
loafing behind a veneer of false compliance, ironic and overexaggerated compliance with
rules and regulations – to the point of inefficiency – and cynical disengagement can
introduce significant disruption into a workplace and act as a way for workers to reassert
their own identities against corporate ideals (Baines, 2011; De Certeau, 1984; Fleming &
Sewell, 2002; Hodson, 2001; Mumby, 2005; Sotirin & Gottfried, 1999).
However, this optimism surrounding even the most seemingly innocuous forms of
misbehaviour has led others to question whether we have been too quick to attribute the
label of resistance to actions which offer relatively little threat to capitalist relations of
production (Contu, 2008; Paulsen, 2014; Prassad, 2008). One of the best examples of
this skeptical turn in the misbehaviour literature is contained in Contu’s work on ‘decaf
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resistance’: “These transgressive acts that we call ‘resistance’ are akin to a decaf
resistance, which changes very little. It is resistance without the risk of really changing
our ways of life or the subjects who live it” (2008, p. 367). The work of Contu and others
who problematize the connection between misbehaviour and resistance is particularly
useful in raising the question of whether these small acts of misbehaviour should instead
be understood as evidence of how capitalist power relations are truly effective – allowing
us to imagine ourselves as free-thinking and agentic individuals engaging in a ‘resistance’
that actually contains no significant potential for social change (Contu, 2008; Fleming,
2005; Fleming & Spicer, 2003; Paulsen, 2014).
While the misbehaviour-as-resistance debate is important – and ongoing – perhaps the
most important lesson we should take from it is a recognition that resistance is rarely pure
or authentic; rather, it is often ambiguous and complex and may contain some measure of
collusion or consent (Burawoy, 1979; Collinson, 1994; Edwards et al., 1995; Fleming &
Sewell, 2002; Kondo, 1990). An intriguing suggestion is to dispense with both the effort
to draw a line in the sand between authentic resistance and ‘decaf resistance’ and the
tendency to readily declare any minute deviation from the strict observance of capitalist
organizational standards as a revolutionary act. Therefore, it is probably most useful to
treat routine resistance as a local social product – requiring a closer study of how
individuals interact with their unique workplace settings, their specific intent and the
results of their actions – and appreciate how the same type of misbehaviour can be
regarded as relatively unthreatening mischief in one context and a significant act of
resistance in another (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Burawoy, 1979; Courpasson, 2016;
Dundon & van den Broek, 2015; Prasad, 2008).
However, even with our recognition that both the “resistance is everywhere” and
“resistance is nowhere” perspectives are lacking, we can make no meaningful evaluation
of resistance without a definition large enough to avoid reification and small enough that
we do not declare all misbehaviour as resistance. For these purposes, a good place to
start is the definition of resistance put forth by Paul Thompson: “[W]orkplace resistance
should be considered an intentional, active, upwardly-directed response to managerial
controls and appropriation of materials and symbolic resources” (2016, p. 118). This
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definition, as is, continues the trend in most previous research on organizational
misbehaviour of leaving employer misbehaviour outside the critical gaze. So, it is
necessary to make the addendum that workplace resistance is also an upwardly-directed
response against employer control or interests. This is a particularly important addition
as the actions of managers are most frequently in-line with and representative of
employer interests, and our understanding of the conflict between workers and managers
is incomplete without this recognition.

1.3 General Methodological Notes
1.3.1

Data

The data for this study on misbehaviour was gathered as a part of a larger national survey
project, titled “Changing Workplaces in a Knowledge Economy: Occupational Class
Structure, Skill Use and the Place of Professions in Canada”. Two workplace
misbehaviour items – employee and employer – were added to the 2016 version of the
survey specifically for use in this study and are not included in the datasets from previous
years. The other variables drawn upon were already present in the CWKE survey due to
its general focus on issues related to work in Canada.
This survey was administered by the Leger research and polling firm through telephone
and online questionnaires – beginning with a pilot phone survey in September 2015 – and
all interviews were completed by the end of March 2016. Respondents were selected
through random digit dialing (RDD) and simple random selection of respondents from
the Leger web panel (made up of approximately 475,000 members). In total, 1248
respondents were reached through telephone while the remaining 1779 sampled
respondents completed their interviews online. Our total sample is comprised of just over
three thousand respondents (N=3007) drawn from the Canadian population of adults
above 18 years of age who speak one of Canada’s official languages and reside in a
private home in one of Canada’s ten provinces (territories excluded). The sample was
also intended to include only employed individuals and those temporarily absent from
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work (ex. parental leave, vacation, etc.), but 28 unemployed individuals were erroneously
included. After removing these unemployed individuals, our final sample is comprised of
2,979 employed Canadians. For the telephone portion of the survey, the response rate
was approximately 33%, while the online portion had a response rate of 65%: This
resulted in an overall response rate of 52% (for further information on response rate,
please see Appendix 1). The survey data have been weighted using information from the
2016 Labour Force Survey on region, age, sex and educational attainment. Our dataset is
nationally representative, allowing us to study the general phenomenon of misbehaviour
as manifested within the workplaces of Canada and facilitating accurate comparison of
different segments of the labour force. This dataset is utilized for the entirety of the
analyses that follow.
One common limitation with survey data collected from web panels is underrepresentation of those without access to the internet (or limited access) and those who
are less-skilled in internet use. A second limitation of web panels is that they are often
susceptible to self-selection bias. These limitations represent a potential source of error
for the 1779 respondents selected from the Leger web panel. However, the Leger
Research and Intelligence Group have taken a number of efforts to increase the quality of
their web panel and guard against these limitations which are worth mentioning here:
1) 60% of the panel of 475,000 individuals are recruited by phone using RDD (The
majority of the rest are recruited through referrals – 25%).
2) The panel is monitored using email verification, digital fingerprinting, quality
checks and illogical response detection to remove inactive users, cheaters or
“speeders” (those who rush through filling out a survey without comprehension of
questions).
3) Respondents for this survey were selected at random from the larger Leger web
panel.
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1.3.2

Practical Issues Related to the Study of Organizational
Misbehaviour

There are two main characteristics of workplace misbehaviour which complicate any
study of the phenomenon. First, workplace misbehaviour – by the very definition of it as
such – will always be accompanied by some manner of negative connotations. Where the
activities associated with workplace misbehaviour are not illegal, they are usually at least
frowned upon – if it were otherwise, they would not be perceived of as misbehaviour,
after all. Even when an individual does not perceive her own actions as constituting
misbehaviour, an appreciation for the fact that others may view the matter differently
may cause her to take measures towards hiding evidence of her involvement in
questionable practices. As a result, any study of misbehaviour is faced by the usual
challenges of research into behaviour widely perceived as deviant or undesirable and
requires the addressing of significant ethical considerations and guaranteed protection of
the respondent.
Faced with these challenges, much of the study of misbehaviour has taken the form of
participant observation with reasonable effort taken to conceal the identity of the
involved parties. Participant observation is particularly useful for demonstrating how the
expression of misbehaviour is associated with the unique factors and social dynamics
present within every workplace, but there are obvious complications with connecting
these findings with a more generalizable understanding of the phenomenon.
In the present study, we chose a different methodological approach for dealing with the
ethical and practical challenges of studying misbehaviour by requesting only that
respondents report their evaluation of the overall frequency of misbehaviour in their
workplace – not necessarily including any misbehaviour engaged in by them. An
obvious benefit of this approach is to provide protection for respondents and encourage
them to answer truthfully – granting them deniability as well as anonymity. A drawback
of our approach is that we cannot know how much of the misbehaviour reported by the
respondent is also carried out by them, though it is reasonable to assume that our
measures of the frequency of misbehaviour within a respondent’s workplace and a
hypothetical measure of the respondent’s own misbehaviour might be associated. Our
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decision to rely exclusively on survey data allows us to make inferences about the extent
of the phenomenon in Canadian workplaces but does prevent us from a deeper
understanding of organizational misbehavior which might be provided by qualitative
methods.
The second characteristic of misbehaviour that needs to be acknowledged in the context
of our methodological approach is the element of subjectivity contained within our
measures of misbehaviour. This is not an issue unique to the present study, as any
research utilizing data reported by human subjects will contain some reporting error, but
this issue is likely compounded by differences in individual definitions of what
constitutes misbehaviour. While we expect that our respondents are generally accurate in
their evaluation of the frequency of misbehaviour within their workplace, it is undeniable
that these reports will be coloured by their own subjectivity and the availability of
evidence of misbehaviour, some of which will be hidden from them. We acknowledge
that fact here and move forward with the understanding that this is an inherent limitation
of our decision to study misbehaviour in general – instead of limiting ourselves to one or
more specific manifestations of the phenomenon.

1.3.3

Key Misbehaviour Variables

Our study is concerned with perceptions of misbehavior frequency in the work
organization and we have two measures available for examining this phenomenon. Our
first measure concerns the most often studied form of organizational misbehaviour –
employee misbehaviour. For this questionnaire item, respondents were asked the
following: “How common do you think employee misbehaviour such as taking
organization-owned materials or loafing on the job is in places like where you work?”
Responses were close-ended with options on a 4-point scale ranging from extremely
uncommon to extremely common. Two non-response categories were also available for
those who preferred not to answer or said they did not know – around 10% of all
respondents chose one of these non-response options.
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Our survey also contained a measure for employer misbehaviour. Respondents were
asked, “How common do you think employer misbehaviour such as not paying
employees some earned benefits or avoiding taxes on earnings is in places like where you
work?” and provided with the same four ordinal response options as for the employee
misbehaviour item. Once again, respondents had the ability to give the answers “I don’t
know” or “I prefer not to answer” and 13% of them chose to do so.
We conducted a non-response analysis for each of our key misbehaviour variables (See
Appendix 2 for detailed results). Self-employed respondents had significantly higher
odds of providing non-valid responses to each of these items compared to the comparison
category of service workers: They were 3.38 times more likely not to respond to our
employee misbehaviour item and 2.10 times more likely not to respond to the employer
misbehaviour item. Female respondents (1.64) also had higher odds of nonresponse to
the employee variable compared with male respondents. The rest of the significant
results of our non-response analyses concerned only the employer misbehaviour item.
Higher respondent wealth increased the chance of valid response, with each unit increase
in the 15-point wealth variable corresponding with a 7% decrease in the odds of nonresponse. On the other hand, a higher respondent age suggested greater chance of nonresponse, with each extra year of life representing a 2% increase in the odds of nonresponse. Finally, highest level of education received played a role, as both the holders
of a non-university post-secondary certificate (.60) or a Bachelor’s degree (.58) had about
40% lower odds of non-response to our employer misbehaviour item, compared with the
reference category of those whose highest education is a high school diploma.

1.3.4

Conceptualization of Misbehaviour

The concept of misbehaviour utilized throughout the present study is that advanced by
Sprouse (1992) and Ackroyd and Thompson (1999) of organizational misbehaviour as
‘anything at work that you are not supposed to do’ (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999, p. 7).
There are two primary methodological justifications for why this conceptualization is
appropriate for our study.
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First, we think it is reasonable to suggest that this definition runs close to a layperson’s
understanding of workplace misbehaviour and the standpoint from which most
respondents would understand our questions as presented to them. Second, the
misbehaviour items available to us are not specific in identifying what behaviours
respondents should consider as misbehaviour. Aside from the examples included in the
questionnaire of taking organizational materials or loafing for employee misbehaviour
and not paying out earned benefits or avoiding taxes for employer misbehaviour, we
cannot make assumptions about which activities respondents perceive as examples of
employee or employer misbehavior. It might also be the case that respondents restricted
their answers to primarily those activities described by the examples and other types of
misbehavior (ex. sabotage) may be underreported. As a result, our misbehaviour items
provide us with a more diffuse measure of the phenomena of interest and it makes
methodological sense to make use of a general definition which can be expected to
encompass a diversity of perceptions on misbehaviour.

1.4 The Path Forward
This chapter has outlined the theoretical framework of this dissertation and covered a
number of general methodological notes. The following three chapters (2, 3 and 4)
contain our data analyses. Our fifth chapter brings together the results of the chapters
which precede it and concludes this dissertation.
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Chapter 2

2

Canadian Workers Misbehaving

2.1 Introduction
Individuals do not always follow the rules at work and the study of the organizational
misbehaviour of employees is concerned with expanding our understanding of why
workers engage in activities on the job that they are not supposed to do (Ackroyd &
Thompson, 1999; Burawoy, 1979; Sprouse, 1992).
The variety of practices understood as misbehaviour is extensive – ex. loafing on the job,
vandalism, absenteeism, sabotage, theft – and varies considerably based on one’s own
definition of proper behaviour, but it is increasingly clear that employee misbehaviour is
pervasive within contemporary workplaces. Several notable studies have estimated that
as many as 75% of all employees routinely engage in some form of misbehaviour
(Harper, 1990; Lawrence et al., 2007) with 90% of informants reporting it as an everyday
occurrence in their workplace (Harris & Ogbonna, 2002, 2006; Lee & Ok, 2014; Slora,
1989) and the average worker spending approximately two hours of her workday engaged
in activities unrelated to her paid work (Paulsen, 2014).
The aim of this study is to contribute a general study of perceptions of undifferentiated
employee misbehaviour that goes beyond individualistic accounts of the phenomenon and
illuminates class position, lack of autonomy and experiences of injustices as primary
explanatory variables. In doing so, we reconnect the already established currents within
the organizational misbehaviour literature surrounding issues of injustice and challenges
to autonomy with a Marxist appreciation of alienation as an enduring source of
dissatisfaction with work – and motivation towards employee misbehaviour – inherent to
the structure of the capitalist system.
A major contribution of this study is located within its provision of results representative
of the entire Canadian working population – the first study on employee misbehaviour to
do so, according to our knowledge. In fact, the lack of representative data sets in
misbehaviour research is not an issue limited to Canadian studies. Due to the negative
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connotations associated with employee misbehaviour and the difficulties associated with
definition and detection, many studies have opted for a qualitative approach focused on
intimate observation of the activities taking place in a single work organization – or
occasionally several (Ambrose et al., 2002; Brock et al., 2013; DiBattista, 1996;
Giacalone & Rosenfeld, 1987; Muholland, 2004; Shkoler & Tziner, 2017; Skarlicki et al.,
1999, 2008; Sprouse, 1992). These studies are interesting and informative – particularly
for their ability to illuminate the motives and varieties of employee misbehaviour – but
are limited in generalizability or comparison between diverse types of workers. Our
study addresses this general gap in the organizational misbehaviour literature.

2.2 Background
The activities defined as misbehaviour – and the types of misbehaviour most deserving of
attention – obviously differ by the interests and discipline of the individual researcher,
but there are still some dominant trends within the literature. Emphasizing employee
misbehaviour as a method of output restriction and re-appropriation by workers
(Amichai-Hamburger, 2003; Burawoy, 1979; Flynn, 1916; Roy, 1952; Taylor, 1911) is
one major trend that has contributed to a prioritizing of activities which are readily
understood in such a context, such as sabotage (Ambrose et al., 2002; Analoui, 1995;
Sprouse, 1992; Taylor & Walton, 1971) and pilferage/employee theft (Atkinson, 2006;
Brock et al., 2017; Greenberg, 1990, 1993; Henle et al., 2010; Hollinger & Clark, 1983).
This stream of research remains strong, but other new and interesting perspectives on
misbehaviour are expanding the range of activities coming under study: For example, the
conception of misbehaviour as a coping strategy for disaffected workers has brought
previously unacknowledged activities – clowning, cynical joking and gossip – into the
picture (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Contu, 2008; Fleming & Spicer, 2003; Noon &
Blyton, 2007; Noon & Delbridge, 1993; Taylor & Bain, 2003), while the growth of the
service industry has prompted understandable interest into the unique forms and
characteristics of service sabotage and a new appreciation of the workplace conflict
arising from the required interaction with belligerent or harassing customers (Ang &
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Koslow, 2015; Harris & Ogbonna, 2002, 2006; Hawkins, 1984; Lee & Ok, 2014;
Skarlicki et al., 2008).
Almost as numerous as the forms of employee misbehaviour are the diversity of
explanatory variables which have been explored, but these factors are generally aligned
with either an individual pathological approach to the phenomenon or one that
emphasizes the role of structural conditions present within the workplace.
Some of the individual explanatory factors that have received considerable attention in
the organizational misbehaviour literature are emotional intelligence (Bibi, 2013; Lee &
Ok, 2014), aggression or anti-social tendencies (Giacalone & Rosenfeld, 1987; Kets de
Vries, 2017) and ethical or moral immaturity (Henle et al., 2010). To some extent, there
will always be a limited number of cases of employee misbehaviour traceable to
individual pathology or interpersonal conflict. However, any approach to the study of
employee misbehaviour that prioritizes individual characteristics will advance an
incomplete understanding of the topic – and it is an unfortunate reality that pathological
explanations of employee misbehaviour remain popular among managers and other
policy-makers (Analoui, 1995; Edward et al., 1995).
Individualistic models of employee misbehaviour draw on a popular assumption of
general worker compliance in advanced industrial countries (Barker, 1999; Casey, 1999;
Frenkel et al., 1998; Kinnie et al., 2000; Luthans, 1972) and the mistaken belief that most
acts of misbehaviour are attributable to a small minority of “bad-apple” employees (Bibi,
2013; Henle et al., 2010; Kets de Vries, 2017; Laabs et al., 1999; Leavitt, 1973; Wilson &
Rosenfeld, 1990). However, it has become increasingly clear that the worker pathology
explanation of misbehaviour is untenable in the face of a wealth of evidence that suggests
these activities are ubiquitous and engaged in by numerous – if not the majority of –
workers (Harper, 1990; Harris & Ogbonna, 2002, 2006; Lawrence et al., 2007; Lee & Ok,
2014; Paulsen, 2014; Slora, 1989).
Correspondingly, the primary trend in the organizational misbehaviour literature has been
to approach the phenomenon as a rational reaction by individuals to the conditions of
their work environment. A variety of organizational characteristics has been highlighted
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as potential predictors of employee misbehaviour, but the structural factors which receive
the most attention are those which result in greater dissatisfaction and discontent for the
worker – feelings which, according to one source, may account for as many as 65% of all
cases of employee misbehaviour (Analoui, 1995). It should come as no surprise that the
most influential determinants of employee misbehaviour are also useful for measuring
degraded or dissatisfying working conditions – lack of autonomy and the experience of
injustice.

2.2.1

Autonomy

Worker autonomy is a variable included in much of the previous research on employee
misbehaviour (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Ambrose, 2002; Analoui, 1995; Ang &
Koslow, 2015; DiBattista, 1996; Fleming & Sewell, 2002; Lawrence & Robinson, 2007;
Paulson, 2014) and has received frequent attention as a prerequisite for satisfaction with
one’s work. The desire of the labourer to be meaningfully engaged in the labour process
as an active agent runs deep and – when this need is not satisfied – employees are more
motivated towards engaging in misbehaviour (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1995; DiBattista,
1996; Edwards et al., 1995; Mulholland, 2004).
Hypothesis 1: Respondents reporting more autonomy in their work will report less
employee misbehaviour in the workplace.

2.2.2

Injustice

Another key variable found to be associated with higher rates of employee misbehaviour
is the experience of injustice in the workplace. Here, the literature provides considerable
evidence of how ‘the motivation to redress violations of moral norms indeed triggers
retaliatory tendencies…’ (Skarlicki et al., 2008) and how misbehaviour can function as a
method of retaking one’s dignity in the face of whatever injustice is present within one’s
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workplace (Edwards et al., 1995; Folger, 1993; Folger & Skarlicki, 1998; Sheppard et al.,
1992; Skarlicki et al., 1999; Skarlicki et al., 2008).
It is true that some amount of the injustice experienced within the workplace will be the
result of interpersonal conflict not necessarily related to the structural characteristics of
the organization, but a great amount of the injustice experienced by workers can be
linked to causes endemic to the work organization – for instance, unethical operating
procedures and hostile or unsafe work environments (Hodson, 1995; Karlsson, 2012;
Lawrence & Robinson, 2007; Paulsen, 2014; Skarlicki et al., 1999).
Therefore, in accordance with the findings of previous studies, we expect to find that
greater injustice in the workplace will be accompanied with greater amounts of employee
misbehaviour (Ambrose et al., 2002; Baron & Neuman, 1996; Martinko & Zellars, 1998;
McLean Parks, 1997; McLean Parks & Kiddler, 1994).
Hypothesis 2: Respondents experiencing injustice at work will report more
employee misbehaviour.

2.2.3

Occupational Class

Writing before the establishment of organizational misbehaviour as a distinct area of
study, Marx’s work on exploitation and alienation of the wage labourer – inherent
contradictions of the capitalist system – remain relevant as factors explaining
contemporary dissatisfaction with work (Adonis & Pollard, 1997; Marx, 1844, 1867;
McGlynn, 2016; O’Donohue & Nelson, 2014; Rosa, 2010). It is evident that the majority
of contemporary workplace conflict continues to surround traditional issues related to
class antagonism – amount of pay, the amount and intensity of work and control over the
labour process (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Edwards & Scullion, 1982; Hodson, 1995,
2001; Karlsson, 2012; Lawrence & Robinson, 2007; Thompson, 2015).
A useful method for conceptualizing class in contemporary times is to emphasize the
individual’s occupational position within the relations of capitalist production
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(Livingstone & Scholtz, 2016; Livingstone & Watts, 2018; Wright, 1980). Taking this
perspective is particularly useful in recognizing and accounting for the reality that
workers can occupy a variety of class positions and may have interests in conflict with
other workers – that is, semi-autonomous workers may share some interests in common
with less privileged workers, but more closely align with the interests of employers on
other matters.
An approach to class based on occupational position offers a more nuanced
understanding of the diversity of interests represented within the employed population.
The distinctions between isolated groups of workers enabled by a focus on occupational
class is particularly useful for understanding the divergent experiences of workers in the
face of the developing knowledge economy in Canada – characterized by growth in the
service sector, a higher proportion of labourers attaining post-secondary education,
credential inflation and a growing number of jobs requiring specialized knowledge
(Adams, 2010; Livingstone, 2014; Livingstone & Guile, 2012). Without a recognition of
class divisions between employees, one risks making general assumptions about the
experience of work in contemporary society (see the professionalization of everyone vs.
proletarianization debate [Bell, 1976; Cotada, 1998; Haug, 1975; Larson, 1980;
Wilensky, 1964]). Our occupational class position variable (see Appendix 3 for
construction logic) allows us to compare how the unique working conditions faced by
different classes of employees can contribute to divergence in the amount of
organizational misbehaviour and explain why more privileged workers (professionals)
might be less motivated towards engaging in misbehaviour than those who are confronted
by less-desirable working conditions (industrial and service workers).
Hypothesis 3: Professional workers will report less employee misbehaviour than
service and industrial workers.
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2.2.4

Social Class

Although the focus of the class analysis presented in this paper surrounds occupational
class (outlined in the section above), we had some interest in exploring the relationship
between alternative conceptions of class and employee misbehaviour. Correspondingly,
we included two alternative measures for class in our study – one an objective wealth
measure and the other comprised of a subjective self-evaluation – with the intention to
interrogate whether either of these social class measures might have a unique relationship
with our dependent variable not already accounted for by the occupational class variable.
We expect that individuals of a lower social class are more likely to be exposed to the
degraded working conditions that often give rise to a greater frequency of employee
misbehaviour.
Hypothesis 4: Lower social class (objective economic and subjective evaluation) will
correlate with a greater amount of employee misbehaviour in the workplace.

2.3 Methodology
2.3.1

Data

The dataset for this study is made up of a subsample drawn from the larger Changing
Workplaces in a Knowledge Economy: Occupational Class Structure, Skill Use and the
Place of Professions in Canada (CWKE) 2016 sample of employed Canadians (N=2,979).
This survey focuses on examining issues surrounding work and lifelong learning and
respondents were selected through random digit dialing (RDD) and simple random
selection of respondents from a professional web panel of approximately 475,000
respondents maintained by the Leger Research Intelligence Group (see our general
methodology notes in chapter 1 for more information about our data). Our focus on nonmanagerial workers’ reporting of employee misbehaviour frequency necessitated the
removal of all employers and managers from our analytical sample. Using our 9category occupational class variable as a filter, we removed all large employers, small
employers, self-employed, upper managers, middle managers, supervisors and
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unclassified individuals from the data set. Our final analytic sample is made up of all the
employed respondents belonging to one of the three categories of non-managerial
employee: Professional employee, service worker and industrial worker. After the above
selection, we were left with 1,880 respondents (from a total sample of 2,979 working
individuals).

2.4 Measures
2.4.1

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable for the present analysis measures the most commonly studied
form of organizational misbehaviour – employee misbehaviour. The questionnaire item
associated with this variable requested that respondents answer the following: “How
common do you think employee misbehaviour such as taking organization-owned
materials or loafing on the job is in places like where you work?” The valid responses to
this question make up a 4-point Likert scale ranging from extremely uncommon to
extremely common, with fairly uncommon and fairly common as intermediary options
(See general methodological notes section in chapter 1 for more information about this
variable and Appendix 2 for a non-response analysis).

2.4.2
2.4.2.1

Independent Variables
Occupational Class

Our original occupational class variable was constructed using detailed job description
and job title information (See Appendix 3 for construction logic). After the selection of
only non-managerial employees for our analytical sample, we were left with a 3-category
occupational class variable: (1) professional employees, (2) service workers and (3)
industrial workers. We privilege occupational class over social class in these analyses
because of the former’s closer connection with the actual conditions that individuals
experience in their work as a result of their occupational position within the relations of
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capitalist production (Livingstone & Scholtz, 2016; Livingstone & Watts, 2018; Wright,
1980).
We also regard certain occupational classes as lower in the hierarchy of the relations of
production: Industrial and service workers are lower in the class order than both nonmanagerial professional employees and managerial employees. Within the managerial
hierarchy, we consider supervisors as lower in class position than middle managers, who
are themselves lower than upper managers. In the context of this study, we will often
refer to industrial and service workers as lower class and we do so in the context of their
relatively disadvantaged position in the relations of productions compared with other
employees.

2.4.2.2

Social Class

We utilized 2 measures to represent social class: Respondent total net wealth and
personal class identification. Our net wealth variable was originally presented to
respondents as a 15-point scale ranging from “less than $5,000” to “Above $10 million,”
but has since been reduced to only ten categories for ease of analysis and presentation.
Our second measure of social class – personal class identification – was selected to
complement our wealth measure with one which incorporated respondent subjectivity.
Our personal class identification variable was constructed by grouping together the
verbatim results of inquiry into what class respondents placed themselves. Respondents
were not limited in their answers, but most answers fit cleanly into one of five categories
used in the construction of our final personal class identification measure: (1) Poor, (2)
Working, (3) Middle, (4) Upper middle and (5) Rich. It will not surprise the reader to
hear that our two measures of social class are significantly associated, but we believe
both to be important in a discussion of how social class – and the interests derived from it
– relates to the amount of employee misbehaviour in the workplace.
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2.4.2.3

Autonomy

Our survey data provided us with many potential autonomy measures, but we have
limited ourselves to just the two most relevant. The first of these measures provides a
local measure of job autonomy and how much control respondents have in relation to the
specific circumstances under which their labour takes place, while the second is
concerned with employee involvement in general decision-making processes in the work
organization.
Our local autonomy variable is composed of responses to the question “How often is it
possible for you to plan or design your own work?” recorded on a 5-point scale from
“Never” to “All the time”. For our ‘inclusion in organizational decision-making
autonomy’ variable, responses to the question “Would you like to have more say than
you do now in decisions in your workplace?” are limited to two categories – yes and no.

2.4.2.4

Injustice

The process of selecting appropriate measures to operationalize the experience of
workplace injustice was not uncomplicated. In the absence of a straightforward measure
of injustice, we have identified four variables which together outline common
circumstances experienced by employees which might reasonably result in a sense of
unfair treatment: Feeling that one is undercompensated, being discriminated against,
feeling one’s health and safety is threatened and expecting to lose one’s job.
Our first injustice measure – related to inadequate compensation – is ordinal and made up
of responses to the question “Compared to the value you produce at your workplace, do
you think your compensation is much less than you deserve, somewhat less, about right,
somewhat more than you deserve or much more than you deserve?”. Our second
measure of injustice was measured by asking respondents whether they had been
discriminated against by anyone at work in the past year (yes or no). For our third
injustice variable, we measured threats to employee health and safety with the question
“To what extent, if at all, do you think your health or safety is at risk because of your
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job?” Valid responses fell into one of four ordinal categories ranging from “Not at all” to
“A great deal”. Finally, the risk of job loss as a source of injustice was measured with
respondents’ answers to the question of how likely it was that they would lose their job in
the next 12 months. Responses are once again organized into four ordinal categories: (1)
Very likely, (2) Somewhat likely, (3) Somewhat unlikely and (4) Very unlikely.

2.4.2.5

Demographic Variables

In preliminary analysis, we examined the relationships between several individual
demographic variables that are often influential in sociological research (race, gender and
age) and our dependent variable (see Table 2.1). Race and gender were found to have no
significant impact on the reporting of employee misbehaviour. Age was expected to
show a negative correlation with misbehaviour and we found evidence of a weak
relationship in the expected direction. This relationship may be explained by older
employees having more to lose from discovery of their misbehaviour or being more
content with/accustomed to their position and so less motivated towards misbehaviour.
This age effect was relatively minor, however, with only a 18% difference between the
youngest and oldest groups in the number of respondents reporting misbehaviour as
common in their workplace. All three of these demographic variables were left out of
any further analysis.
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Table 2.1 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Demographic Variables
Demographic
N
Percentage % who report employee
Gamma Significance
misbehaviour as common or
(γ)
extremely common
Race
White
1370
38.6
Non-White
318
37.7
Total
1688
38.5
-0.15
.756
Gender
Male
867
39.3
Female
839
37.6
Total
1706
38.5
-0.008
.838
Age
18-24
250
44.0
25-34
409
37.7
35-44
367
41.4
45-54
376
37.0
55-64
262
35.0
65+
49
26.5
Total
1713
38.5
-0.065*
.015

2.4.2.6

Organizational Control Variables

Our control variables were selected to avoid spuriousness related to important
organizational characteristics which we might expect to be related to the amount of
organizational misbehaviour taking place within a workplace.
The first of these control variables is the size of the work organization, represented by the
categories of an 8-point scale from “1 to 2 employees” to “1000 or more employees”.
The second organizational control variable is the general industry associated with the
work organization: (1) Goods-producing, (2) Mixed (transport, storage or
communication) or (3) Service-providing. The final organizational measure accounts for
the sector that best characterizes the work organization (private, public or non-profit).
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2.4.2.7

A Note on Multicollinearity

To check for potential issues with multicollinearity, we constructed a correlation matrix
(see Appendix 4). There are a number of weak or very weak correlations between
independent variables that are not particularly surprising (ex. personal class identification
and personal wealth). Outside of these weak correlations, the stronger associations are
primarily limited to the various categories of the included dummy variables (to be
expected and not cause for concern). One relationship of moderate strength that is worth
mentioning here is between the industrial worker occupational class category and
employment within a goods-producing organization (.42). Again, this relationship is not
particularly surprising, but worth noting. Overall, our correlation matrix suggests that
there is little reason to suspect multicollinearity of significantly impacting our results.
We conducted a separate multicollinearity check for the supplementary analysis
concerning managerial workers and found very similar results (see Appendix 5). The
industrial worker association with goods-producing organizations was not present
(because there were no industrial workers in this analysis) and every one of the moderate
or strong relationships were between the categories of the dummy variables and not a
cause for concern in our supplemental analysis focusing on managers.

2.5 Analytical Approach
For the purposes of our analyses, we have divided our independent variables into several
modules which group together like measures. This grouping by module acts as a
reminder of our underlying conceptual framework, facilitates the evaluation of our
hypotheses and provides the basis for how our multivariate analysis is structured. The
modules are as follows:
0: Occupational Class
1: Social Class
2: Autonomy
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3: Injustice
4: Organizational Controls
Modules 0 through 3 represent our key explanatory variables, with occupational class
(module 0) present within most of the following analyses to enable the sustained
comparison of employees across occupational category. Module 4 incorporates several
organizational characteristics to be controlled for, but the role of these organizational
variables in predicting employee misbehaviour is not otherwise emphasized in our study.
Our analysis is composed of two major sections. The first section is made up of the
bivariate analyses between each independent variable and the employee misbehaviour
measure. Throughout this section, occupational class is controlled for and measures of
association and tests of significance are generated for each category of employee
alongside the undifferentiated figures for all non-managerial employees.
The second section is composed of multivariate results from four ordinary least squares
regression models. The first of these models contains only the independent variables
corresponding to modules 0 and 1 – occupational class and social class. The second
model retains modules 0 and 1 and adds in our autonomy variables (module 2). The third
model retains all the previous modules and incorporates injustice measures (module 3).
The fourth and final model also includes organizational control variables (module 4).
For the purposes of the multivariate analysis, we made the decision to treat our ordinal
misbehaviour variable as continuous, enabling us to conduct OLS regression. There are
several reasons behind this decision. First, we are more interested in measuring increases
and decreases in misbehaviour related to changes in our independent variables than
documenting the changes in likelihood of a respondent landing in a particular category on
our dependent variable. Second, OLS regression allows us to use statistical techniques
and methods of presentation which we believe our audience will be more familiar with
and the advantage this lends to the communication of our results should not be
understated. Third, we believe it is reasonable to assume approximately equal distance
between the categories of our employee misbehaviour variable (1 extremely uncommon,
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2 fairly uncommon, 3 fairly common, 4 extremely uncommon) and a linear relationship
between variables, so OLS regression will provide us with understandable results based
on realistic approximations. In bivariate analysis, we used gamma when possible (ordinal
by ordinal analysis) and chi2 when the independent variable was nominal (including
Cramer’s V when strength of association was also required). Gamma makes no
adjustment for table size or considers tied pairs so that it sometimes overemphasizes the
strength of a relationship in comparison to alternative measures (ex. tau-b and tau-c).
However, gamma and tau measures are most often very similar, and the former was
chosen for its relative ease of interpretation and familiarity to the author. In preliminary
analyses, we examined gamma alongside other ordinal by ordinal measures of association
and found no evidence of gamma overexaggerating results.

2.5.1.1

Supplementary Analysis

Following a review of the results for our non-managerial analyses (outlined just above),
the decision was made to expand on – and further contextualize – our initial findings with
a supplementary analytical section.
This supplementary section repeats the format of the multivariate section for nonmanagerial employees, but substitutes an analytical sample made up of only managerial
employees. Following from the precedent set in the literature on organizational
misbehaviour, we excluded managerial employees from our initial analysis because of the
significant differences in working conditions compared to non-managerial employees. In
most research on employee misbehaviour, the role of managers in decision-making and
setting policy and their efforts to control the behaviour of non-managerial workers are the
aspects of their position that are emphasized (Ackroyd, 2015; Ackroyd & Thompson,
1999; Dundon & van den Broek, 2015; Edwards et al., 1995; Jackall, 2010; Thompson,
2015). However, managers are still paid workers, so – though excluded from our primary
results because of their role in organizational oversight – our supplementary analytical
section examines how managerial employees experience organizational misbehaviour.
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2.6 Results
2.6.1
2.6.1.1

Bivariate Analysis
Module 0: Occupational Class

The first step of our analysis was to compare perceptions of employee misbehaviour by
occupational class. Here we found evidence of a significant relationship between
variables (Table 2.2). Only about 31% of professional employees reported employee
misbehaviour as fairly or extremely common, compared with 42% of service workers and
45% of industrial workers.
Table 2.2 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Employee Occupational
Class
Occupational
N
% who report misbehaviour as
Chi-Square
Significance
Class
fairly or extremely common
Professional
589
30.7
Service
653
41.5
Industrial
470
44.5
Total
1712
38.5
Chi2 =30.79
.00

2.6.1.2

Module 1: Social Class

Table 2.3 displays the results of our analysis of wealth by employee misbehaviour. Here,
we found evidence of a weak negative relationship, with respondents of a lower wealth
level reporting more employee misbehaviour (γ= -.06). Interestingly, this relationship
appears to be strongest for service workers (γ= -.10) though the association remains
relatively weak overall.
Turning to our subjective measure of class identity, we found more evidence supporting
the existence of a negative relationship between social class and employee misbehaviour.
In Table 2.4, we can see that half of the poor respondents and 41% of the working class
reported misbehaviour as being common in their workplace. The percentage of middle
and upper middleclass respondents reporting misbehaviour is considerably lower and
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only 29% of those employees who identify as rich report common misbehaviour. While
this relationship between perceived class and employee misbehaviour is significant, it is
relatively weak (γ= -.14) irrespective of occupational class.
Table 2.3 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Employee Social Class
Level of Wealth ($)
N
% who report employee
Occupational Gamma Significance
misbehaviour as fairly or
Class
(γ)
extremely common
Less than 5,000
237
46.4
5,000 to 20,000
178
38.6
20,001 to 40,000
111
31.5
40,001 to 75,000
102
40.2
75,001 to 100,000
69
44.9
100,001 to 150,000
94
38.3
150,001 to 250,000
115
32.2
250,001 to 500,000
202
35.1
Professional
-.03
.60
500,001 to 1 million 131
42.0
Service
-.10
.04
Above 1 million
55
30.9
Industrial
-.01
.79
Total
1292
38.8
All Employees
-.06
.03

Table 2.4 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Employee Personal Class
Identification
Personal
N
% who report
Classification Gamma Significance
Class
misbehaviour as
of Employee
(γ)
Identification
fairly or extremely
common
Poor
145
49.7
Working
68
41.2
Middle
781
34.6
Professional
-.11
.24
Upper middle
48
37.5
Service
-.14
.11
Rich
28
28.6
Industrial
-.10
.25
Total
1070
37.0
All
-.14
.00
Employees

2.6.1.3

Module 2: Autonomy

Looking at the results for our autonomy measures, we found a relationship between lower
levels of autonomy and higher reporting of employee misbehaviour in the workplace.
This inverse relationship is evident for both of our autonomy measures (Table 2.5 and

68

Table 2.6) and the general trend holds for all non-managerial employees with some
notable differences in magnitude by occupational class.
The relationship between having less local autonomy – the ability to plan/design your
own work – and perceiving greater employee misbehaviour was significantly stronger for
professional employees and slightly weaker for service employees. On the other hand,
the connection between wanting to have more say in organizational decision-making and
reporting more misbehaviour was considerably weaker for professional employees (γ=
.15), compared to service (γ= .24) and industrial employees (γ= .26).
Table 2.5 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by How Often Plan or Design
Own Work
How often is it possible
N
% who report employee Classification Gamma Significance
for you to plan or
misbehaviour as fairly
of Employee
(γ)
design your own work?
or extremely common
Never
249
45.8
Some of the time
321
41.1
About half the time
257
40.9
Professional
-.12
.02
Most of the time
517
33.1
Service
-.10
.03
All the time
332
37.0
Industrial
-.06
.24
Total
1676
38.5
All Employees
-.11
.00

Table 2.6 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Want More Say in
Organizational Decisions
Would you like to have more
N
% who report employee
Classification of
Gamma Significance
say than you do now in
misbehaviour as fairly
Employee
(γ)
decisions in your workplace?
or extremely common
Professional
.15
.02
No
882
32.9
Service
.24
.00
Yes
726
44.5
Industrial
.26
.00
Total
1608
38.1
All Employees
.21
.00

2.6.1.4

Module 3: Injustice

The first of our bivariate analyses utilizing measures of injustice focused on how
respondents’ evaluations of the fairness of their compensation relates to the amount of
employee misbehaviour occurring in the workplace (see Table 2.7). Here, we found
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evidence of a negative relationship, with undercompensated workers reporting
significantly more employee misbehaviour. Those who reported fair compensation (a
match between remuneration and value produced) reported the lowest amount of
employee misbehaviour. This trend held for all employees, but it appears that the
relationship between compensation and misbehaviour is even stronger for industrial
employees – and notably weaker for professional employees. Interestingly, the
frequencies from Table 2.7 suggest that perceptions of misbehaviour might increase again
when compensation is considered more than fair, but only a minority of respondents are
fortunate enough to be paid so well and their contradictory results are not influential
enough to reverse the general trend already outlined. However, this reversal in trend in
later categories does make us question whether the relationship between subjective
compensation and misbehaviour should instead be understood as curvilinear.
Table 2.7 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Fairness of Compensation
Compared to the value
N
% who report employee Classification Gamma Significance
produced, respondent
misbehaviour as fairly
of Employee
(γ)
compensation is:
or extremely common
Much less than deserved
Somewhat less
About right
Somewhat more
Much more than deserved
Total

309
561
701
70
35
1676

51.5
40.8
30.2
38.6
57.1
38.6

Professional
Service
Industrial
All Employees

-.14
-.17
-.27
-.18

.01
.00
.00
.00

Table 2.8 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Experienced
Discrimination at Work
In the last year, at work, have
N
% who report
Classification Gamma Significance
you been discriminated
employee
of Employee
(γ)
against, in any way by anyone
misbehaviour as fairly
you've had contact with?
or extremely common
Professional
.41
.00
No
1394
34.6
Service
.44
.00
Yes
282
58.4
Industrial
.29
.00
Total
1676
38.2
All Employees
.39
.00
The next step in our injustice analyses revealed a significant and moderately strong
positive relationship between the experience of discrimination at work and reports of
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employee misbehaviour (γ= .39; Table 2.8). This relationship is even stronger for
professional and service employees, in comparison to industrial workers, for whom
discrimination and employee misbehaviour are less closely related.
In Table 2.9 the results of the next bivariate analysis respecting job safety are displayed.
Unsurprisingly, we found evidence of an inverse relationship between safety at work and
reported employee misbehaviour (γ= -.26). Only 28.9% of the employees whose job
posed no risk to their health or safety reported employee misbehaviour as common in
their workplace, compared with 48.4% of those whose job posed a great risk to health or
safety. Once again, this trend was consistent in direction across all classes of employee,
but notably weaker for industrial workers (γ= -.11).
Table 2.9 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Job Safety
To what extent is your
N
% who report employee Classification Gamma Significance
health and safety at risk
misbehaviour as fairly
of Employee
(γ)
because of your job?
or extremely common
Great deal
182
48.4
Moderate amount
393
46.1
Professional
-.30
.00
A little
471
41.8
Service
-.30
.00
Not at all
653
28.9
Industrial
-.11
.05
Total
1699
38.6
All Employees
-.26
.00

Table 2.10 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Job Security
How likely is it that
N
% who report
Classification Gamma Significance
you will lose your
employee
of Employee
(γ)
job in the next
misbehaviour as fairly
year?
or extremely common
Very likely
83
51.8
Somewhat likely
177
51.4
Professional
-.11
.08
Somewhat unlikely
378
34.9
Service
-.06
.29
Very unlikely
933
35.8
Industrial
-.16
.01
Total
1571
38.2
All Employees
-.12
.00
Table 2.10 presents the relationship between job security and perceptions of employee
misbehaviour. Those respondents perceiving a greater likelihood of immanent job loss
reported more employee misbehaviour in their workplace. This relationship is significant
for all non-managerial employees but is notably stronger for industrial workers.
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2.6.1.5

Module 4: Organizational Measures

The final section of our bivariate analyses was concerned with observing the changes in
the amount of employee misbehaviour according to relevant organizational
characteristics. In Table 2.11, there is an obvious progression in the amount of
misbehaviour reported according to the size of the organization (γ= .12) and, for service
and industrial workers, this connection between larger organizational size and higher
misbehaviour appears to be even stronger.
Table 2.11 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Size of Work
Organization
Number of
N
% who report employee Classification
Gamma
Employees in the
misbehaviour as fairly
of Employee
(γ)
Work Organization
or extremely common
1 to 2
48
27.1
3 to 10
203
35.0
11 to 49
238
30.3
50 to 99
123
39.0
100 to 249
156
39.7
250 to 499
112
46.4
Professional
.07
500 to 999
120
42.5
Service
.20
1,000 or more
584
40.8
Industrial
.15
Total
1584
38.3
All Employees
.12

Significance

.20
.00
.00
.00

Looking to our second organizational variable, we found some limited – though
significant – evidence of a relationship between the general industry of the organization
and perceptions of the amount of misbehaviour taking place within it (Table 2.12).
Service organizations appear to host slightly less employee misbehaviour than goodsproducing or mixed organizations, but this gap only amounts to a difference of about 5%
between industry categories.
The final organizational variable of interest to us was the sector of the work organization
(Table 2.13). Here, we did not find any evidence that perceptions of the amount of
employee misbehaviour vary according to the sector of the organization (private, public
or a non-profit).
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Table 2.12 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Organizational Industry
General Industry of
N
% who report employee Classification Cramer’s Significance
Work Organization
misbehaviour as fairly
of Employee
V
or extremely common
Goods-producing
264
42.4
Professional
.07
.49
Mixed (transport,
194
42.3
Service
.08
.31
storage, communication)
Service
1230
37.3
Industrial
.06
.77
Total
1688
38.7
All Employees
.06
.04
Note: Cramer’s V utilized in place of gamma because industry was treated as nominal.

Table 2.13 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Organizational Sector
Sector of Work
N
% who report employee misbehaviour Classification Cramer’s Significance
Organization
as fairly or extremely common
of Employee
V
Private
1046
39.8
Professional
.07
.45
Public
545
35.6
Service
.06
.56
Non-Profit
111
42.3
Industrial
.10
.18
Total
1702
38.6
All Employees
.05
.33
Note: Cramer’s V utilized in place of gamma because sector was treated as nominal.

2.6.2

Multivariate Analysis

The results of all four of our multivariate models are displayed in Table 2.14. Model 1
included only occupational class and our two social class measures as independent
variables. The results from this model indicate that industrial workers – and service
workers to a lesser extent – report more frequent employee misbehaviour than
professional workers. Model 1 also identifies a negative relationship between wealth and
our dependent variable: Those with more wealth were more likely to report lower levels
of employee misbehaviour. In contrast, we found no evidence of a significant
relationship for personal class identification, suggesting that there is no unique
association between it and the dependent variable not already explained by reference to
occupational class or wealth.
Model 2 incorporated all the variables present in Model 1 and introduced our two
autonomy measures. With these additions, we see that the higher reports of employee
misbehaviour by industrial workers remains significant – and of comparable strength to
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the results of Model 1 – while the difference between the amount of misbehaviour
reported by service and professional workers loses significance. Model 2 also reports a
loss of significance for wealth – leaving both of our social class measures without
evidence of association with the dependent variable. On the other hand, there is evidence
of significant association between both of the newly added autonomy measures and our
dependent variable: Respondents with less ability to plan/design their own work and
those who indicated that they want more influence in organizational decision-making
reported employee misbehaviour as a more common occurrence than employees with
greater autonomy.
Model 3 retains all previously included variables and introduces our four injustice
measures. Of these measures, we found two to be positively correlated with perceptions
of employee misbehaviour – employees experiencing workplace discrimination or
working in an unsafe or unhealthy workplace tended to report higher levels of
misbehaviour. Workplace discrimination seems particularly influential here (β= .16).
Additionally, this third multivariate analysis saw our autonomy measures lose statistical
significance. Meanwhile, service employees were again found to report significantly
more employee misbehaviour than professionals with a notably larger difference between
the two classes than that seen in the second model – bringing the amount of misbehaviour
reported by service workers closer to the figures for industrial workers.
In our fourth and final multivariate model, we included several organizational measures
alongside all variables from model 3. Here, we found evidence of a positive relationship
between the number of individuals in a work organization and the frequency of
misbehaviour taking place. There were also indications of significantly more
misbehaviour within goods-producing organizations, compared to service organizations.
Meanwhile, employees of mixed industry work organizations (i.e. communication,
storage, transport) reported significantly less misbehaviour than the employees of both
goods-producing and service organizations.
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Table 2.14 Multivariate Models of Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour
(Non-Managerial Workers)
Regression Coefficient (Standard Error)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Module 0:
Employee Class
Occupational
Professional (ref.)
----Class
Service
.08* (.075)
.072 (.077)
.105* (.079)
.136** (.082)
Industrial
.134***
.128***
0.119** (.086) .129** (.100)
(.078)
(.081)
Module 1:
Total Net Wealth
-.078* (.011) -.069 (.011)
-.046 (.012)
-.058 (.012)
Social Class
Personal Class
-.06 (.038)
-.053 (.039)
-.040 (.041)
-.067 (.041)
Identification
Module 2:
Allowance to plan or
-.075* (.024)
-.057 (.025)
-.052 (.025)
Autonomy
design own work
Want more say in
.07* (.064)
-.001 (.068)
-.017 (.069)
organizational decisions
Module 3:
Appropriateness of
.000 (.038)
-.008 (.039)
Injustice
compensation compared
to value produced
Experienced
.16*** (.089) .134*** (.090)
discrimination at work
Safety at work
-.147***
-.132***
(.017)
(.017)
Job security
.046 (.039)
.026 (.040)
Module 4:
Number of employees
.204*** (.015)
Organizational Industry
Measures
Goods-producing
.085* (.105)
Mixed industry
-.076* (.114)
Service (ref.)
-Sector
Private (ref.)
-Public
-.055 (.080)
Non-profit
.022 (.135)
N
846
801
736
705
R2
.031
.042
.089
.123
Adjusted R2
.026
.034
.076
.104
Notes. *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001.
Regression coefficients represent standardized slopes (standard error in brackets).
No notable relationship was discovered between organizational sector and employee
misbehaviour. And, once again, no evidence of significance was found for any of the
social class or autonomy measures. However, the relationships between two of the
injustice measures – discrimination in the workplace and threats to health and safety –
and the dependent variable remained significant and of comparable strength to previous
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models. Finally, occupational class also remained a significant indicator of reported
organizational misbehaviour with both service and industrial workers reporting
considerably more misbehaviour than professional employees.

2.6.3

Supplementary Analysis for Managerial Employees

Table 2.15 contains the results of the supplementary multivariate analysis for managerial
employees. The variables and order of inclusion in these models largely match those of
the multivariate analysis for non-managerial employees, with the only real difference
limited to the change in categories of occupational class resulting from the change in
sample.
Model 1 included only occupational class and social class measures as explanatory
factors. The results linked to occupational class follow the general trend established by
the non-managerial employees of lower occupational class corresponding to more
employee misbehaviour – supervisors reported significantly more misbehaviour (β= .245)
than higher level managers.
As before with the non-managerial employees, Model 2 of this supplementary analysis
incorporates our two autonomy measures alongside the variables from Model 1. Here,
we found evidence of a relationship between wanting more influence in organizational
decision-making and reporting higher amounts of employee misbehaviour (β= .118).
Occupational class remained relevant with supervisors reporting considerably more
misbehaviour (β= .279) than higher-level managers.
Model 3 incorporates our four injustice variables alongside those of Model 2. Once
again, supervisors reported significantly more misbehaviour (β= .285). However, we
found that the relationship from Model 2, concerning the connection between the desire
for more influence in organizational decision-making and reporting higher amounts of
misbehaviour, lost significance in this new model. On the other hand, appropriateness of
compensation (amount received vs. value of work) emerged as a significant factor, with
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managers reporting less misbehaviour as the appropriateness of their compensation
increased (β= -.164).
Table 2.15 Multivariate Models of Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour
(Managerial Workers)
Regression Coefficient (Standard Error)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Module 0:
Managerial Class
Occupational
Upper manager (ref.)
---Class
Middle manager
.118 (.185) .164 (.188) .183 (.190)
.182 (.192)
Supervisor
.245**
.279**
.285**
.267**
(.211)
(.215)
(.220)
(.226)
Module 1:
Total Net Wealth
- .052
- .061
- 0.75
-.080 (.021)
Social Class
(.020)
(.020)
(.021)
Personal Class Identification
- .026
- .004
.054 (.073)
.058 (.075)
(.069)
(.071)
Module 2:
Allowance to plan or design own
- .020
- .005
-.009 (.050)
Autonomy
work
(.048)
(.048)
Want more say in organizational
.118*
.057 (.121)
.065 (.123)
decisions
(.110)
Module 3:
Appropriateness of compensation
- .164*
-.172**
Injustice
compared to value produced
(.073)
(.074)
Experienced discrimination at
.066 (.159)
.075 (.160)
work
Safety at work
- .083
-.081 (.033)
(.032)
Job security
- .049
-.033 (.076)
(.074)
Module 4:
Number of employees
-.007 (.028)
Organizational Industry
Measures
Goods-producing
.036 (.155)
Mixed industry
.076 (.229)
Service (ref.)
-Sector
Private (ref.)
-Public
-.051 (.142)
Non-profit
-.057 (.204)
N
291
280
261
257
R2
.038
.065
.121
.139
Adjusted R2
.025
.044
.086
.086
Notes. *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001.
Regression coefficients represent standardized slopes (standard error in brackets).
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Finally, the addition of our organizational control variables in Model 4 revealed no
notable difference from the Model 3 results – supervisors and undercompensated
managers continued to report significantly more misbehaviour than those who received
better compensation or who occupied a higher position in the managerial hierarchy.

2.7 Discussion
Throughout all our analyses, respondent occupational class emerged as a variable
wielding considerable influence over the perceived amount of employee misbehaviour
reported. From a perspective on employee misbehaviour that understands the
phenomenon as a reaction by workers to the negative working conditions that confront
them at work, we would expect those occupying lower occupational classes to endure the
most degraded working conditions, experience the greatest alienation and to most often
find their own interests in conflict with organizational imperatives (Edwards & Scullion,
1982; Marx, 1844, 1867). It would follow that workers of lower occupational classes
will be most motivated towards misbehaviour and our results appear to reinforce previous
work that has emphasized the potential for employee misbehaviour to act as a form of
worker resistance (Analoui, 1995; Hodson, 1995, 2001; Karlsson, 2012; Lawrence &
Robinson, 2007; Mulholland, 2004). It is not clear to us whether employee misbehaviour
should be understood as resistance, but it seems obvious that there is a positive
correlation between the perceived frequency of misbehaviour and the experience of
degraded work.
In addition to the above general finding, we found that professional workers reported
significantly less employee misbehaviour than both industrial and service workers. There
are several potential explanations for the lower rates in perceived misbehaviour by
professional employees. One explanation is that misbehaviour is no less frequent among
professionals, but that professionals are less inclined to report the misbehaviour of their
peers. The literature suggests that many professionals are often hesitant to report even
the most serious misconduct by their professional peers (Coburn, 1999; Collier, 2012;
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DesRoches et al., 2010; Fesler, 2015), so it is reasonable to assume that less serious
misbehaviour by others of their profession would frequently pass beneath notice.
A second explanation for the lower reporting of misbehaviour by professionals could be
differences between their definitions of organizational misbehaviour compared to the
definitions of non-professionals. Our misbehaviour survey item provides employee theft
and loafing as examples of misbehaviour and it could be that these examples are less
applicable to professional work. A review of the professional literature reveals much
emphasis by professional organizations on preventing unethical behaviour that violates
the public trust in the profession (Bakre, 2007; Golden & Schmidt, 1998), and so it is
possible that professionals interpreted our misbehaviour measure differently than nonprofessionals.
A third explanation for a lower perceived frequency of misbehaviour among
professionals could be related to the behavioural regulation provided by a strong
conception of occupational identity. Previous work has outlined the importance of
jurisdictional claims in the process of professional recognition (Abbott, 1988; Adams,
2010) and the conception of a distinct professional identity is central to this process
(Cruess, 2014; Procter, 2017). Correspondingly, individuals seeking to break into
professional work must do more than simply acquire the requisite technical skills and
knowledge – they must construct a new personal identity in line with the values, beliefs
and relations characteristic of the profession (Williams, 2013; Webb, 2017). We suggest
that the personal regulation required for a professional identity may inhibit employee
misbehaviour because of the dissonance brought on by engaging in misbehaviour while
also trying to maintain one’s conception of self as upholding the ideals of the profession.
Perhaps the best way to understand the lower reported frequency of misbehaviour by
professionals is with reference to the unique privileges enjoyed by these employees over
non-professionals. Professional workers generally enjoy more autonomy and authority in
their work, greater protection through work-related rights and privileges and a higher
social status than non-professionals (Abbott, 1988; Adams, 2010; Leicht & Fennell,
2001; Wilensky, 1964). Though the extent of these advantages will understandably vary,

79

it is evident that most professional employees enjoy some unique benefits over their nonprofessional counterparts and partial protection from the conditions of degraded work
that often motivate employees towards misbehaviour.
In parallel with previous research, we found evidence of a relationship between
workplace injustice and greater employee misbehaviour (Ferris et al., 2012; Giacalone &
Rosenfield, 1987; Hollinger & Clark, 1983; Karlsson, 2012). However, not every
injustice measure was a significant predictor of the perceived frequency of misbehaviour
in our multivariate model: For non-managerial employees, we found no evidence of
association for the injustice measures related to compensation or job security, so it was
only injustice related to discrimination or unsafe working conditions that predicted a
higher reporting of misbehaviour. It is not entirely clear why these two measures of
injustice are particularly influential, but there are some clues in the literature, as it has
already been established that the type and source of injustice experienced by the worker
is associated with the type and target of retaliatory misbehaviour (Ambrose et al., 2002;
Lawrence & Robinson, 2007; Skarlicki et al., 2008). It could be that the injustice of
working in unsafe conditions is particularly motivating towards misbehaviour because of
its stark demonstration of a lack of regard by employers/managers for the safety and
wellbeing of the worker. In these circumstances – with a clear source of injustice and an
obvious division between the interests of workers and owners/managers – it is easier to
understand why we find evidence of greater employee misbehaviour than when the
source of injustice is less obvious and the type of injustice less offensive. Following this
line of argument, the lesser effect of injustice related to compensation and job insecurity
on the perceived frequency of employee misbehaviour might be explained by difficulties
in locating the source of the injustice or assigning culpability – for example, inadequate
reimbursement might be perceived as an organizational necessity dictated by market
forces/competition, rather than as a concerted effort by owners to expand their profits at
the expense of workers’ wages.
We were interested to find that, among the managerial employees, misbehaviour was
reported as significantly more frequent by those in lower managerial positions
(supervisors). The explanation of these results is not entirely clear, but we suggest the
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systematic perception of greater misbehaviour by those in lower-management is likely
connected to the expectations of their position within the work organization. The job of
supervisor or foreperson will usually entail some element of responsibility for the routine
discipline of workers and the detection of – and intervention against – employee
misbehaviour, and it makes sense that those who are paid to be on the lookout for
misbehaving employees will more often find them. In contrast to supervisors, middle and
upper managers have a certain distance from the day-to-day activities of employees, so
routine and minor misbehaviour might often go beneath their notice.
Considering their strength of influence in our main analysis, it was surprising to find that
working in an unsafe job or being discriminated against in the workplace were not also
associated with higher amounts of reported misbehaviour by managerial employees.
Instead, only the inappropriate pay injustice measure was significantly associated with a
higher reporting of misbehaviour by managers. These results may reflect class
differences in the interests and priorities of managerial versus non-managerial employees
– it is for this very reason that we conducted a supplementary analysis for these
managerial employees and did not include them in our primary analysis of nonmanagerial workers.
The role expected of managerial employees in the work organization is to act as the
employer’s agent and to represent the employer’s interests. It is reasonable that a wellcompensated manager will be less motivated towards misbehaviour – as their interests are
best served by maintenance of the status quo and the smooth-running of the organization.
Correspondingly, managers will usually be those most motivated towards the curtailing
of organizational misbehaviour – and it is for this reason that they have often been
overlooked as subjects capable of their own misbehaviour in past research (Ackroyd &
Thompson, 1999; Analoui, 1995; DiBattista, 1996; Fleming, 2002; Giesberg, 2001). The
results of our study could suggest that managers might also be inclined towards
misbehaviour when the privileges of their position are not sufficient to insure their
loyalty to employer interests – i.e. when compensation is too low – but we cannot be sure
how much of the employee misbehaviour reported by managers is carried out by the
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manager themselves: it is possible that managers who feel undercompensated are simply
reporting more frequent non-managerial employee misbehaviour.
Initially, we were surprised to find only limited multivariate evidence for the relationship
between a lack of autonomy and increased misbehaviour, considering this relationship
has been emphasized by numerous previous studies (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999;
Analoui, 1995; DiBattista, 1996; Fleming & Sewell, 2002; Lawrence & Robinson, 2007;
Paulson, 2014). However, this finding may be explained by our inclusion of occupational
class as an explanatory variable – a measure left out of most other research on
organizational misbehaviour. In an additional multivariate model not reproduced here,
we found that the removal of class measures – occupational class and social class – saw
every injustice and autonomy measure emerge as significant predictors of the perceived
frequency of employee misbehaviour.
Therefore, we suggest that fairness of compensation, job security and greater autonomy
correspond with a lower amount of perceived employee misbehaviour, but that these
variables are so closely related with class that they have little unique influence on the
dependent variable once class is already controlled for.
Finally, though organizational characteristics were not a focal point of our study, we did
find evidence to suggest greater misbehaviour within larger work organizations. This
relationship was significant in the multivariate analysis for non-managerial workers (β=
.204). This relationship between organizational size and the perceived frequency of
employee misbehaviour may be the result of the additional cover granted by the relative
anonymity in the large organization (Ashforth, 1994; Roscigno et al., 2009).
Alternatively, the intensification of alienation and heavy rationalization characteristic of
many large organizations might act as additional motivation towards employee
misbehaviour (Braverman, 1974; Hodson, 2001; Matheson, 2007; Rinehart, 2006;
Roscigno et al., 2009; Sanders, 1997).
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2.8 Conclusion
In accordance with previous research on organizational misbehaviour, we found lack of
autonomy and workplace injustice to be important predictors of the perceived frequency
of employee misbehaviour. However, by incorporating and controlling for occupational
class – a variable not present in much of the previous work – we found the unique
explanatory power of these factors to be considerably weaker. Our results revealed a
trend towards greater employee misbehaviour at lower class positions with industrial and
service workers perceiving it as more frequent than professionals.
Professional work seemed to correlate with lower perceptions of misbehaviour, and these
employees reported it as much less frequent than industrial and service workers. Taken
together, these results make a case for the inclusion of occupational class as a general
measure of the degraded working conditions that motivate employees towards
organizational misbehaviour – and a measure that largely incorporates the roles of
autonomy and injustice emphasized by previous work.
Furthermore, even after occupational class is controlled for, certain injustice measures –
discrimination at work or unsafe working conditions – remain significantly associated
with the amount of employee misbehaviour reported. Exploring the unique character of
each different type of workplace injustice in relation to its impact on rates of
organizational misbehaviour may provide one interesting direction for future research.
In our supplementary analysis of managers, we found a considerable divergence from the
factors of significance which predicted employee misbehaviour for non-managerial
employees. Appropriateness of compensation and managerial class emerged as factors of
central influence and we found that managers who are lower in the hierarchy or who feel
underpaid reported perceptions of employee misbehaviour as more frequent. On the
other hand, middle and upper managers – and well compensated ones – can be expected
to be among those most opposed to employee misbehaviour. It may be worth exploring
managers’ ambiguous relationship with misbehaviour further in future work and
exploring how differences in their working conditions – compared to non-managerial
employees – may uncover unique predictors of organizational misbehaviour.
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Finally, while our conclusions are based upon a number of significant relationships, the
overall explanatory power of our models remains limited (Non-managerial analysis:
Adjusted R2=.10; Managerial analysis: Adjusted R2=.09). These figures tell us that there
is still considerable unexplained variation in our dependent variable. While this does not
invalidate our findings, it does suggest that there is still room to expand our
understanding of the phenomenon of organizational misbehaviour.
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Chapter 3

3

Exploring the Neglected Phenomenon of Employer
Misbehaviour

3.1 Introduction
A more general definition of organizational misbehaviour as ‘anything at work that you
are not supposed to do’ (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Sprouse, 1992) has been available
since the 90s but, nearly three decades later, there has been very little effort to examine
misbehaviour engaged in by anyone other than the non-managerial employee. This
overemphasis on the misbehaviour of low-level employees has contributed to a lack of
systematic study into the misbehaviour of employers – a gap in the literature the
following study is positioned to begin to address.
Extending the general definition of organizational misbehaviour advanced by Sprouse
(1992) and Ackroyd and Thompson (1999), we define employer misbehaviour as
anything to do with work that employers are not supposed to do. With this general
definition, there are obviously a wide array of activities that can be understood as
employer misbehaviour, but some easily recognized examples are denying employees
earned benefits or pay, expecting unpaid overtime by workers, fraud and tax evasion.
In the present study, we do not focus on any specific type of employer organizational
misbehaviour but make use of an undifferentiated measure to expand our general
understanding of the structural conditions that motivate or constrain employer
misbehaviour. Additionally, our sample of employers contains only a small number of
corporate capitalist executives. This group is too small to appear in most national
samples, but their misbehaviour can often be the most consequential, with the greatest
reach and capability to adversely affect the lives of thousands of employees, customers
and other stakeholders. Our findings suggest significant asymmetry between the
phenomena of employee and employer misbehaviour, as economic pressure to increase
profit and worker vulnerability to exploitation emerge as key predictors of the perceived
frequency of employer misbehaviour.
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3.2 Background
The phenomenon of employer misbehaviour differs from that of employees in a variety
of ways. One distinction between employee and employer misbehaviour is that the
former is assumed to be far more common than the latter. The near-complete absence of
any inquiry into employer misbehaviour is understandable in the context of its presumed
rarity compared to the misbehaviour of employees, and there are numerous explanations
for why this assumption might be well-founded. One obvious reason to suspect that
employer misbehaviour might be less common is because there are fewer employers than
employees and, therefore, fewer potentially-misbehaving employers than potentiallymisbehaving employees. However, there are additional explanations outside of the
simple employee-employer ratio to expect employer misbehaviour to be less frequent
than that of employees.
In the previous chapter, we found that employee misbehaviour generally increased when
workers were exposed to more degraded working conditions. The general thrust of the
organizational misbehaviour literature echoes this finding, emphasizing how
dissatisfaction with work, lack of autonomy or feelings of injustice motivate workers
towards greater misbehaviour (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Ambrose et al., 2002;
Lawrence & Robinson, 2007; Paulson, 2014; Skarlicki et al., 1999; Skalicki et al., 2008).
Because the structure of capitalist production tends to produce these outcomes of
degraded work (Marx, 1844, 1867) – and capitalist organizations most often do not
adequately represent the best interests of their workers – we can expect employee
misbehaviour to remain frequent – manifesting routinely in reaction to the degraded
working conditions typical of capitalist production (Edwards & Scullion, 1982; Hodson,
1995, 2001; Karlsson, 2012; Thompson, 2015). On the other hand, employers would not
be expected to share this routine motivation towards misbehaviour, because their best
interests are generally already well-represented within the structure and standard
operating procedures of a privately-owned work organization. The typical capitalist
organization is designed to produce the best return on investment for the owner – who
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also has the freedom to withdraw her capital where this fails to be the case – so statusquo economic production generally complements employers’ interests and would not be
expected to foster employer misbehaviour to the same extent that it does for employees.
Hypothesis #1: Employee misbehaviour will be reported as more common than
employer misbehaviour.
In addition to the above reasons to expect employer misbehaviour to be less prevalent
than employee misbehaviour, it is also true that the dominance of capitalist hegemony
will contribute to a general underestimation of the phenomenon by promoting the
perception of employers as individuals largely incapable of misbehaviour.
If misbehaviour is defined as activity that you are not supposed to do – and the structure
of the capitalist work organization is designed to best serve the interest of the employer –
then the activities of the employer – far from being perceived as misbehaviour – are
much more likely to be presented as a model for ‘proper’ behaviour within the work
organization, against which others’ actions can then be defined as misbehaviour (Contu,
2008; Fleming & Sewell, 2002; Hartt et al, 2015). While much of the routine behaviour
of the employer could rightly be defined as misbehaviour under another production
system, the guiding principles of capitalist ideology lend legitimacy to actions by the
owners of capital (Braverman, 1974; Burawoy, 1979; Marx & Engels, 1846), so that they
are only really seen to misbehave when their actions infringe on the interests of other
capitalists in ways that are generally accepted as illegitimate and illegal or when their
misdeeds are exposed by regulators, whistleblowers, and muckraking journalists. An
expansion of the range of activities studied as examples of employer misbehaviour
requires the challenging of the popular assumptions of misbehaviour as an activity
engaged in only by employees. Unfortunately, awareness of employers’ capacity to
misbehave remains seriously limited in the main body of the organizational misbehaviour
literature, where searches utilizing the keywords “employer” and “misbehaviour” will
lead one towards work that questions only the extent to which employers should be liable
for the misbehaviour of their employees (for examples, Bonner, 2017; Mustafa, 2016;
Qiasi & Heidari, 2017; Rideout, 2014; Warburg, 2014)
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Fortunately, this lacuna in the academic literature is not absolute and the adjacent fields
of white collar and corporate crime research can contribute knowledge to our
understanding of the misbehaviour of employers. Although researchers in these areas
generally prioritize the study of crime over misbehaviour more generally, it should be
obvious that crime is also a form of misbehaviour – of a sort that is particularly welldefined or generally denounced. And so, even within these areas, the study of employer
misbehaviour is limited primarily to activities which are unequivocally illegal or result in
social damages both great and conspicuous – activities such as stealing employee
pensions, killing workers or consumers with inadequate safety provisions or rampant
pollution of the environment. (Arrigo & Lynch, 2015; Foster & Barnetson, 2017; Punch,
1995; Stretesky & Lynch, 1998).
Unfortunately, even in circumstances of blatant and pronounced illegal and immoral
activity, the misbehaviour of employers still receives significant ideological justification
and preferential media coverage (Burns & Orrick, 2002; Commager, 1971; McMullan &
McClung, 2006; Michel et al., 2016; Schwartz & Ellison, 1982; Wright et al., 1995).
Adding to this ideological protection, misbehaving employers will also often benefit from
a variety of legal protections that make it difficult to assign culpability or punishment to
individual owners – the limited liability corporation is particularly influential here,
leveraging legal privileges not afforded to most human individuals (Bakan, 2004; Fisse &
Braithwaite, 1993; Gilson & Gordon, 2003; Greenfield, 2006; Lamb, 2012; Peston,
2012). As a result, even the most destructive and illegal forms of employer misbehaviour
often go unpunished or unresolved, so it is likely that less extreme forms of employer
misbehaviour may routinely go unnoticed, contributing to a further underestimation of
incidences of employer misbehaviour.
In the previous chapter, we saw that members of lower occupational classes reported
more employee misbehaviour – a result of their greater familiarity with degraded working
conditions and higher likelihood of being an employee in the first place. We suggest that
there might likewise be a relationship between class and the perceived frequency of
employer misbehaviour. We suspect individuals of a higher occupational class – who
find their economic interests generally well-represented within the capitalist system of
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production – will be less likely to perceive employer misbehaviour to be a common
occurrence, reframing activities that others might properly define as misbehaviour (ex.
cutting worker benefits) as effective – or even proper – behaviour in the advancement of
the bottom line. Therefore, comparing perceptions of misbehaviour by class, we would
expect respondents of a lower occupational class, who are more likely to find their best
interests in conflict with capitalist hegemony, to report both employee and employer
misbehaviour as more frequent than their upper-class counterparts.
Hypothesis 2: Respondents of lower occupational classes will report more employee
misbehaviour than other classes.
Hypothesis 3: Respondents of lower occupational classes will report more employer
misbehaviour than other classes.
So, employer misbehaviour is a social phenomenon liable to be underreported and
downplayed, but the literature does fortunately offers us a few clues as to the factors
which might act to constrain or encourage it.
An important and reoccurring finding within the academic literature associated with
white collar and corporate crime – and one that is reinforced by the investigative
journalists behind the most famous exposés on employer misbehaviour – is the pursuit of
profit-maximization at the expense of wider values, ethics and normative expectations.
Though the misbehaving employer, company or corporation will almost always seek to
deny their involvement or redirect blame – citing the incompetence of managers or
employees is a favoured strategy. Concerned or affected parties (journalists, researchers,
investigators, families of workers, etc.) have most often referenced how the maximization
of profit came to outweigh all other considerations within a particular organization,
creating an environment where immoral and illegal activity was permissible if it would
help the bottom line (Bakan, 2004; Biggerstaff et al., 2015; Davidson, 1970; Gilbert,
2005; McAdams, 1977; Nader, 1965; Schwartz & Ellison, 1982).
Though the sorts of employer misbehaviour that are most often studied are primarily
criminal, we predict that the drive towards greater profit will remain an influential
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predictor of employer misbehaviour even when a more general conception of employer
misbehaviour is utilized. In the present study, we make use of several economic
indicators expected to influence the amount of reported employer misbehaviour
connected to the pursuit of profit.
Hypothesis #4: Less wealthy employers will report more frequent misbehaviour.
Hypothesis #5: Employers who report compensation lower than they feel they
deserve will report more misbehaviour.
Hypothesis #6: Employers who believe it is likely that they might lose their business
will report more misbehaviour.
Another question of interest to us is whether certain characteristics of an employer’s
work force might influence the reported frequency of employer misbehaviour. More
specifically, we are interested in measures of employee vulnerability to employer
misbehaviour.
The central purpose of a labour union is to advance the interests of workers by
maintaining or raising wages, protecting benefits and working standards, and providing
collective representation for those who would otherwise be fundamentally disadvantaged
in individual employment negotiations (Behrens, 2014; Fernandez, 2016; Marx, 1867;
Webb & Webb, 1898). While it is true that not all unions are equally effective – and they
may offer little protection to customers, the wider public or the environment – we think it
is reasonable to expect that their presence in a workplace will act as a constraint upon
employer misbehaviour by opposing at least those instances of misbehaviour which
threaten workers’ safety or economic interests.
In contrast to unionized workers who might be expected to be better protected from
employer misbehaviour, temporary or part-time workers facing precarious working
conditions could be more vulnerable to employer misbehaviour because they lack the
protections generally afforded to permanent employees (Letourneux, 1998; Quinlan,
2012; Underhill & Rimmer, 2015; Vosko, 2006). We hypothesize that the relative
vulnerability of an employer’s workforce will influence the frequency of employer
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misbehaviour – with a union presence acting as a constraint on misbehaviour and
increased employment of part-time or temporary workers motivating greater
misbehaviour by employers.
Hypothesis #7: The presence of a union in the workplace will be associated with less
reported employer misbehaviour.
Hypothesis #8: Employers who report a recent organizational change towards
greater employment of part-time or temporary workers will report more frequent
employer misbehaviour.

3.3 Methodology
3.3.1

Data

The analyses associated with this study make use of two different samples, both of which
are drawn from the larger Changing Workplaces in a Knowledge Economy (CWKE)
2016 data set focused on issues of work and lifelong learning. This data was gathered
through random digit dialing and simple random selection of respondents from the Leger
Research Intelligence Group’s professional web panel of 475,000 individuals. Our larger
CWKE data set is representative of the national working population and comprised of
2,979 adult Canadians (more information on the data set and sampling methodology is
available in the general methodology notes section of chapter 1). In the following
analytical approach section, we include an explanation of the two subsamples utilized for
the analyses in this chapter.

3.3.2

Analytical Approach

The following analysis is separated into two distinct modules. The first and shorter of
these modules is focused on comparing the perceived frequency of employee and
employer misbehaviour, while accounting for any differences in perceptions of
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misbehaviour by occupational class (Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3). Because we were interested
in perceptions of employee and employer misbehaviour by respondents across the entire
occupational hierarchy, our sample includes everyone from the CWKE data set that
provided information on their class category (N=2881; about 97% of the complete
CWKE data set of working Canadians N=2,979). While some respondents in our sample
chose not to answer one or either of our misbehaviour items, the response rate for both
items remains respectable (N=2,613 and N=2,544). This analytical module consists of
only bivariate analysis.
Our second – and larger – analytical module is concerned with exploration of the
phenomenon of employer misbehaviour as reported by employers themselves
(Hypotheses 4,5,6,7,8). Correspondingly, we used a 9-category occupational class
variable to select only small employers (1 to 10 employees) and large employers (11 or
more employees) for these analyses. Upper managers, middle managers, supervisors,
professional employees, service workers, industrial workers, the self-employed (with no
other paid employees) and respondents who could not be classified were excluded. After
this selection of only employers, we were left with a total sample of 108 respondents,
spanning the range of employers who had only one paid employee up to those engaging
as many as two-hundred and forty workers. In this module, we began by conducting a
separate bivariate analysis for each of our independent variables by the dependent
variable (frequency of employer misbehaviour), and then conducted several waves of
multivariate analysis that incorporate all explanatory variables alongside relevant control
variables. As with the previous chapter, we treat our ordinal dependent variables as
continuous, enabling OLS regression for our multivariate analysis (see section 2.5 for
justification of this decision). We note here that a sample of only 108 individuals is a
relatively small sample for multivariate analysis; though it would be preferable to have
more respondents, our sample size is reflective of the lower proportion of employers
within the Canadian work force. For bivariate analysis, each of our independent
variables were ordinal, so gamma was available to help describe each relationship. We
chose gamma over more conservative measures (ex. tau-b, tau-c) due to our greater
familiarity with the measure and for ease of interpretation. Additionally, our preliminary
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analyses examining gamma alongside other possible ordinal by ordinal measures
convinced us that gamma was not greatly exaggerating the strength of the relationships
under study.

3.3.2.1
3.3.2.1.1

Summary of Approach
Module 1

Bivariate Analyses:
N=2,881 (all working individuals with valid occupational class data)
1) Occupational Class x Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour
2) Occupational Class x Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour

3.3.2.1.2

Module 2

Bivariate Analyses:
N=97 (only employers of one or more other full-time employees, who also have a valid
response on employer misbehaviour item). NOTE: Size of N varies across analyses
according to missing data within independent variables.
1) Employer Wealth x Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour
2) Self-Evaluation of Appropriateness of Employer Compensation x Frequency of
Employer Misbehaviour
3) Likelihood of Business Loss x Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour
4) Union Presence x Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour
5) Increased Employment of Non-Permanent Workers x Frequency of Employer
Misbehaviour
Multivariate Analyses:
N=97 (only employers of one or more other full-time employees, who also have a valid
response on employer misbehaviour item). NOTE: Size of N varies across analyses
according to missing data within independent variables.
Model 1: Independent Variables: Wealth, Appropriateness of Compensation, Likelihood
of Business Loss
Dependent Variable: Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour
Model 2: Independent Variables: Wealth, Appropriateness of Compensation, Likelihood
of Business Loss, Union Presence, Greater Reliance on Non-Permanent Labour
Dependent Variable: Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour
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Model 3: Independent Variables: Wealth, Appropriateness of Compensation, Likelihood
of Business Loss, Union Presence, Greater Reliance on Non-Permanent Labour
Dependent Variable: Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour
Control Variables: Sector, Industry, Number of Employees, Employer Participation in
Organizational Decision-making

3.4 Measures
3.4.1

Dependent Variables

The first of our dependent variables operationalizes employee misbehaviour. The item,
as it appeared to respondents, read “How common do you think employee misbehaviour
such as taking organization-owned materials or loafing on the job is in places like where
you work? Respondents could answer “extremely uncommon”, “fairly uncommon”,
“fairly common” or “extremely common”. This dependent variable is only used within
the first analytical module of our study (See general methodological notes section in
chapter 1 for more information about this variable and Appendix 2 for non-response
analysis).
Our second dependent variable – and the one which is used throughout the entirety of our
analysis – measures respondents’ perceptions of the frequency of employer
misbehaviour. The item, as posed to respondents, read “How common do you think
employer misbehaviour such as not paying employees some earned benefits or avoiding
taxes on earnings is in places like where you work?” As with our other employee
misbehaviour item, the four available valid responses ranged from “extremely
uncommon” to “extremely common” (See general methodological notes section in
chapter 1 for more information about this variable and Appendix 2 for non-response
analysis).
It should be noted here that both of our misbehaviour items measure respondents’
perceptions of misbehaviour, rather than an objective count of misbehaviour events. The
measuring of the latter would entail significant methodological difficulties and ethical
concerns, including identification of misbehaving individuals, so we move forward with
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the assumption that respondent perceptions of misbehaviour – while remaining an
indirect measure – will generally reflect the actual incidence of employer misbehaviour.

3.4.2
3.4.2.1

Independent Variables
Occupational Class

The first of our independent variables measures respondent occupational class and was
constructed using detailed job description and job title information provided by
respondents (See Appendix 3 for construction logic). Respondents could belong to one
of nine occupational classes (large employer, small employer, self-employed, upper
manager, middle manager, supervisor, professional employee, service worker and
industrial worker) or remain unclassified.
This variable was the primary explanatory variable in the first analytical module and was
also used to select our sample of employers for the second module. This variable is not
further utilized in the second module as the applicable sample is composed of
respondents of only two occupational class categories – small and large employers.
We regard certain occupational classes as lower in the hierarchy of the relations of
production than others: Industrial and service workers are lower in the class order than
both non-managerial professional employees and managerial employees. Within the
managerial hierarchy, we consider supervisors as lower in class position than middle
managers, who are themselves lower than upper managers. Large and small employers
are considered higher in the class order than most other occupational categories.

3.4.2.2

Employer Net Wealth

Our net wealth variable was originally presented to all respondents as a 15-point scale
ranging from “less than $5,000” to “Above $10 million,” but has been reduced to only six
categories for ease of bivariate analysis and presentation in module 2, which makes use
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of ordinal by ordinal measures of association and significance. An additional reason for
this reduction of categories for bivariate analysis was because of the small number of
cases in some wealth categories (somewhat to be expected with an N lower than 100). In
the multivariate portion of module 2, we incorporate the more specific information
provided by the original 15-category wealth variable.

3.4.2.3

Employer Self-Evaluation of Appropriateness of
Compensation

In the following analysis, we utilize an appropriateness of compensation variable to
measure employers’ subjective evaluation of the profit gleaned from their position of
ownership. The applicable item posed the following question to respondents, “Compared
to the value you produce at your workplace, do you think your compensation is much less
than you deserve, somewhat less, about right, somewhat more than you deserve or much
more than you deserve?” and provides us with a 5-point ordinal variable for use within
our second analytical module. For the purposes of the bivariate ordinal by ordinal
analysis, the two categories of “somewhat more than you deserve” and “much more than
you deserve” are combined due to the low number of cases within these categories
(again, not unexpected when working with a smaller sample size).

3.4.2.4

Likelihood of Business Loss in the Next Year

For hypothesis 6, we were interested in whether the economic pressure associated with
the loss of one’s business might encourage greater employer misbehaviour. The original
questionnaire item associated with this variable requested all respondents answer “How
likely is it that you will lose your job/business in the next year?”. Moving forward with a
sample of only employers for Module 2, we assume that all remaining respondents are
commenting on the likelihood of business loss (rather than job loss). The responses to
this questionnaire item provide us with an ordinal variable with data points along a 4point Likert scale ranging from very unlikely to very likely.
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3.4.2.5

Presence of Union within Employer’s Work Organization

Our union presence variable is made up of the respondents’ answers to the question “Is
there a trade union at your workplace?” with “Yes or “No” as the only two valid response
categories (3 non-response categories were also available). Further information on the
characteristics of the union, its effectiveness or the rate of unionization among employees
within the employer’s organization is unfortunately not available within our data set.

3.4.2.6

Increased Employment of Non-Permanent Workers

For our eighth hypothesis, we are interested in examining whether a precarious workforce
will motivate employers towards greater misbehaviour. The assumption here is that the
lack of protections afforded to non-permanent workers – and viable options for recourse
in the face of employer misbehaviour – will provide employers with greater opportunity
to misbehave. We do not have available to us a straightforward measure on the
employment status of the employees who make up a respondent’s workforce, but we do
know whether an employer’s organization has increased its employment of part-time or
temporary workers in the past five years. Two obvious caveats here surround the fact
that the magnitude of the increased reliance on non-permanent workers for the employer
is unknown and also that it is possible for an employer who has been relying on nonpermanent labour for longer than five years – without increasing this reliance – to
reasonably answer in the negative to our question “Has your workplace experienced any
of the following forms of organizational change in the last five years: greater reliance on
part-time or temporary workers?” We acknowledge the possibility of these outside cases
as potential sources of error, but still consider it worthwhile to use this variable – the only
measure of employers’ engagement of precarious labour available to us. Valid responses
to this item are in binary format (yes or no).
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3.4.3

Control Variables

The control variables included in our final multivariate model were selected in an effort
to avoid spuriousness and separate the influence of our key explanatory variables from
that of other potentially relevant variables.
The first of our control variables indicates the sector of the employer’s work organization
(private, public or non-profit). In our sample, about 95% of the employers are associated
with the private sector.
The second control variable measures the industry the employer is associated with
(goods-producing or service providing). About 33% of our sample of employers are
associated with goods-producing industries while the remainder are service-providers.
The third control variable measures the size of the work organization defined by the
number of employees. This number ranges from one to two hundred and forty, but about
84% of our sample of employers engage ten or fewer employees.
Our fourth and final control variable indicates whether the employer participates in
workplace decision-making related to policy on types of products or services delivered,
employee hiring and firing, budgeting, determining workload or changing work
procedure. Eighty-eight percent of the employers indicated involvement in decisions
such as these.

3.4.4

A Note on Multicollinearity

A correlation matrix was constructed to check for multicollinearity (see Appendix 6).
This was particularly important considering the high R2 values in our multivariate models
(Table 3.7). Our correlation matrix reveals only weak and very weak associations
between independent and control variables. The associations between the dummy
categories of organizational sector are moderately powerful, but this is to be expected and
not cause for concern. Despite their lower strength, there are still several significant
relationships worth highlighting here: 1) The presence of a union by employer wealth (-
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.30), 2) employer wealth by employer subjective evaluation of compensation (.27) and 3)
employer wealth by risk of business loss (-.24). Though these relationships are weak,
they are between variables which are all significantly related to the dependent variable
and this limited multicollinearity could be inflating our R2 measures to some extent.
However, this multicollinearity is still well within tolerance with each of these
explanatory variables maintaining significant power of association with the dependent
variable. It is likely that the high R2 values have more to do with the limited sample size
of later multivariate models (N=37; N=36).
Note that the above discussion of multicollinearity applies only to the second and primary
module of this chapter, focused on the exploration of the phenomenon of employer
misbehaviour. The smaller analytical module concerned with perceptions of the
frequency of misbehaviour by occupational class features only bivariate analysis, making
a multicollinearity check unnecessary.

3.5 Results
3.5.1

Module 1: Reported Misbehaviour by Occupational Class

The results for the first module of our analysis is displayed in Table 3.1. First, we can
see that, across every occupational class, the perception of organizational misbehaviour
as common or extremely common is a minority position. However, while the general
trend is to perceive both employer and employee misbehaviour as an uncommon
occurrence, there is an obvious difference between these types of misbehaviour in terms
of their perceived frequency: Only about 15% of respondents reported employer
misbehaviour as common, while 37% of the sample perceived misbehaviour by
employees to be a common workplace occurrence. This perception of misbehaviour by
employees as being more frequent than that of employers holds across all class positions
and provides solid evidence in support of our first hypothesis (see rightmost column of
Table 3.1 for magnitude of employee misbehaviour reporting relative to employer

112

misbehaviour). However, there are also notable differences by occupational class in the
reported frequency of both types of misbehaviour.
In the previous chapter, we examined the association between non-managerial employee
occupational class and the frequency of employee misbehaviour and found it to be
significant, with employees who occupied lower class positions (service and industrial
workers) reporting more misbehaviour than employees of a higher occupational class
(professionals). Now, comparing all respondents across the full range of the occupational
class structure, a general trend whereby employee misbehaviour is reported as less
frequent by those higher up in the hierarchy of the work organization is immediately
perceptible: Less than 34% of all the employers, upper managers and middle managers
report it as a common workplace occurrence. On the other hand, those occupying lower
class positions perceive employee misbehaviour as much more frequent, with as many as
48% of the respondents in some categories reporting it as a fairly or extremely common
event. Professional employees stand out as reporting considerably less employee
misbehaviour than other non-managerial employee categories, with figures much closer
to that of employers and upper and middle management. Finally, supervisors – the
managerial group most closely observing non-managerial workers – were distinguished
as the class category reporting the greatest frequency of employee misbehaviour: Close
to half of them (48%) perceived it as a common occurrence in the workplace.
We found a similar trend to that outlined above in the reporting of greater employer
misbehaviour by respondents lower in the occupational class structure – service workers
and industrial workers reported employer misbehaviour as common in greater numbers
than the respondents in any other class category. Once again, professional employees
were notable in reporting employer misbehaviour as considerably less frequent than other
non-managerial employees. On the other hand, supervisors – the occupational class
category which reported employee misbehaviour as more frequent than any other – do
not particularly stand out with regards to their reporting of the frequency of employer
misbehaviour.
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Table 3.1 Perceived Frequency of Misbehaviour (Employee and Employer) by
Occupational Class
Occupational Class
% who report % who report % difference in
employee
employer
reporting of
misbehaviour misbehaviour employee
as common
as common or misbehaviour
or extremely extremely
compared to
common
common
employer
misbehaviour
Employers
Large Employer
29.4
17.6
11.8
Small Employer
25.6
12.7
12.9
Managers
Upper Manager
23.0
4.8
18.2
Middle Manager
33.4
8.1
25.3
Supervisor
47.8
13.3
34.5
Non-Managerial
Employees
Professional Employee 30.7
11.0
19.7
Service Worker
41.5
19.6
21.9
Industrial Worker
44.5
19.5
25.0
Self-Employed (no full29.1
19.3
9.8
time employees)
Overall %
36.6
15.1
21.5
Total N
2613
2544
Though we found considerable evidence of higher perceptions of employer misbehaviour
by those at the bottom of the occupational class structure, there is no obvious linear trend
that can be perceived across the entire hierarchy: The service and industrial workers did
express the highest reporting of employer misbehaviour – around 20% say it is common
or extremely common – but the large employers are close behind with 18% in that
category of respondent saying the same (note: a 2% difference is not significant for a
sample of this size and there may be no practical difference between these groups).
Additionally, it was interesting to find that the lowest reporting of employer
misbehaviour was to be found within the managerial class hierarchy – where upper and
middle managers reported employer misbehaviour as relatively infrequent (only 4.8% of
upper managers and 8.1% of middle managers perceived it to be common).

114

3.5.2
3.5.2.1

Module 2: Key Factors Associated with Employer
Misbehaviour
Bivariate Analysis

The following results correspond to our second analytical module, featuring a sample of
only employers, to explore the structural factors associated with the reported frequency of
employer misbehaviour. Our fourth hypothesis suggested that less wealthy employers
would be more likely to report greater misbehaviour and the bivariate results displayed in
Table 3.2 provide evidence in-line with this assumption.
Table 3.2 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Employer Wealth
Total Wealth ($)
N
Employer
Gamma Significance
misbehaviour fairly or
(γ)
(p-value)
extremely common (%)
20,000 or less
8
37.5
20,001 to 75,000
4
25.0
75,001 to 150,000
14
35.7
150,001 to 500,000
15
0.0
500,001 to 1 million
10
10.0
Above 1 million
18
5.6
Total
69
15.9
-.503
.000
For every employer wealth category up to $150,000, 25% or more of the respondents
reported employer misbehaviour as a fairly or extremely common occurrence – with the
percentage of respondents reporting common employer misbehaviour reaching as high as
38% in the lowest employer wealth bracket. On the other hand, employers in wealth
brackets above $150,000 reported employer misbehaviour as considerably less frequent:
None of the employers possessing wealth between $150,000 to $500,000 and 10% or less
of those possessing above $500,000 reported employer misbehaviour as a common
occurrence. Our measure of association for the bivariate relationship between employer
wealth and the frequency of misbehaviour is significant with a gamma coefficient (γ) of .503, indicating a negative relationship of moderate strength.
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Table 3.3 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Appropriateness of
Compensation
Compared to the value
N
Employer
Gamma (γ) Significance
you produce at your
misbehaviour
(p-value)
workplace, do you think
fairly or extremely
your compensation is…
common (%)
Much less than deserved
16
50.0
Somewhat less
21
19.0
About right
48
2.1
More than deserved
7
14.3
Total
92
15.2
-.443
.008
The second of our economic explanatory variables looked at the subjective evaluation of
the appropriateness of compensation by employers (see Table 3.3 above for bivariate
results). First, while it was possible for respondents to evaluate the appropriateness of
their compensation using any of the five categories from “much less than deserved” to
“much more than deserved”, the great majority of employers answered in the range from
“much less than deserved” through “somewhat less than deserved” to “about right”. Only
7% of the employers sampled believed their compensation to be “somewhat more than
deserved” or “much more than deserved” and were grouped together as one category for
bivariate analysis.
This analysis of employers’ evaluations of compensation appropriateness in relation to
frequency of employer misbehaviour revealed significant evidence of a moderately strong
negative relationship between these variables (γ= -.443): Employers who evaluated
themselves as undercompensated reported more frequent employer misbehaviour than
those who felt adequately compensated or overcompensated. The results for those few
employers who reported overcompensation are harder to interpret for a couple reasons: 1)
the number of cases are few, requiring additional caution in our conclusion, and 2) they
do not easily fit the established linear trend between variables – the employers who
reported more compensation than deserved reported less frequent misbehaviour than
those who felt undercompensated, but considerably more than those who believed they
were adequately compensated.
Our third explanatory variable, likelihood of employer business loss – like wealth and
appropriateness of compensation – acts as an indicator of the economic circumstances or
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pressures that employers can find themselves confronted with. In Table 3.4, the bivariate
results for this variable are displayed.
Table 3.4 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Likelihood of Business
Loss
How likely is it that you
N
Employer misbehaviour Gamma Significance
will lose your business in
fairly or extremely
(γ)
the next year?
common (%)
Very unlikely
57
12.1
Somewhat unlikely
20
5.0
Somewhat likely
9
37.5
Very likely
2
0.0
Total
88
12.5
.233
.219
The employers reporting the most frequent misbehaviour were those who believed it was
somewhat likely that they might lose their business in the next year. However, the
frequencies for the other categories do not follow any perceivable trend and our test of
significance was not passed, so there is little evidence of a bivariate relationship between
the likelihood of business loss and our dependent variable.
We next examined the possibility of a bivariate relationship between the amount of
misbehaviour reported by employers and the presence (or non-presence) of a union
within the work organization (see Table 3.5). Here, we found intriguing evidence in
support of such a relationship, but in the opposite direction as hypothesized: 80% of the
employers of unionized workers reported employer misbehaviour as common or
extremely common compared to only 11% of the employers of non-unionized workers.
Additionally, our test of association provides further evidence of a significant and very
strong positive relationship between these two variables (γ= .952). It should be noted that
only about 5% of employers reported a union presence in their organization, so there is
some reason to be cautious in our conclusions regarding this relationship. Nevertheless,
the differences in frequency of employer misbehaviour by union presence is particularly
pronounced – and there is no obvious reason to suspect that our sampled employers of
unionized workers are not representative of the wider Canadian population – so we move
forward assuming our results indicate the existence of a real increase in the perceived
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frequency of employer misbehaviour explained by the presence of a union within the
workplace.
Table 3.5 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Union Presence
Union Present in
N
Employer misbehaviour fairly Gamma Significance
the Workplace?
or extremely common (%)
(γ)
No
89
11.2
Yes
5
80.0
Total
94
14.9
.952
.017
While we expected the presence of a union within the workplace to act as a constraint on
employer misbehaviour, an increasing reliance upon non-permanent workers was
hypothesized to have the opposite effect – motivating employers towards more frequent
misbehaviour. The results of the bivariate analysis displayed in Table 3.6 seem to
provide support for a connection between a workforce characterized by non-permanent
employment arrangements and greater perceptions of employer misbehaviour – about
13% more of the employers who indicated a recent organizational change towards greater
reliance on part-time or temporary workers – compared with those who did not indicate
such an organizational change – reported common or extremely common employer
misbehaviour. However, our measure of association falls short of statistical significance,
so we should be cautious in our interpretation of the bivariate relationship between these
variables.
Table 3.6 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Greater Reliance on
Non-Permanent Workers
Greater reliance on part- N
Employer misbehaviour
Gamma Significance
time or temporary
fairly or extremely
(γ)
workers
common (%)
No
34
8.8
Yes
18
22.2
Total
52
13.5
.324
.199

3.5.2.2

Multivariate Models

Following the bivariate analyses, we conducted multivariate analyses for three models of
employer misbehaviour, with each subsequent one incorporating additional explanatory
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variables (all of which are key variables receiving attention in the preceding bivariate
portion of module 2).
Table 3.7 Multivariate Models of Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
β coefficient β coefficient β coefficient
(SE)
(SE)
(SE)
Economic
Total net wealth
-.344
-.439
-.574
Pressures
(.029)**
(.036)**
(.039)***
Appropriateness of
-.245
-.297
-.439
compensation
(.091)*
(.117)*
(.119)**
Likelihood of Business
-.034 (.117) -.035 (.115) -.125 (.112)
Loss
Protection
Trade union present in
.459
.369
or
workplace
(.338)***
(.339)**
Vulnerabilit Greater Reliance on Non.205 (.241)
.369
y of
Permanent Workers
(.253)**
Workforce
Control
Number of Employees
.265 (.015)*
Variables
Sector
Private (ref.)
-Public
-.245 (.402)
Non-Profit
-.174 (.718)
Industry
Goods-producing (ref.)
-Service-providing
-.118 (.212)
Employer participates in
.019 (.271)
workplace decision-making
R2
.194
.597
.717
2
Adjusted R
.156
.534
.610
N
66
37
36
Notes. *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001.
Regression coefficients represent standardized slopes (standard error in brackets).
The first of our multivariate models contained three explanatory variables – total net
wealth, appropriateness of compensation and likelihood of business loss. These variables
are related to the economic circumstances and pressures faced by employers – identified
as potential explanatory factors by the white-collar crime and corporate violence
literature that routinely lists profit-maximization as a central motivator towards employer
misbehaviour. Unsurprisingly, the two measures most closely connected to employer
profits – total wealth and appropriateness of compensation – were revealed to wield
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considerable and significant influence, with both lower net wealth and evaluations of
compensation as less than deserved contributing to greater frequency of perceived
employer misbehaviour. The relative effects of these explanatory variables are similar,
but there is some indication that total net wealth may be the slightly more influential of
the two measures (β= -.344 versus β= -.245). On the other hand, likelihood of business
loss appeared to have no significant association with the dependent variable.
Our second multivariate model retains our three economic explanatory variables and adds
in our two measures of workforce protection and workforce vulnerability –
conceptualized as trade union presence and greater reliance on non-permanent workers.
After incorporating these two additional measures, both of the significant economic
predictors of employer misbehaviour from the first model retained their significance –
with an increase in their estimated influence on the dependent variable. As with the first
model, the likelihood of business loss did not appear to be significantly linked with the
reported frequency of misbehaviour.
Of the two variables measuring workforce protection/vulnerability to employer
misbehaviour, only trade union presence emerged as significantly associated with the
dependent variable. As with the prior bivariate results, a union presence in the
organization was associated with the reporting of employer misbehaviour as more
frequent. The estimated strength of this relationship is considerable (β= .459) and union
presence as a predictor exceeds the explanatory power of both employer wealth and
appropriateness of compensation (β= -.439 and β= -.297).
In Model 3, we retained all previous explanatory variables and incorporated four control
variables – number of employees, sector, industry and employer involvement in
organizational decision-making. One of these control variables – number of employees –
was found to have a weak to moderate positive relationship with the dependent variable
(β= .265), so there is reason to suspect that employer misbehaviour may be more frequent
in larger organizations.
Unsurprisingly, the inclusion of these control variables modified the strength of
association for the significant factors already outlined, but none of the predictors of
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perceived employer misbehaviour identified in the previous models lost significance
through the inclusion of these controls. In this third model, both wealth and
appropriateness of compensation once again emerged as the most influential predictors,
with lower wealth (β= -.574) and lower self-evaluated appropriateness of compensation
(β= -.439) corresponding with a higher reported frequency of employer misbehaviour.
The presence of a union remained a significant predictor of more frequent employer
misbehaviour, but the inclusion of our control variables reduced the influence of this
variable slightly (β= .369 down from β= .459).
Interestingly, the inclusion of our control variables also resulted in our measure for
increased employer reliance on non-permanent labour gaining significance as a
moderately powerful predictor of greater frequency of employer misbehaviour (β= .369).
Employers who indicated greater employment of part-time or temporary workers also
reported greater frequency of employer misbehaviour.

3.6 Discussion
The first analytical module of our study was concerned with evaluating how the
perceived frequency of misbehaviour – by employees and employers – was associated
with the occupational class of the respondent. In the previous chapter, we studied the
relationship between occupational class and reported frequency of solely employee
misbehaviour for non-managerial and managerial employees separately. This chapter
incorporates employers and compares respondents across the full range of the
occupational hierarchy in their reporting of the frequency of both employee and employer
misbehaviour. These inclusions have provided us a more nuanced understanding of
organizational misbehaviour – though there is some limited overlap with our previous
exploration of the topic.
One trend which was present in the previous chapter and remains evident here is the
reporting of employee misbehaviour as more frequent by industrial and service workers.
This finding is not surprising from a perspective which understands the phenomenon of
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employee misbehaviour as a reaction by employees to negative working conditions, as
industrial and service workers are the occupational groups most likely to be confronted
by degraded working conditions on a routine basis (see chapter 2).
However, we also found industrial and service workers to be the greatest reporters of
frequent employer misbehaviour – rivaled only by large employers. This higher
perception of frequent employer misbehaviour by respondents of the lowest occupational
classes supported our third hypothesis and is more easily understood when recognizing
the ideological element in the very act of recognizing employer misbehaviour: Those
who experience the greatest alienation and whose working lives are in stark contradiction
to the promises of capitalist ideology may be more likely to express resistance to
hegemonic rule – in this case, by greater recognition of employers’ capacity to
misbehave.
Because hegemony is a feature of the antagonistic relationship between classes and
constantly leaves room for resistance by exercise of consciousness outside those patterns
sponsored by the economically dominant, it can never be fully complete (Connel, 1978;
Marx, 1844, 1867; Shapiro, 1984). However, it is those whose best interests are in
contradiction to capitalist hegemony that have the most to gain by challenging it, and this
is one possible explanation for why industrial and service workers report employer
misbehaviour as more frequent than both professional employees and managerial workers
– who both generally occupy more privileged positions in the class hierarchy and have
less to gain by challenging the popular assumption of employers as less prone to
misbehaviour than their employees.
In addition to this ideological explanation, it is also the case that industrial and service
workers may report greater employer misbehaviour because they are the ones most likely
to suffer from it: The negative working conditions experienced by many lower-class
workers can often be explained – at least in part – by an employer’s misbehaviour,
negligence or reluctance to take unprofitable action towards improving working
conditions (Bakan, 2004; Burns & Orrick, 2002; Greenwood, 2005; Hambrick & Mason,
1984; Marx, 1844, 1848, 1867).
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In chapter 2, we also proposed that professional employees report less employee
misbehaviour than other workers because of their lower inclination to report bad
behaviour of peers, the behavioural regulation that accompanies a professional identity
and because of the considerable benefits of their position relative to non-professionals.
Additionally, professional employees are probably less likely to be the victims of
employer misbehaviour, as the privileges and protections of their vocation – as well as
the fact that their specialized skills are not easily replaceable – make them harder
potential targets for employer misbehaviour.
Previously, we found that the reporting of frequent employee misbehaviour declined as
one ascended through the ranks of management and supervisors – those lowest in the
managerial hierarchy stood out as the class of worker that reported employee
misbehaviour as most frequent. We suggested that this result could be related to job
expectations and supervisor responsibility for early detection of employee misbehaviour
and routine discipline (see chapter 2). In terms of the detection of employer
misbehaviour, however, supervisors do not appear to regard it as a very frequent
occurrence – except when compared to other managers who report employer
misbehaviour as even more infrequent.
The occupational class that stood out as reporting the smallest amount of employer
misbehaviour were upper managers – a distinction they also hold with regards to the
reporting of employee misbehaviour. Upper managers’ lower perceptions of employee
misbehaviour can be explained by both their relative distance from the routine labour
taking place within the work organization and from the negative working conditions
which generally give rise to more frequent employee misbehaviour. On the other hand,
upper managers’ perceptions of employer misbehaviour as a rare occurrence likely has
more to do with the unity of economic interest generally shared by upper managers and
employers and the dependence of upper managers on employers for their relative
advantages over lower managers and non-managerial employees. While theorists have
commented in the past on the numerous distinctions between members of the upper class
and problematized the view of this group as monolithic (Bourdieu, 1986, 1996;
Dahrendorf, 1959; Flemmen, 2012; Scott, 1997; Weber, 1946; Zeitlin, 1989), at least in
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cases of employer misbehaviour which serve the bottom line, upper managers’ general
unity of economic interest with owners might contribute to a general overlooking of
misbehaviour engaged in by the latter.
Though there are obvious class differences in the reporting of misbehaviour, our results
also indicated a relative underreporting of the frequency of employer misbehaviour by
respondents of all occupational class positions – compared to the much higher reported
frequency of employee misbehaviour. The magnitude of reported difference between
employer misbehaviour and employee misbehaviour unsurprisingly varied by class – that
is, supervisors stood out as reporting far more employee than employer misbehaviour;
however, respondents of every class reported misbehaviour by employees as the more
common phenomenon. These results provide support for one of our initial hypotheses
and were not particularly surprising: The benefits of ownership extend considerable
ideological and legal protection to employers, making it far less likely that their actions
will be perceived as misbehaviour.
Three of our independent variables were selected to evaluate how economic pressures on
the employer can encourage greater employer misbehaviour. The first of these economic
variables measured employer wealth and was found to have an inverse relationship with
the reported frequency of employer misbehaviour. A simple explanation to this result is
that less wealthy employers face greater economic pressure and may be more inclined to
engage in misbehaviour as a means by which to raise profits. In contrast, an employer of
greater wealth may already be doing quite well using more legitimate means of wealthcreation and can afford to avoid the most questionable methods of raising profits. Profitmaximization has been highlighted by the corporate crime literature as a key motivator
towards misbehaviour for employers (Bakan, 2004; Biggerstaff et al., 2015; Davidson,
1970; Gilbert, 2005; McAdams, 1977; Nader, 1965; Schwartz & Ellison, 1982), and
wealthy owners are surely just as capable of misbehaviour – but it is likely that those who
are less wealthy will be more prone to engage in misbehaviour as a means to remain
competitive with other capitalists.

124

Our second economic explanatory variable measured employers’ subjective evaluation of
their own compensation, and we found a meaningful relationship whereby employers
who believed themselves to be undercompensated reported more frequent employer
misbehaviour. Previous work has outlined how envy by the undercompensated can act as
a powerful motivator towards unethical behaviour in a variety of circumstances (Gino &
Pierce, 2009, 2010; John et al., 2014; Toby, 1979), and we suspect we are witnessing a
similar effect here. We should note that a true deficit is not necessary for feelings of
envy to emerge, and that a simple overestimation of personal contributions to the work
environment is more than sufficient to motivate one towards misbehaviour as a means by
which to correct the perceived state of under compensation (Zenger, 1994). Therefore, it
is not just the less wealthy employers who are motivated towards misbehaviour in this
way, as a full 40% of the sampled employers reported feeling under compensated (only
8% felt overcompensated and 52% said their compensation was about right). As such,
subjective under-compensation emerged as a powerful predictor of greater perceived
misbehaviour for employers of all wealth levels.
We also included a variable for likelihood of business loss and hypothesized that
employers who perceived a greater likelihood that they would soon lose their business
would report more misbehaviour: The assumption here being that potential business loss
would motivate employers towards misbehaviour in hopes of maintaining the viability of
their business. However, we found no evidence of such a relationship. On reflection, it
may be that the diversity of potential reasons for losing one’s business could make a
difference: For example, low profits threatening the longevity of the business might be
improved by cost-cutting employer misbehaviour, but it is hard to imagine how this
would save a business that sells a newly-obsolete product. Additionally, the loss of one’s
business may not always be a wholly-negative experience that employers seek to avoid
(ex. being purchased by a competitor), and we might expect less motivation towards
employer misbehaviour in such circumstances. However, it should be noted here that
only 13% of the sampled employers anticipated business loss as somewhat or very likely
in the next year and perhaps a relationship would be discovered with a larger sample
and/or information on the reason for an employer’s loss of business.
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The last two of our main explanatory variables were chosen to aid in the examination of
whether characteristics of the work force might act to motivate or constrain employer
misbehaviour. It was hypothesized that greater employment of non-permanent workers
(temporary or part-time) would be associated with more frequent misbehaviour by
employers, and we found significant evidence of this relationship in our final model.
There is ample evidence within the literature to support the argument that precarious and
non-permanent workers are more likely to be victims of employer misbehaviour: Nonpermanent workers more frequently suffer psychologically as a result of organizational
injustice (Inoue et al., 2013), are more frequently treated as second-class employees by
employers (Boyce et al., 2007), are paid less and receive fewer benefits (Kalleberg et al.,
2000) and are often employed in hazardous jobs where they are easily replaceable
(Kochan et al, 1994). Therefore, despite the advantages provided to employers, nonpermanent workers’ vulnerability to mistreatment is salient, while any benefits of a
nonstandard work arrangement apply primarily to the highly-skilled and self-employed
(ex. lawyers, independent contractors, etc.) (Rasell & Appelbaum, 1998). In lesspreferred positions, non-permanent employment is clearly not a first-choice and engaged
in mainly out of a lack of other viable options (one study reported that 66% of oncall/day-labourers and 73% of temporary workers would prefer a permanent position
[Rasell & Appelbaum, 1998]). We propose that the relative vulnerabilities of nonpermanent workers make this group a more enticing target for misbehaving employers, as
a lack of job security and few alternative employment options offer scarcer protection
from exploitation and ill-treatment.
On the other hand, the presence of a union within a work organization was hypothesized
to contribute to a lower perceived frequency of employer misbehaviour. Compared to
those without collective representation, unionized workers generally receive better
employment protection and job training, higher pay and more robust non-wage benefits
(health, pension, support for reskilling/upskilling, etc.) (Boheim & Booth, 2004;
Kalleberg, 2009; Kalleberg et al., 2000; Oh, 2012; Raymo et al., 2011). In distinction to
the expected vulnerability of non-permanent workers to employer misbehaviour, the
advantages afforded to unionized workers were expected to act as additional protection
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from – and act as a restraint on – employer misbehaviour. However, we were surprised
to find significant evidence to the contrary, with employers reporting a union presence in
their organization also reporting more frequent employer misbehaviour. We think the
most likely explanation for this relationship is that unionization drives will be more
successful where there is a recognized history of employer misbehaviour. Martinez and
Fiorito (2009) and Eaton et al. (2014) have demonstrated how a negative evaluation of an
employer as “bad” was more influential than workers’ knowledge of the instrumental
advantages of union membership in predicting whether a particular drive towards union
formation would be successful. Therefore, to some extent, we should expect a
misbehaving employer to motivate employees towards unionization.
However, there is also some indication that employers might engage in more frequent
misbehaviour as a means of combatting union influence or weakening a union’s
effectiveness: Blacklisting of union activists, hiring private investigators to intimidate
and spy, fostering employee dependency on employer paternalism and the promotion of
“company” or conservative unions are all strategies that have been utilized by employers
in the past (Cochrane, 1989; Cooper & Patmore, 2002, 2009; Wright, 1995).
While unionization will not always prompt retaliatory employer misbehaviour, Bentham
(2002) found that Canadian employers opposed unionization 80% of the time; others
have added that incidences of unfair business practice by employers tend to increase in
response to unionization drives (Bruce, 1994; Riddel, 2001). Because union-busting
activities are often successful, employers may be motivated to participate in these
activities in circumstances where the outcome of the unionization drive is uncertain or
where union formation threatens to significantly diminish their profits (Freeman &
Kleiner, 1990). In this context, our results demonstrating the positive association
between union presence and perceptions of employer misbehaviour as more frequent is
understandable – with unionization as both a reaction by workers to past employer
misbehaviour and as motivation for further employer misbehaviour in the form of unionbusting activities.
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Finally, though an examination of the relationships between control variables and our
dependent variable were not a primary focus of our study, there are a few results worth
mentioning.
We found evidence of a weak to moderate strength positive relationship between
organizational size (number of employees) and the frequency of employer misbehaviour
reported. A similar relationship was discovered for employee misbehaviour in the
previous chapter and it may be that the additional cover and shielding from discovery –
as well as the considerable legal protections – that a large organization provides also
motivates greater employer misbehaviour. Additionally, the greater familiarity between
employers and employees in smaller organizations might function to reduce employer
misbehaviour by increasing the psychological cost of misbehaviour that would negatively
impact the lives of employees who they have a personal connection with. On the other
hand, the greater distance between larger employers and those they employ likely reduces
this cost, allowing employers distance from the consequences of their actions and also the
ability to more easily abdicate responsibility for their actions and transfer blame onto
upper managers (Biggerstaff et al., 2015; Gottschalk, 2012; McMullan & McClung,
2016; Shaban et al., 2017; Trevino, 2005).
Sector was included in this study as a control variable instead of a main explanatory
variable for employer misbehaviour because nearly all the employers sampled were
owners of for-profit organizations (only 5% were non-profit or public). In the context of
our findings that economic pressure towards profit-maximization is a key motivator of
employer misbehaviour, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the phenomenon will be more
frequent in for-profit environments which prioritize the bottom-line as the primary – or
sole – means of evaluating organizational performance. Examining the role of
organizational sector with a more diverse sample of employers would surely be a fruitful
direction for future research on the topic of employer misbehaviour.
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3.7 Conclusion
Comparing perceptions of both employee and employer misbehaviour by occupational
class, we found considerable differences in reported frequency related to differences in
structural position and divergent economic interests. In addition, across every class
group, there was a consistent trend towards the underreporting of employer misbehaviour
relative to the reported frequency of employee misbehaviour.
The results of our exploratory research into the phenomenon of employer misbehaviour
revealed lower wealth, subjective under compensation, employment of non-permanent
workers and union presence within the workplace to be important predictors of a higher
perceived frequency of employer misbehaviour.
However, while our model boasts a relatively high measure of explained variance in
employer misbehaviour (Adjusted R2=.61), it is likely that the relatively small sample
size of our final multivariate model is playing a role here (N=36). Correspondingly,
replication of these results is one obvious and necessary direction for future research into
employer misbehaviour.
Two other promising avenues for future research would address the need for a closer
examination of the relationship between unionization and employer misbehaviour and a
fuller accounting of the differences in employer misbehaviour by sector (for-profit versus
non-profit).
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Chapter 4

4

Class Consciousness and Perceptions of
Organizational Misbehaviour

4.1 Introduction
In our earlier general methodological notes section (chapter 1), we acknowledged that
respondent subjectivity would invariably colour the reported frequency of misbehaviour
within a workplace. In the two previous papers (chapters 2 and 3), we focused on the
relationships between respondents’ structural conditions and the frequency of workplace
misbehaviour reported by them, treating subjective differences in respondents’
perceptions of misbehaviour as an unknown – but unavoidable – source of error inherit to
our methodological approach.
However, in this chapter we enquire whether an individual’s class consciousness will
influence their perception of the frequency of workplace misbehaviour. We highlight
three key elements of class consciousness in the present study: (1) Personal class
identification (what class does the individual identify themselves as being a part of), (2)
oppositional attitudes (recognition of the structural conflict of interest between workers
and owners) and (3) counter-hegemonic attitudes (believing there are viable alternatives
to capitalist economic relations). We find that all three of these elements of class
consciousness influence the frequency of misbehaviour reported by respondents:
Respondents who identified as a member of a lower class, who expressed a more
oppositional perspective or who held more counter-hegemonic attitudes perceived both
employee and employer organizational misbehaviour as more frequent than other
respondents.

4.2 Background
The literature surrounding organizational misbehaviour provides good reason to examine
the connection between ideological attitudes and perceptions of misbehaviour, as their

143

influence is more than evident within the variety of perspectives taken by those who write
on the topic. For example, studies on organizational misbehaviour taking an individual
pathological approach – i.e. human-resource or management perspectives – tend towards
underestimating the frequency of the phenomenon, denying or ignoring considerable
evidence of workplace misbehaviour as a widespread phenomenon engaged in – at least
to some extent – by most employees (Harper, 1990; Harris & Ogbonna, 2002, 2006;
Lawrence et al., 2007; Lee & Ok, 2014; Paulsen, 2014; Slora, 1989). This downplaying
and underestimating of the phenomenon is not particularly surprising for a segment of the
organizational misbehaviour literature that is primarily concerned with advancing
managerial and employer interests: To acknowledge that employee misbehaviour is
widespread invites inquiry into the structural conditions that often give rise to it –
degraded work, lack of autonomy and experiences of injustice.
A structural understanding of employee misbehaviour and the recognition of its ubiquity
compete with the dominant capitalist narrative of general worker compliance, orderly
production and harmony of worker, manager and owner interests (Barker, 1999; Casey,
1999; Frenkel et al., 1998; Kinnie et al., 2000; Luthans, 1972). Therefore, the standard
operating procedure of those who are aligned with the capitalist ideological perspective
that presents capitalist relations of production as the only viable means by which to
organize human economic activity has been to maintain that misbehaviour within the
workplace is infrequent and carried out primarily by a small number of pathological
individuals (Bibi, 2013; Henle et al., 2010; Kets de Vries, 2017; Laabs et al., 1999;
Leavitt, 1973; Wilson & Rosenfeld, 1990).
On the other hand, incidences of misbehaviour might also be overestimated by a different
group of stake-holders. Employee misbehaviour is often highlighted for its potential to
act as a form of worker resistance that is subtle and individual – in contrast to more
formalized or collective resistance strategies such as union representation and negotiation
(Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Analoui, 1995; Edwards et al., 1995; Fleming & Sewell,
2002; Hodson, 2001; Muholland, 2004; Prasad & Prasad, 2000; Thompson, 2016). Now,
while there is good reason to highlight how employee misbehaviour can sometimes
function as a form of worker resistance (for example, sabotage or output limitation) there
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is also a danger that those who emphasize this potential for resistance may overestimate
misbehaviour. In her work on “decaf resistance,” Alessia Contu (2008) is critical of
those who are overly optimistic about misbehaviour, too-readily celebrating every small
act of misbehaviour as a potentially revolutionary act. Though the objective of Contu
and others is to problematize the assumption of misbehaviour as resistance, their
evidence suggests that those who are overly-inclined towards identifying misbehaviour as
worker resistance – and highly-motivated in their search to find evidence of more
resistance – might also perceive greater frequency of misbehaviour (Contu, 2008;
Fleming, 2005; Fleming & Spicer, 2003; Paulsen, 2014; Prassad, 2008). For example, a
personal cynical disengagement from work that has no effect on production efficiency
would not be considered a form of misbehaviour by most, but those who are looking for
evidence of grass-roots worker resistance may readily do so (Baines, 2011; De Certeau,
1984; Hodson, 2001; Mumby, 2005; Sotirin & Gottfried, 1999).
It is evident that the political leanings of an individual can affect their perception of the
frequency of organizational misbehaviour, but we might expect this relationship to be
even stronger where a general definition of misbehaviour – rather than one which is
rigidly defined – is utilized. In the present study, we use a definition of organizational
misbehaviour that encompasses any activity in the workplace that one is not supposed to
engage in (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Burawoy, 1979; Sprouse, 1992). With this
general and non-restrictive definition of misbehaviour, the frequency of misbehaviour
reported will be more heavily mediated by the subjectivity of the respondent – as every
individual can be expected to have a unique conception of what is, and is not, proper
workplace behaviour. For example, is it acceptable to check personal email while at
work? If it is permissible to do so, does checking personal email become misbehaviour if
engaged in too frequently? If yes, what is the acceptable amount of personal email after
which this behaviour becomes misbehaviour? The range of possible perspectives on the
activity of checking personal email at work varies widely and whether this activity is
deemed to be misbehaviour would depend on each individual respondent’s evaluation of
it. This subjective evaluation of misbehaviour is likely impacted by the individual
characteristics of the respondent – manners, habits, upbringing, characteristics of the job,
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and so on – but the personal characteristics that we take for this study’s primary
explanatory variables measure the various elements of the class consciousness of the
respondent.
Class consciousness is a concept originally outlined by Karl Marx, but one which has
been developed considerably since his time, as later Marxists have come to grips with the
reality of a proletarian revolution that seems to be endlessly forestalled. In his critique of
capitalism, Marx outlined the objective conditions inherit to this system of production
that would produce the circumstances ripe for a proletarian revolution – degraded work,
alienation, exploitation and class antagonism (Marx, 1848, 1867) – but the industrial
proletariat of the 19th century let him down by failing to develop the requisite popular
revolutionary class consciousness (Mann, 1973; Ollman, 1972). Marx originally
explained class consciousness as the transition from the proletariat as a ‘class-in-itself’ to
a ‘class-for-itself,’ but it can also be understood as the process of psychological
development leading to one’s recognition that they are a part of a class and that the
members of this class have common interests (Ollman, 1972). Revolutionary proletarian
class consciousness would then go one step further by including the recognition that
one’s interests are best served by overthrow of the system of capitalist production that
exploits the proletariat both individually and collectively (Mills, 1962).
Class consciousness is a useful concept for reminding us how the structural conditions
produced by class antagonism inherent to the capitalist system of production – while a
necessary condition for proletarian revolution – are not sufficient, on their own, to bring
it about. Marx (1852) recognized that proletarian revolution overthrow of the capitalist
system was not inevitable and that it would be brought about only by the determined
actions of individuals guided by a revolutionary class consciousness. However, Marx
might still be criticized for over-simplifying the psychological development of the
proletariat to a single step from false consciousness to a fully-formed proletarian class
consciousness (Ollman, 1972).
It is necessary to acknowledge that class consciousness can exist in a partially developed
form and neo-Marxist theorists have aided us in this recognition by emphasizing how
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Marxist class conscious is comprised of several distinct psychological elements, all of
which must be present for an individual to be fully class conscious – and free of false
consciousness. Michael Mann (1973) outlines (1) class identity, (2) opposition to the
capitalist class, (3) recognition of the systemic nature of class antagonism and
exploitation under capitalism and (4) believing that there is a viable alternative to the
capitalist system of production as necessary for revolutionary class consciousness. These
elements do not always arise together and Mann (1973) has noted how the working class
has often been strong on solidarity – the first two elements – but weak on their
perceptions of alternative political and economic relations to those of capitalism. There
is some indication that this trend may be reversing as support for the profit motive has
decreased since 1982 and around half of non-managerial workers now believe that
effective economic relations are possible without it (Livingstone and Watts, 2018).
Additionally, worker solidarity is not always progressive or revolutionary, as when it is
restricted to only those belonging to one’s narrow segment of the working-class: There is
a history in North America – and elsewhere – of white, higher-paid and more privileged
workers benefitting from secondary exploitation and taking reactionary and racist
positions in their dealings with non-white, lower-paid and less privileged workers
(Bonacich, 1972; Lapides, 1987; Lenin, 1901; Ollman, 1972).
So, class consciousness is clearly not monolithic, but another way to perceive it is as a
scale with multiple points running from false consciousness – or a capitalist ideological
perspective – to full proletarian revolutionary consciousness. Bertell Ollman (1972)
approaches class consciousness this way, outlining nine psychological steps that a worker
must ascend on the path to revolutionary consciousness, beginning with the simple
realization that they have interests (step 1), through the realization that their class
interests take precedence over interests related to nation, race, ethnicity or religion (step
4) and concluding with the will to take action when the revolutionary moment arrives
(step 9). Ollman’s scale approach is interesting because it presumably allows for the
evaluation and comparison of individuals by their level of class consciousness: “What we
find then is that most workers have climbed a few of these steps (enough to complain),
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that some have scaled most of them (enough to vote for working-class candidates), but
that relatively few have managed to ascend to the top” (Ollman, 1972, p. 8).
In the present study, we borrow primarily from Michael Mann’s approach (1973) and
conceptualize class consciousness using three primary elements: (1) class identity (the
individual’s recognition that they are part of a class), (2) an oppositional perspective
(recognition of systemic class antagonism and exploitation and opposition to the
capitalist class) and (3) a counter-hegemonic perspective (believing that there are viable
alternatives to capitalist relations of production and other possible social formations). By
focusing on these three elements, we can examine how the class consciousness of the
individual is related to the frequency of misbehaviour that they report. Note here, that
counter-hegemony is defined in the context of the individual’s questioning of the
legitimacy or necessity of primary elements of capitalism and therefore problematizing
capitalist hegemony – defined by Mann as the dominant ideological perspective that
believes ‘freedom and justice are best secured by “breaking down” man’s [human] needs
and activities into separate segments (work, consumption, politics, etc.) and providing
each one with a separate market in which individuals can express their preferences and
realise their needs’ (1973, p. 19). What makes this ideology hegemonic is its popular
adoption and elevation to the level of ‘common-sense’, so that a counter-hegemonic
perspective will always require the challenging of the status-quo and popular consensus
on the dynamics of social reality (Gramsci, 1971).
Though Marxist class consciousness is generally discussed in the context of the
proletarian class, our analytic sample is not restricted and contains individuals of every
class. As noted previously, the capitalist perspective on misbehaviour has tended towards
underestimation of the phenomenon, pathological explanations for employee
misbehaviour and the denial of employers as individuals even capable of misbehaving in
the workplace. Correspondingly, we expect those who benefit most from the capitalist
system and have the greatest interest in defending it (upper classes) will report less
misbehaviour of both types than other respondents.
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Hypothesis 1A: Upper class and upper-middle class respondents will perceive
employer misbehaviour as less frequent than respondents with any other class
identities.
Hypothesis 1B: Upper class and upper-middle class respondents will perceive
employee misbehaviour as less frequent than respondents with any other class
identities.
Class identity is obviously an important element of class consciousness, but we were also
interested in how ideological attitudes relate to respondents’ perceptions of the frequency
of organizational misbehaviour. The second component of our conceptualization of class
consciousness is holding an oppositional perspective – which we operationalize as greater
support for workers’ right to strike and agreeing that owners make gains at the expense of
their employees. It is predicted that holding more oppositional attitudes will correspond
with perceptions of misbehaviour as more frequent, as these respondents are already
more critical of capitalist economic relations and interests and will have less inclination
to underestimate occurrences of misbehaviour – they have little interest in supporting the
capitalist ideological account of misbehaviour as rare and pathological by underreporting
or downplaying its occurrence.
Hypothesis 2A: Respondents who support the right to strike will report more
frequent employer misbehaviour.
Hypothesis 2B: Respondents who support the right to strike will report more
frequent employee misbehaviour.
Hypothesis 3A: Respondents who believe owners make gains at the expense of
workers will report more frequent employer misbehaviour.
Hypothesis 3B: Respondents who believe owners make gains at the expense of
workers will report more frequent employee misbehaviour.
The final element of class consciousness we concern ourselves with here is the
development of a counter-hegemonic perspective. Because the capitalist hegemonic
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perspective is to present capitalism as – if not the perfect economic system – the only
pragmatic means by which to organize human production, those who question the
proposed necessities of capitalism – or the entire system itself – can be distinguished as
counter-hegemonic by their problematization of “common-sense” notions that often go
unquestioned within an ideological domain dominated by capitalist interests. In the
present study, we operationalize a counter-hegemonic perspective using two attitudinal
variables – the belief that a modern economy is possible without the profit motive and
belief that employee-run work organizations can be effective. Respondents holding more
counter-hegemonic attitudes are less likely to be convinced by the capitalist hegemonic
account of misbehaviour as a minor phenomenon, and so they are expected to report
more frequent misbehaviour than other respondents.
Hypothesis 4A: Respondents who believe a modern economy is possible without the
profit motive will report more frequent employer misbehaviour.
Hypothesis 4B: Respondents who believe a modern economy is possible without the
profit motive will report more frequent employee misbehaviour.
Hypothesis 5A: Respondents who believe work organizations could be run by nonmanagement without bosses will report more frequent employer misbehaviour.
Hypothesis 5B: Respondents who believe work organizations could be run by nonmanagement without bosses will report more frequent employee misbehaviour.

4.3 Methodology
4.3.1

Data

The data for this study are drawn from the complete Changing Workplace in a
Knowledge Economy (CWKE) 2016 sample of employed Canadians above 18 years of
age (N=2,979). A detailed description of this dataset (including sampling technique,
weighting and response rate) is available in our methodology notes section in chapter 1.
The respondents for this study were recruited both through random digit dialing and the
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simple random selection from a professional web panel maintained by the Leger
Research Intelligence Group (N=475,000). The overall response rate for this data set is
52% (see Appendix 1 for this calculation). For this chapter, our analytical subsamples
are reduced as a result of non-response on our two key misbehaviour variables to
N=2,663 and N=2594 respectively. For each individual portion of the following analyses,
all valid cases are utilized, so the value of N varies according to the response rate of the
explanatory variables under consideration in each case.

4.3.2

Measures

4.3.3

Dependent Variables

The first of our dependent variables measures perceptions of the frequency of employee
misbehaviour. The questionnaire item associated with this variable requested that
respondents answer the following: “How common do you think employee misbehaviour
such as taking organization-owned materials or loafing on the job is in places like where
you work?” The valid responses to this question make up a 4-point Likert scale ranging
from “extremely uncommon” to “extremely common,” through “fairly uncommon” and
“fairly common” as intermediary options.
Our second dependent variable measures respondents’ perceptions of the frequency of
employer misbehaviour. The item, as posed to respondents, read “How common do you
think employer misbehaviour such as not paying employees some earned benefits or
avoiding taxes on earnings is in places like where you work?” As with our other
misbehaviour item, the four available valid responses ranged from “extremely
uncommon” to “extremely common”.
More information about both of these misbehaviour variables is available within the
general methodological notes section of chapter 1 and the results of a non-response
analysis can be located within Appendix 2.
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It should be mentioned that both of our misbehaviour items measure respondents’
perceptions of the frequency of workplace misbehaviour and should not be conflated with
an objective accounting of employee or employer misbehaviour events. Additionally, we
cannot know what activities the respondent is considering when reporting the frequency
of misbehaviour – though it is reasonable to expect that the examples of misbehaviour we
included will be salient for most respondents during their individual deliberations.

4.3.4
4.3.4.1

Independent Variables
Class Identity

Our class identity variable contains respondents’ self-evaluations of their own class
membership. The item as presented to respondents read, “IF YOU HAD TO CHOOSE
one of the following names for your social class, which one would you say you belong
to?” Valid responses were upper class, upper-middle class, middle class, lower-middle
class, working class and lower class, but several non-response options were available
(Don’t know, Refused or I do not think of myself as part of any class). Just over 4% of
respondents chose a non-valid response category and are left out of any analyses that
incorporate class identity. We have grouped together the original categories to create a
new ordinal scale variable: (1) working/lower class, (2) lower-middle class, (3) middle
class and (4) upper/upper-middle class.

4.3.4.2

Oppositional Attitude – Right to Strike

The first of our oppositional attitudinal variables measures the individual’s support for
the right of workers to strike. The question as it appeared to respondents read, “During a
strike, management should be prohibited by law from hiring workers to take the place of
strikers”. Respondents indicated their level of agreement with this statement choosing
from one of five Likert-scale categories (1 – Strongly disagree, 2 – Somewhat disagree, 3
– Neither, 4 – Somewhat agree, 5 – Strongly agree). Respondents who answered with an

152

“I don’t know” or “Refused” were left out of further analysis utilizing this variable (about
10% of the sample chose one of these non-valid response categories).

4.3.4.3

Oppositional Attitude – Owner’s Gain at Workers’ Expense

Our second oppositional attitude variable is composed of responses to the statement
“Owners of corporations make gains at the expense of their workers.” Again,
respondents indicated their level of agreement along a 5-point Likert scale ranging from
“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”. About 7% of respondents refused to answer or
indicated they did not know.

4.3.4.4

Counter-Hegemonic Attitude – Modern Economy Possible
without Profit Motive

Our first counter-hegemonic perspective measure evaluates respondents’ attitude
regarding the necessity of the profit motive to effective economic relations. The
statement respondents were asked to agree/disagree with was “It is possible for a modern
economy to run effectively without the profit motive” and they did so using the same five
response categories as the previous two oppositional attitude variables (from “Strongly
disagree” to “Strongly agree”). Eleven percent of respondents chose a non-valid
response category.

4.3.4.5

Counter-Hegemonic Attitude – Employee-Run
Organizations Can Be Effective

Our final attitudinal variable measures respondents’ agreement/disagreement with the
counter-hegemonic belief that employee-run work organizations can be effective. Using
the same answer categories as the previous three attitude variables, respondents indicated
their level of agreement with the sentiment “Non-management could run things without
bosses”; 6% of respondents chose a non-valid response category instead.
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4.3.5

Control Variables

We include several individual demographic variables as controls for our multivariate
models. These controls were chosen due to suspected association with key explanatory
or dependent variables in effort to avoid spuriousness. We were also interested if there
might be additional differences in perceptions of misbehaviour between demographic
categories not accounted for by the class consciousness of the respondent.
The first of our demographic control variables indicates the gender of the respondent.
We make use of a binary gender variable for our analyses in the present study and our
analytic sample is 52% male and 48% female.
The second control variable concerns respondent’s highest level of education attained.
This information is represented in a 5-point ordinal scale (1 – No diploma, 2 – High
school diploma, 3 – Non-University Post-Secondary Certificate, 4 – Bachelor Degree, 5 –
Professional/Graduate degree). Our sample is relatively highly educated with about 68%
of respondents attaining a credential above the high-school diploma level – this level of
education is comparable to the Canadian labour force.
Our third demographic variable is respondent age. The range for our sample is 75 years,
with all respondents being between 19 and 94 years old. The average age of respondents
is 43.
Our last control variable is respondent self-identified race. We make use of a 2-category
binary variable (white or non-white) for simplicity in presentation of results and to
capture the influence of the advantages and privileges afforded to individuals categorized
as white. We note here that the respondents who make up the non-white category selfidentified as over two dozen distinct racial categories (or a mixture of two or more) and
so conclusions about these respondents (except in comparison to their counterparts who
identified as white) should be treated with caution. Most (82%) of our sample identified
themselves as white, while the remaining respondents associate themselves with a nonwhite racial group.
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4.3.6

A Note on Multicollinearity

In order to check for potential issues resulting from multicollinearity, we constructed a
correlation matrix (see Appendix 7). Most of the significant relationships between
variables are weak or very weak, with those of moderate strength or greater limited to
dummy variable categories (to be expected and not cause for concern). It is worth briefly
highlighting the relationships between our attitudinal explanatory variables. Though
these relationships are weak (strongest is r=.30), every one of these attitudinal variables
is related to every other. The strongest relationships between attitudes were always with
the complimentary measure – oppositional attitudes are more closely associated with one
another than with counter hegemonic attitudes (and vice-versa) – which provides some
additional support for our operationalization of these concepts. The associations between
our attitudinal explanatory variables are not of sufficient strength to suspect
multicollinearity is inflating our measures of R2 but are still useful in reminding us that
certain attitudes will tend to accompany one another.

4.4 Analytical Approach
Our analytical approach begins with a bivariate analysis of class identity by each of our
dependent variables (perceived frequency of employee misbehaviour and perceived
frequency of employer misbehaviour).
Next, we ran bivariate analyses for both oppositional attitude variables by both dependent
variables to compare the individual influence of each oppositional attitudinal measure as
a predictor of respondents’ perceptions of the frequency of misbehaviour. This process is
repeated a final time for the counter-hegemonic attitude measures. It was possible to use
gamma throughout the entirety of our bivariate analyses (every independent variable was
ordinal) and we chose to do so, prioritizing this measure over other more conservative
options (ex. tau-b and tau-c) for ease of interpretation derived from our greater familiarity
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with the measure. We did examine other ordinal by ordinal measures and found no cause
to suspect that gamma was exaggerating results in the context of this study.
Finally, we ran two series of multivariate regression models (one for each of our
dependent variables). The first model of each series contains only our class
consciousness variables: class identity, oppositional attitudes and counter-hegemonic
attitudes. The second model of each series also incorporates demographic control
variables (gender, education, age and race). For the purposes of multivariate analysis,
both of our dependent variables were treated as continuous, enabling OLS regression.
Our four ordinal attitudinal variables were also treated as continuous. We made the
decision to treat these ordinal variables as continuous for several reasons: (1) increases
and decreases in perceptions of misbehaviour and movement on the attitude scale were
more important to us than comparison between particular variable categories as
categorically different, (2) OLS regression allows for use of statistical techniques and
methods of presentation more familiar to our readers and (3) it is reasonable to assume
approximately equal distance between the categories of these variables – in this case,
OLS regression will provide us with understandable and realistic results. Class identity
was treated as a categorical variable in our multivariate analysis to enable the comparison
between particular class groupings. Dummy variables were created so that a regression
coefficient could be calculated for each class category (middle class – as the mostpopulated category – was chosen as the reference group).

4.5 Results
4.5.1
4.5.1.1

Bivariate Results
Perceived Misbehaviour by Class Identity

The result of our bivariate analysis of class identity and perceived frequency of employer
misbehaviour are displayed in Table 4.1. Across every class identity category, the
respondents who perceive employer misbehaviour to be a fairly or extremely common
occurrence are outnumbered by those who perceive it to be uncommon. However, there
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is also an obvious difference in the perceived frequency of employer misbehaviour across
class groups – there is a linear progression of decreased reporting of employer
misbehaviour by those higher up the class hierarchy: Only 12% of upper class and
upper-middle class respondents perceived employer misbehaviour to be a common
occurrence compared with 22% of the respondents in the lowest class category. Our
gamma coefficient of -.158 provides further evidence of a negative relationship between
these variables and our test of significance allows us to be confident (at the .001 level)
that this result is not due to random chance. Together, these results provide strong
evidence to support our hypothesis (1A) of an inverse relationship between class identity
and the perceived frequency of employer misbehaviour.
Table 4.1 Perceptions of Employer Misbehaviour by Class Identity
Class Identity
N
% who report employer Gamma Significance
misbehaviour as fairly
(γ)
(p-value)
or extremely common
Working/Lower Class
479
22.2
Lower-Middle Class
398
15.9
Middle Class
1111
13.4
Upper/Upper-Middle Class 534
11.8
Total
2522
15.1
-.158
.000
Turning our attention to Table 4.2, we have reported the bivariate results of our
exploration of the relationship between class identity and perceptions concerning the
frequency of employee misbehaviour. In comparison with the results from Table 4.1
concerning employer misbehaviour, it is clear that – while the perception of employee
misbehaviour as a common occurrence is still a minority position for the respondents of
every class – employee misbehaviour is very clearly perceived to be more frequent
overall than employer misbehaviour: No less than 30% of even the upper/upper-middle
class respondents, and as many as 46% of the working/lower class respondents, perceived
employee misbehaviour to be a common workplace occurrence. The reported
frequencies in Table 4.2 suggest a linear trend, and our measures of association (γ= -.145)
and significance (p= .000) provide verifying evidence of a negative relationship between
class identity and perceptions of employee misbehaviour that is similar in strength,
direction and level of significance to the results for employer misbehaviour. Once again,
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respondents identifying with a higher class perceived misbehaviour to be significantly
less frequent than other respondents (support for hypothesis 1B).
Table 4.2 Perceptions of Employee Misbehaviour by Class Identity
Class Identity
N
% who report employee
Gamma
misbehaviour as fairly or
(γ)
extremely common
Working/Lower Class
494
46.4
Lower-Middle Class
419
38.9
Middle Class
1139
35.0
Upper/Upper-Middle
542
29.8
Class
Total
2594
36.7
-.145

4.5.1.2

Significance
(p-value)

.000

Perceived Misbehaviour by Oppositional Attitudes

The next section of our bivariate analysis examines the relationship between agreement
or disagreement with oppositional ideological attitudes and respondents’ perceptions of
the frequency of employer misbehaviour (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4). Through examination
of the frequencies for each table, it is evident that agreement with these oppositional
statements corresponds with the reporting of employer misbehaviour as more frequent,
while the respondents who indicated disagreement with these statements generally
perceived less frequent employer misbehaviour (support for Hypotheses 2A and 3A).
The level of significance calculated for both variables’ relationship with the dependent
variable is at the .001 level and provides us with confidence that each of these
oppositional attitudes are significant bivariate predictors of perceived frequency of
employer misbehaviour. However, by comparing measures of association (γ) for each
attitude, it is possible to evaluate which of our two oppositional attitudes is more strongly
related with the perceived frequency of employer misbehaviour. Doing so, we find
evidence that the recognition of corporate owners as deriving profit at the expense of
their workers (γ= .206) may be more closely related with the dependent variable than
support for the right to strike (γ= .108). However, while absolute difference between
these measures of association is not particularly great, the frequency distribution for the
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recognition of owners profiting at workers’ expense shows a greater difference in
perceptions of employer misbehaviour as common between those who strongly disagreed
and those who strongly agreed with the associated statement (16%). In comparison, the
range of difference in the perceived frequency of employer misbehaviour as common by
those who strongly disagreed and those who strongly agreed with the statement
concerning the right to strike was only 9%.
Table 4.3 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Support for Right to Strike
During a strike, management
N
% who report
Gamma Significance
should be prohibited by law
employer
(γ)
(p-value)
from hiring workers to take the
misbehaviour as
place of striker.
fairly or extremely
common
Strongly disagree
343
10.8
Somewhat disagree
324
9.6
Neither
381
16.3
Somewhat agree
574
15.5
Strongly agree
791
19.7
Total
2413
15.5
.108
.000
Table 4.4 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Recognition of Class
Antagonism
Owners of corporations
N
% who report
Gamma Significance
make gains at the expense of
employer
(γ)
(p-value)
their workers.
misbehaviour as fairly
or extremely common
Strongly disagree
300
7.7
Somewhat disagree
316
8.2
Neither
354
11.0
Somewhat agree
855
16.4
Strongly agree
652
24.4
Total
2477
15.6
.206
.000
Moving on to our bivariate analysis of oppositional attitudes by perceptions of employee
misbehaviour (see Table 4.5 and 4.6), we find that agreement with either oppositional
attitude predicts a higher reported frequency of misbehaviour (both bivariate relationships
are positive and significant at the .001 level). These results support hypotheses 2B and
3B, but there is an obvious difference in strength between oppositional attitudes in their
strength of association with the dependent variable. Once again, the recognition of class
antagonism between owners and workers is distinguished as more influential in
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predicting the perceived frequency of employee misbehaviour than a respondent’s
opposition to strikebreaking (γ= .233 compared with γ= .075). It is also worth noting that
the lack of a clear trend within the frequency distribution of Table 4.5 gives reason to
question whether there is a substantive bivariate relationship between support for the
right to strike and perceptions of the frequency of employee misbehaviour. In obvious
contrast, the frequency distribution in Table 4.6 demonstrates a clear difference in the
perception of employee misbehaviour as common between those who strongly disagree
(29.3%) and those who strongly agree (49.4%) with the statement “Owners of
corporations make gains at the expense of their workers.”
Table 4.5 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Support for Right to
Strike
During a strike, management should
N
% who report employee Gamma Significance
be prohibited by law from hiring
misbehaviour as fairly
(γ)
(p-value)
workers to take the place of striker.
or extremely common
Strongly disagree
347
38.3
Somewhat disagree
325
32.9
Neither
390
34.1
Somewhat agree
591
38.7
Strongly agree
818
38.8
Total
2471
37.2
.075
.001

Table 4.6 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Recognition of Class
Antagonism
Owners of corporations make
N
% who report
Gamma Significance
gains at the expense of their
employee
(γ)
(p-value)
workers.
misbehaviour as
fairly or extremely
common
Strongly disagree
307
29.3
Somewhat disagree
315
27.3
Neither
358
28.2
Somewhat agree
870
36.3
Strongly agree
690
49.4
Total
2540
36.8
.233
.000
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4.5.1.3

Perceived Misbehaviour by Counter-Hegemonic Attitudes

We next conducted a bivariate analysis for each of our counter-hegemonic attitudinal
variables by respondents’ perceptions of the frequency of employer misbehaviour. For
each of these two attitude variables, agreement with the offered statement indicated a
more counter-hegemonic perspective on the part of the respondent – a perspective which
appears to be related to a higher reported frequency of employer misbehaviour. The
results displayed in both Table 4.7 and 4.8 suggest a significant positive bivariate
relationship for each of our counter-hegemonic attitude variables with the dependent
variable. The gamma values suggest our second measure (Non-management could run
things without bosses) may be more strongly associated with perceptions of employer
misbehaviour than our first counter-hegemonic attitudinal measure (It is possible for a
modern economy to run effectively without the profit motive). However, the magnitude
of difference between these measures of association is not particularly great (γ= .132 and
γ= .220, respectively), so these variables may still be relatively similar in their influence
over the dependent variable.
Table 4.7 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Believe Non-Profit
Economy Possible
It is possible for a modern
N
% who report employer Gamma Significance
economy to run effectively
misbehaviour as fairly
(γ)
(p-value)
without the profit motive.
or extremely common
Strongly disagree
450
12.7
Somewhat disagree
652
10.7
Neither
361
18.8
Somewhat agree
660
17.0
Strongly agree
283
24.0
Total
2406
15.6
.132
.000
The final section of our bivariate analyses concerns the relationship between each of our
two counter-hegemonic attitude variables and the perceived frequency of employee
misbehaviour (see Table 4.9 and 4.10). Examining the frequency distributions for both
tables, we find some evidence in support of Hypotheses 4B and 5B (holding more
counter-hegemonic attitudes will be related to a higher reported frequency of employee
misbehaviour). In a similar fashion to the results pertaining to perceptions of employer
misbehaviour, we find that both counter-hegemonic attitudes (Belief in the possibility of
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a non-profit economy and support for employee-run organizations) are significantly and
positively related with respondents’ perceptions of the frequency of employee
misbehaviour. However, our gamma values here (γ= .075 and γ= .111) suggest that these
counter-hegemonic attitudes might be weaker predictors of the reported frequency of
employee misbehaviour than they are for predicting employer misbehaviour.
Table 4.8 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Support for EmployeeRun Organizations
Non-management could run
N
% who report employer Gamma Significance
things without bosses.
misbehaviour as fairly
(γ)
(p-value)
or extremely common
Strongly disagree
558
10.4
Somewhat disagree
709
9.3
Neither
312
15.7
Somewhat agree
701
18.8
Strongly agree
240
32.5
Total
2520
15.2
.220
.000

Table 4.9 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Believe Non-Profit
Economy Possible
It is possible for a modern
N
% who report employee Gamma Significance
economy to run effectively
misbehaviour as fairly
(γ)
(p-value)
without the profit motive.
or extremely common
Strongly disagree
466
34.3
Somewhat disagree
657
33.6
Neither
365
38.1
Somewhat agree
677
37.1
Strongly agree
290
44.8
Total
2455
36.7
.075
.002

Table 4.10 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Support for EmployeeRun Organizations
Non-management could
N
% who report employee Gamma Significance
run things without bosses.
misbehaviour as fairly
(γ)
(p-value)
or extremely common
Strongly disagree
560
34.1
Somewhat disagree
716
32.0
Neither
319
35.4
Somewhat agree
715
41.4
Strongly agree
258
43.4
Total
2568
36.6
.111
.000
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4.5.2
4.5.2.1

Multivariate Results
Perceptions of Employer Misbehaviour

Leaving behind our bivariate analysis, we focus on the multivariate relationships between
all the elements of class consciousness and the perceived frequency of employer
misbehaviour. In the first multivariate model of Table 4.11 (containing only our primary
class consciousness variables and our dependent variable), we found several noteworthy
results. First, we found that working class or lower-class respondents reported
significantly more frequent employer misbehaviour (β= .090) than the comparison
category (middle class respondents), while lower-middle-class and upper/upper middleclass respondents do not appear significantly different from middle-class respondents in
their reporting of employer misbehaviour. Second, in examining the multivariate results
for our oppositional attitude variables, we found that only one remained a significant
predictor of a higher reported frequency of misbehaviour: Owners of corporations make
gains at the expense of their workers (β= .105). Meanwhile, the attitude that strikebreaking should be prohibited by law lost the significance it demonstrated in earlier
bivariate analysis with the dependent variable. The results for our counter-hegemonic
attitudes told a similar story: Support for the employee-run work organizations was
significantly related to a higher reported frequency of employer misbehaviour (β= .132)
while questioning the necessity of the profit motive to the efficacy of a modern economy
was not significantly related to our dependent variable.
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Table 4.11 Multivariate Models of Perceptions of Employer Misbehaviour
Model 1
Model 2
β
Significanc
β
Significanc
Coefficient e (p-value) Coefficient e (p-value)
(SE)
(SE)
Class
Class Identity
Identity
Working or Lower-class
.090 (.050)
.000***
.072 (.050)
.002**
Lower-middle class
.017 (.053)
.431
.005 (.053)
.818
Middle class (ref.)
----Upper or upper-middle
-.018 (.046)
.428
-.023 (.047)
.307
class
Oppositional Strike-breaking should be .029 (.013)
.188
.028 (.013)
.206
Attitudes
prohibited by law
Owners of corporations
.105 (.014)
.000***
.096 (.014)
.000***
make gains at the expense
of their workers
CounterPossible for a modern
.013 (.014)
.564
.014 (.014)
.525
Hegemonic economy to run effectively
Attitudes
without the profit motive
Non-management could
.132 (.014)
.000***
.138 (.014)
.000***
run things without bosses
Control
Gender
Variables
Male (ref.)
--Female
-.094 (.036) .000***
Highest Education Level
No diploma
.049 (.085)
.029*
High school diploma
--(ref.)
Non-university post-.007 (.047)
.783
secondary certificate
Bachelor degree
-.033 (.053)
.205
Professional/Graduate
-.045 (.067)
.065
degree
Age
-.073 (.001) .001***
Race
Non-white (ref.)
--White
-.053 (.048)
.014*
R2
.055
.079
Adjusted R2
.052
.073
N
2198
2133
Notes. *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001. Regression coefficients represent standardized slopes.
Once we controlled for individual demographic variables in our second multivariate
model of employer misbehaviour (Table 4.11), we see that the results from the first

164

model remain relatively unchanged. However, the inclusion of these control variables
revealed new relationships between respondent demographics and perceptions of the
frequency of employer misbehaviour. We found that female (β= -.094) and white (β= .053) respondents reported less employer misbehaviour than their male and non-white
counterparts. Age was found to be negatively related to our dependent variable (β= .073) with older respondents generally perceiving employer misbehaviour to be a less
frequent occurrence. A low level of education is also a significant factor, with those
respondents who have not earned a high school diploma reporting more frequent
misbehaviour than those with a high school diploma or better (β= .049).

4.5.2.2

Perceptions of Employee Misbehaviour

For the final section of our results, we repeated the above multivariate analysis of class
consciousness and demographic variables by perceptions of the frequency of workplace
misbehaviour – this time substituting employee misbehaviour as the dependent variable.
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 4.12 and – examining our first model
which contains only the elements of class consciousness as explanatory variables – we
see many of the same significant factors from our multivariate analysis of employer
misbehaviour are relevant for predicting perceptions of the frequency of employee
misbehaviour. Agreement with the oppositional attitude that owners of corporations
make gains at the expense of their workers (β= .166) and the counter-hegemonic attitude
that non-management could run things without bosses (β= .057) are both significantly
related with a higher reported frequency of employee misbehaviour, while our other two
measures of oppositional and counter-hegemonic attitudes are not. In addition, a working
class or lower-class identity once again predicts reports of more frequent misbehaviour
(β= .064) than middle class respondents, but the upper-class and upper-middle class
respondents distinguish themselves as reporting employee misbehaviour as significantly
less frequent (β= -.044). This marks a considerable difference from the multivariate
results for employer misbehaviour, where upper-class and upper-middle class

165

respondents were not significantly different from middle-class respondents in their
perceptions of the frequency of misbehaviour.
Table 4.12 Multivariate Models of Perceptions of Employee Misbehaviour
Model 1
Model 2
β
Significanc
β
Significanc
Coefficient e (p-value) Coefficient e (p-value)
(SE)
(SE)
Class
Class Identity
Identity
Working or lower class
.064 (.054)
.004**
.057 (.054)
.013*
Lower-middle class
.028 (0.57)
.200
.021 (.057)
.356
Middle class (ref.)
----Upper or upper-middle
-.044 (.050)
.049*
-.038 (.051)
.094
class
Oppositiona Strike-breaking should be
-.015 (.014)
.500
-.024 (.015)
.289
l Attitudes prohibited by law
Owners of corporations
.166 (.015)
.000***
.161 (.016)
.000***
make gains at the expense of
their workers
CounterPossible for a modern
.014 (0.15)
.536
.009 (.016)
.701
Hegemonic economy to run effectively
Attitudes
without the profit motive
Non-management could run .057 (.015)
.010**
.055 (.016)
.015*
things without bosses
Control
Gender
Variables
Male (ref.)
--Female
-.022 (.039)
.305
Highest Education Level
Attained
No diploma
.016 (.091)
.469
High school diploma (ref.)
--Non-university post.040 (.050)
.129
secondary certificate
Bachelor degree
-.027 (.057)
.294
Professional/Graduate
-.047 (.072)
.050*
degree
Age
-.092 (.001) .000***
Race
Non-white (ref.)
--White
-.014 (.052)
.512
R2
.048
.062
Adjusted R2
.045
.056
N
2230
2168
Notes. *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001. Regression coefficients represent standardized slopes
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The incorporation of individual demographic variables in our second model (Table 4.12)
changes little about the observed relationships between the elements of class
consciousness and perceptions of employee misbehaviour frequency, though the lower
reported frequency of misbehaviour by upper/upper-middle class did lose significance
(indicating that the 6% difference in their reporting of employee misbehaviour as a
common occurrence compared to middle class respondents does not constitute a
statistically significant difference).
We also found considerably fewer significant relationships between the demographic
control variables themselves and perceptions of employee misbehaviour. Age was once
again found to be significantly negatively correlated with reported frequency of employee
misbehaviour (β= -.092) while the highest category of educational attainment
(professional or graduate degree) was related with a significantly lower reported
frequency of misbehaviour (β= -.047) than the comparison category (high school diploma
holders).

4.6 Discussion
The most important of our findings concern the relationship between the elements of
class consciousness and the perceived frequency of misbehaviour (both by employees
and employers). The three elements of class consciousness focused on in this paper are
(1) class identity, (2) oppositional attitudes and (3) counter-hegemonic attitudes; we
found that each one of these elements was significantly related with perceptions of the
frequency of misbehaviour.
The first step to explaining the relationship between greater class consciousness and
respondents’ perceptions of misbehaviour is to understand that the recognition of
misbehaviour as a frequent occurrence is inherently incompatible with popular
justifications for capitalist relations of production. The dominant capitalist narrative for
explaining organizational misbehaviour has been to define the phenomenon as being the
result of individual deficiencies and weaknesses in character (Analoui, 1995; Biggerstaff
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et al., 2015; Edwards et al., 1995; Henle et al., 2010; Lee & Ok, 2014; McMullan &
McClung, 2006; Trevino, 2005). Correspondingly, it is frequently assumed that
misbehaviour is a rare occurrence engaged in only by a pathological minority of workers
and managers – and almost never by employers – in a contemporary workplace
characterized by unity of interest between workers, managers and owners and generally
congenial industrial relations (Leavitt, 1973; Luthans, 1972; Wilson & Rosenfield, 1990).
With regards to the misbehaviour of employers, this general denial of the phenomenon is
even more pronounced. Not only are employers generally regarded to be individuals
largely incapable of organizational misbehaviour, their activities are also those usually set
forth as the model for proper workplace behaviour – workers labouring as hard as
possible to increase profit. In Richard Nixon’s famous interview with David Frost, the
former president said, “when the president does it, that means it is not illegal” (Frost &
Nixon, 2007, p. 1). There is a similar power-based justification at work for employer
misbehaviour: When an employer does it, that means it is not misbehaviour. The strong
influence of this strategy is evidenced by the general lack of inquiry into the
misbehaviour of employers within the organizational misbehaviour literature.
Considering the significant ideological protection granted to employers – and the
motivation for defenders of capitalist relations to deny the frequency of both employee
and employer misbehaviour – we were not particularly surprised to find that the
respondents who were most likely to perceive organizational misbehaviour as more
frequent were those who identified as lower or working class, expressed oppositional
attitudes or held more counter-hegemonic beliefs. These respondents have the least to
gain by defending the capitalist system and were correspondingly less likely to
underreport the frequency of misbehaviour.
Having established connections between class consciousness and perceptions of
misbehaviour, we were also interested in a closer examination of which elements of class
consciousness might be most influential as predictors.
Looking at our results for class identity, we found that a working/lower class identity was
a significant predictor of a higher perceived frequency of misbehaviour across every
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multivariate model. This result is as expected: These individuals’ interests are not best
served by capitalist relations of production, so they are less motivated to prop up this
system by underestimating the frequency of misbehaviour. However, we were somewhat
surprised to see that our multivariate results revealed no significant difference between
lower-middle class respondents and middle-class respondents in their reporting of
misbehaviour. There are a couple likely explanations for this result: (1) lower-middle
class respondents may occupy economic circumstances – and have economic interests –
relatively similar to middle-class respondents and (2) the identification of one’s self as
lower-middle class, rather than working/lower-class, may indicate individual aspirations
of upward mobility and therefore greater support for the capitalist system. Finally, we
found only limited evidence to suggest that upper/upper-middle class respondents
perceive misbehaviour as less frequent than middle class respondents, so it appears likely
that – all other factors being equal – it is only working-class/lower-class respondents who
perceive the frequency of misbehaviour considerably differently than the members of
other classes.
With regards to our measures of oppositional attitudes, we were somewhat surprised to
find that our ‘support for the right to strike’ variable was not a significant factor in any of
our multivariate models, while the recognition that owners of corporations make gains at
the expense of workers was a significant predictor of a higher reported frequency of
misbehaviour throughout. The explanation for this difference in significance is not
entirely clear, though it may be partially explained by the more explicit reference to
employer behaviour located within the statement “Owners of corporations make gains at
the expense of their workers” compared with “Strike-breaking should be prohibited by
law”. The first item requires the respondent to think in terms of class antagonism and
conflicts of interest, whereas it is possible for respondents to regard the second question
as purely a matter of policy or jurisprudence: In short, the first item may be the better
measure of respondents’ oppositional attitudes.
On examination of the multivariate results for our counter-hegemonic attitude variables,
we discovered a similar trend as that described above: One counter-hegemonic attitude
was significant across all multivariate models while the other was not significant within
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any. Here, we were surprised to find that a questioning of the economic necessity of the
profit motive was not related to the perceived frequency of misbehaviour: Because
support for the pursuit of private profit is a key element of capitalist hegemony, we had
expected to find that criticism of this central ideological component would also signal
greater perceived frequency of misbehaviour. This non-significance is particularly
striking considering our other counter-hegemonic attitudinal variable – measuring
respondents’ agreement that “non-management could run things without bosses” – was
significantly related with the perceived frequency of misbehaviour across every
multivariate model. This higher significance may be linked to the explicit mention of
bosses in the above statement, prompting respondents to consider the behaviour of their
employers.
After confirming that a working-class/lower-class identity, recognition of class
antagonism between owners and workers, and support for employees’ capacity to selfdirect production were related with individual perceptions of the frequency of
misbehaviour, we examined whether the relative strength of these predictors differed by
the type of misbehaviour under consideration – employee or employer. The most striking
difference here can be seen in the relative strength of influence of the individual’s support
for employees’ capacity to self-direct work – it was a much stronger predictor of the
frequency of employer misbehaviour compared to that of employee misbehaviour (β=
.138 compared to β= .055). It could be that questioning the necessity of managerial and
employer control corresponds with a greater inclination to question the legitimacy of the
actions of managers and employers – and correspondingly regard more of these actions as
illegitimate, unnecessary or as misbehaviour.
Another notable difference in the influence of our class consciousness variables across
type of misbehaviour is demonstrated by our measures of association between the
dependent variables and agreement with the oppositional attitude that owners of
corporations make gains at the expense of workers. This measure was notably stronger in
its association with the perceived frequency of employee misbehaviour (β= .161
compared with β= .096 for employer misbehaviour). This difference in strength of
association might be explained by a greater likelihood by those who recognize systemic
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class antagonism between employers and employees to define employee misbehaviour as
a form of worker resistance – and so perceive it as more frequent.
However, it should be noted that the differences in strength of association that we have
discussed above are still relatively small – r2= .06 and .08 in final multivariate models –
and our suggested explanations tentative. A fuller understanding of differences in the
perceived frequency of employee versus employer misbehaviour that might be attributed
to specific oppositional and counter-hegemonic attitudes is one avenue for future
research.
Though they were of secondary priority to our study, we also discovered some interesting
results outlining how perceptions of the frequency of misbehaviour might be influenced
by the demographic characteristics of the respondent. Examining our demographic
control variables in the context of our multivariate analysis, we found evidence of a trend
towards lower perceptions of misbehaviour frequency – of both types – by older
respondents. Additionally, those who have obtained a professional or graduate degree
reported significantly less frequent employee misbehaviour.
In the previous two chapters, we found that more privileged work circumstances
corresponded with less misbehaviour: (1) More privileged workers are less likely to
engage in misbehaviour as they are further from the degraded working conditions that
often give rise to employee misbehaviour and (2) Advantageous working conditions
characterized by higher wages, job security, collective representation and other benefits
tend to act as a constraint upon – and protection from – employer misbehaviour. We
should also expect that individuals in more advantageous employment arrangements will
identify more strongly with organizational interests and correspondingly overestimate
organizational harmony and underestimate the amount of misbehaviour taking place.
Research has shown that wages tend to be higher for those who have completed more
years of educational training and those who have lived more years since leaving school
(presumably time spent gaining work experience and additional job training) (Lemieux,
2006; Mincer, 1974; Murphy & Welch, 1990). Though the effects of age and education
on wage are not necessarily linear – and our understandings of these relationships have
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become more nuanced over the last three decades – these factors remain influential in
predicting not only wages, but other positive work outcomes, such as permanent
employment, job security and job satisfaction (Kalleberg et al., 2000; Muñoz-Comet,
2016; Sapkal & Sundar, 2017; Vosko, 2006).
Thus, while an advanced education and greater age are obviously not guarantees of
positive work outcomes, it is evident that higher education and older age (more work
experience is often assumed, correctly or not, to accompany more life experience)
generally extend some advantage in matters of employment. We suspect the lower rates
of perceived misbehaviour by older respondents and those with an advanced degree result
from the greater likelihood of working in better employment circumstances – protection
from employer misbehaviour and distance from the most degraded of working conditions.
On the other hand, a lack of educational credentials clearly puts one at greater risk of
undesirable working conditions and offers less protection from misbehaving employers –
which explains why our analysis revealed a significantly higher perceived frequency of
employer misbehaviour by those respondents with no high school diploma: Unskilled
workers are easily replaced and often have few alternative employment opportunities and
so are more enticing targets for employer misbehaviour.
Finally, our analysis found no relationship between the race or gender of the respondent
and their perception of employee misbehaviour, but both male and non-white respondents
reported more frequent employer misbehaviour than female and white respondents.
In the previous chapter, we found that employers of a workforce characterized by
increased engagement of non-permanent workers (part-time or seasonal) reported more
frequent employer misbehaviour. Our conclusion was that the vulnerabilities associated
with non-permanent employment made these workers more attractive targets for
employer misbehaviour. This targeting of vulnerable populations of workers by
employers may be behind the higher perceived frequency of employer misbehaviour
reported by non-white respondents: There is a well-documented history of employment
discrimination by race (Cohn & Fossett, 1995; Wilson et al., 1995) where the ascribed
status of “non-whiteness” brings a devaluing label to the individual resulting in greater
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risk of lower-skilled, menial, low-pay and unsafe work (Beggs, 1995; Kaufman, 1986,
2002; Mason, 2000; McCall, 2001). In the context of the greater risk of non-permanent
work for non-white individuals – and the greater motivation for employers of nonpermanent workers to engage in misbehaviour – it is unsurprising that employer
misbehaviour was reported as more frequent by non-white respondents.
However, it is not clear why we have not found evidence of a similar effect for female
respondents, as occupational segregation by gender also puts women at greater risk of
non-permanent and non-desirable work compared to men (England, 1992; Padavic &
Reskin, 2002; Philzacklea, 1983; Roscigno et al., 2007). Instead, the female respondents
in our sample perceived employer misbehaviour to be significantly less common than the
male respondents. This difference may yet be explained by gendered differences in
definitions of organizational misbehaviour – which could provide an intriguing avenue
for future qualitative research into individuals’ perceptions of organizational
misbehaviour – but it is likely the result of gender segregation of the Canadian work
force. Men are still over-represented in the industrial sector while women predominate in
the service sector (see Appendix 8) and the distinctions between these sex segregated
work environments may result in different rates of employer misbehaviour.

4.7 Conclusion
Examining the relationships between the elements of class consciousness and individual
perceptions of misbehaviour, we found significant evidence that a working class or
lower-class identity was associated with a higher reported frequency of both types of
misbehaviour. In addition, regardless of respondent class, holding certain oppositional
and counter-hegemonic attitudes predicted perceptions of organizational misbehaviour as
more frequent.
The results of this study suggest that individuals’ perceptions of misbehaviour are shaped
by their class interests and ideological attitudes/beliefs. The acknowledgement of
misbehaviour as a ubiquitous workplace phenomenon and the recognition that it is not
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only employees that misbehave – employers can also, and often do, engage in
misbehaviour – represents an ideological challenge to capitalist rule and is a perspective
which is most likely to be taken up by those who are more class conscious.
We also uncovered evidence of demographic differences in perceptions of the frequency
of misbehaviour. Older respondents and those with a high level of education perceived
misbehaviour to be less frequent – likely the result of generally more advantageous
working conditions experienced by these individuals. In addition, we found that nonwhite respondents – and individuals of any race who had not acquired a high school
diploma – reported significantly more frequent employer misbehaviour overall. Nonwhite individuals – and those with a lower level of education – are often segregated into
more degraded, vulnerable and precarious employment circumstances – working
conditions which tend to encourage greater misbehaviour by both employees and
employers (see chapters 2 and 3).
One intriguing avenue for future research would include an examination in greater detail
of which attitudes are most strongly associated with a higher reporting of misbehaviour –
and whether these attitudes differ in their strength of influence by the type of
misbehaviour under consideration. Another possible direction for further research might
be concerned with exploring demographic differences in both ideological attitudes and
individuals’ perceptions of organizational misbehaviour.
Finally, while our conclusions are based upon several significant relationships, the
explanatory power of our multivariate models in accounting for the total variance in
perceptions of employer misbehaviour (adjusted R2=.07) and employee misbehaviour
(adjusted R2=.06) remain modest. There is still considerable unexplained variation in
perceptions of misbehaviour frequency to be uncovered by further study.
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Chapter 5

5

Conclusion

5.1 Contributions
Despite mounting evidence of the general pervasiveness of misbehaviour within the
contemporary workplace (Harper, 1990; Harris & Ogbonna, 2002, 2006; Lawrence et al.,
2007; Lee & Ok, 2014; Paulsen, 2014; Slora, 1989), individual pathological approaches
towards explaining organizational misbehaviour remain popular with owners, managers
and other policy-makers. According to the individual-pathological narrative of employee
misbehavior, the average worker is perceived as relatively compliant and well-behaved
and any instance of misbehaviour is blamed on a small minority of “bad apple”
employees (Analoui, 1995; Bibi, 2013; Giacalone & Rosenfield, 1987; Henle et al., 2010;
Kets de Vries, 2017; Leavitt, 1973; Luthans, 1972; Wilson & Rosenfield, 1990).
Accordingly, this dissertation contributes to a developing body of literature that
challenges popular explanations of organizational misbehaviour by illuminating the
structural determinants of the phenomenon (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; AmichaiHamburger, 2003; Burawoy, 1979; Flynn, 1916; Marx, 1844, 1867). We utilize the
theoretical framework of Neo-Marxist theory to demonstrate how employee
misbehaviour should be understood in the context of workers’ reactions to the enduring
contradictions of the capitalist system and their experience of degraded work. Our
inclusion of occupational class as a key explanatory variable represents a unique
contribution to the literature and suggests that the influence of worker autonomy and
workplace injustice – characterized as primary determinants by earlier studies (Ackroyd
& Thompson, 1999; Ambrose et al., 2002; Edwards et al., 1995; Folger, 1993; Lawrence
& Robinson, 2007; Sheppard et al., 1992; Skarlicki et al., 2008) – may have been
overemphasized in the past: Once class is controlled for, we found these factors had
much less individual explanatory power in accounting for the frequency of employee
misbehaviour. While lack of autonomy and the experience of injustice remain important
elements for understanding the motivation towards employee misbehaviour, it may be
that these variables can be better understood as intervening variables between class
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position and the frequency of organizational misbehaviour (Occupational Class →
Injustice, Lack of autonomy → Greater employee misbehaviour).
Another major contribution of this dissertation is derived from its unique methodological
approach. Much of the previous research on organizational misbehaviour has taken a
qualitative approach and focused on intimate observation of the phenomenon within a
single workplace – or occasionally several workplaces (Ambrose et al., 2002; Brock et
al., 2013; DiBattista, 1996; Giacalone & Rosenfeld, 1987; Muholland, 2004; Shkoler &
Tziner, 2017; Skarlicki et al., 1999, 2008; Sprouse, 1992). These studies are interesting
and useful for both illuminating the wide varieties of employee misbehaviour and
fostering an appreciation for the influence of the unique local dynamics within a
workplace – but are understandably limited in their generalizability. This dissertation
addresses this general gap in the organizational misbehaviour literature by employing a
representative sample of the Canadian adult working population – the first study to do so,
to our knowledge.
Finally, the most important contribution of our dissertation follows from our exploration
of the topic of employer misbehaviour. In general, the literature on organizational
misbehaviour features a near-complete absence of any inquiry into this phenomenon –
with a limited number of more recent exceptions (Barnes & Taksa, 2012; Lundmark &
Westelius, 2015; Webb et al., 2009). An explanation for this lacuna in the literature can
be found in the considerable legal, political and ideological protections that prevent the
actions of employers from coming to be defined as misbehaviour (Bakan, 2004; Burns &
Orrick, 2002; Commager, 1971; Fisse & Braithwaite, 1993; Gilson & Gordon, 2003;
Greenfield, 2006; Lamb, 2012; Marx & Engels, 1846; McMullan & McClung, 2006;
Michel et al., 2016; Peston, 2012; Schwartz & Ellison, 1982; Wright et al., 1995). In our
exploration of employer misbehaviour, we have also provided evidence of a general
asymmetry between the phenomena of employee and employer misbehaviour. The drive
to increase profits, the employment of vulnerable workers and the presence of a union in
the organization emerge as key motivators towards greater misbehaviour for employers.
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5.2 Summary of and links between findings
Starting within paper 1 (chapter 2) our study of the phenomenon of organizational
misbehaviour is grounded in Marxist theory, with an appreciation for structural
conditions within the contemporary workplace which motivate individuals towards
greater misbehaviour (Analoui, 1995; Edwards & Scullion, 1982; Hodson, 1995, 2001;
Karlsson, 2012; Lawrence & Robinson, 2007; Marx, 1844, 1867; Mulholland, 2004).
Through the introduction of occupational class alongside more traditional measures –
worker autonomy and experiences of injustice – we contribute intriguing new findings to
the study of employee misbehaviour.
First, we found that employees of lower occupational classes (industrial and service
workers) reported significantly more misbehaviour than professional employees – we
suggest this greater misbehaviour is motivated by exposure to more degraded working
conditions which typically confront individuals occupying lower class positions.
Second, we found that the inclusion of occupational class in our models reduced the
strength of association between the reported frequency of employee misbehaviour and
autonomy, unjust compensation and job insecurity, suggesting that lack of autonomy and
these forms of injustice are tied to the class position of the respondent. Interestingly, we
found that our injustice measures related to unsafe work or workplace discrimination
retained a unique association with the perceived frequency of misbehaviour, suggesting
that non-managerial employees of all occupational classes may be more prone towards
misbehaviour if they are discriminated against or made to work in unsafe conditions.
In addition to our main analysis of non-managerial employees, we conducted a
supplementary analysis of managerial employees in paper 1 (chapter 2). Managers have
often been overlooked as subjects capable of their own misbehaviour in past research – as
they are assumed to generally act as good stewards of employers’ interests.
Correspondingly, their treatment in the literature has usually emphasized their efforts to
curtail organizational misbehaviour and not their capacity to engage in it (Ackroyd &
Thompson, 1999; Analoui, 1995; DiBattista, 1996; Fleming and Sewell, 2002; Giesberg,
2001). Having conducted a multivariate analysis of misbehaviour for managers, we
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found evidence of considerable differences in the influential factors related to the
perceived frequency of employee misbehaviour reported by managers compared with
non-managers: A lower position in the managerial hierarchy and the subjective
evaluation that one’s compensation is less-than-deserved were most closely associated
with a higher reported frequency of misbehaviour. These results may suggest that
managers can be inclined towards misbehaviour when the privileges of their position are
not sufficient to ensure their loyalty to employer interests (or perhaps undercompensated
managers simply perceive employee misbehaviour as more frequent overall).
Additionally, we found evidence suggesting that larger work organizations tend to feature
greater employee misbehaviour, likely the result of the additional cover granted to illicit
activities by the relative autonomy of having many co-workers (Ashforth, 1994;
Roscigno et al., 2009) or because of the intensification of alienation and heavy
rationalization characteristic of many large organizations (Braverman, 1974; Hodson,
2001; Matheson, 2007; Rinehart, 2006; Roscigno et al., 2009; Sanders, 1997).
The main priority of paper 2 (chapter 3) was an exploration of the understudied
phenomenon of employer misbehaviour. Drawing on the corporate crime literature that
connects employers’ illegal activity to the pursuit of profit-maximization (Bakan, 2004;
Biggerstaff et al., 2015; Davidson, 1970; Gilbert, 2005; McAdams, 1977; Nader, 1965;
Schwartz & Ellison, 1982), we hypothesized that economic pressures would be primary
motivators for greater employer misbehaviour. In addition, we suspected that
employment of a labour force characterized by greater vulnerability – non-unionized
and/or non-permanent workers – would act as additional motivation towards employer
misbehaviour, as these employees could be expected to have fewer protections from
abusive actions by employers (Letourneux, 1998; Quinlan, 2012; Underhill & Rimmer,
2015; Vosko, 2006). Our results provided evidence in support of these hypotheses and
we found that employers that reported lower wealth, evaluated themselves as
undercompensated or employed a labour force characterized by non-permanent workers
were those who perceived employer misbehaviour as most frequent.
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We were surprised to find that – while the presence of a union within an employer’s
organization was significantly related to the reported frequency of employer
misbehaviour, exceeding both wealth and subjective under-compensation in its
explanatory power – this relationship ran in the opposite direction than expected: The
presence of a union was related with greater employer misbehaviour, rather than less.
We suspect this association is the result of a more complicated relationship between these
variables than initially expected – with unionization as both a reaction by workers to past
employer misbehaviour and as motivation for further employer misbehaviour in the form
of union-busting activities (Bentham, 2002; Bruce, 1994; Eaton et al., 2014; Freeman &
Kleiner, 1990; Martinez & Fiorito, 2009; Riddel, 2001).
Once again, we found additional evidence of the relationship between organizational size
and the perceived frequency of misbehaviour: Complementing the findings from chapter
2 concerning employee misbehaviour, employers associated with a larger work
organization also reported greater employer misbehaviour. This result may be explained
by the additional cover provided by a large organization and the unique legal protections
provided by corporate status.
A secondary focus of paper 2 (chapter 3) was the examination of the reported frequency
of misbehaviour by individuals across the full range of the occupational class hierarchy –
as well as a comparison of the perceived frequency of employee versus employer
misbehaviour. As they did in our first paper (chapter 2), industrial and service workers
once again stood out as reporting more misbehaviour – employee and employer – than
most other occupational groups: Members of these occupational groups are more likely
to be the targets of employer misbehaviour and also the least likely to benefit from it –
and so are less motivated towards underestimating its occurrence. In confirmation of the
results from our first paper (chapter 2), we found further evidence of a negative
relationship between managerial level and the reported frequency of organizational
misbehaviour. Upper managers distinguished themselves as the occupational group that
reported the lowest amount of both employee and employer misbehaviour – the privilege
of their position keeping them far from the negative working conditions associated with
greater employee misbehaviour, while their unity of economic interest with – and
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dependency on – owners encourages turning a blind eye to instances of employer
misbehaviour. It is also important to note that employee misbehaviour was perceived to
be more frequent than employer misbehaviour by respondents of every occupational class
(37% of respondents perceived employee misbehaviour as a common occurrence
compared with only 15% for employer misbehaviour). This finding was not entirely
surprising; employers benefit from considerable ideological and legal protection that
makes it much less likely that their actions will be defined as misbehaviour.
Paper 3 complements the findings from the previous two chapters by examining how the
class consciousness of an individual is associated with their perception of the frequency
of organizational misbehaviour. Here, we found evidence of perceptions of both
employee and employer misbehaviour as more frequent by respondents who identified
themselves as lower- or working-class or who held certain oppositional or counterhegemonic attitudes (recognition of class antagonism between owners of corporations
and their workers and support for the efficacy of employee-run organizations). These
findings suggest that individuals’ perceptions of misbehaviour are shaped by the interests
of the class they identify with and their personal ideological attitudes/beliefs. The
capitalist hegemonic narrative on organizational misbehaviour is to downplay the
frequency of employee misbehaviour and deny the possibility of employers to misbehave,
and so the acknowledgement of misbehaviour as a ubiquitous workplace phenomenon is
a perspective most likely to be taken up by those who are more class conscious.

5.3 Limitations and Future Directions
The papers which comprise this dissertation are not without limitation. Details are
discussed within each chapter, but the limitations of our study which have specific
implications for future research are discussed here.
First, it is worth reminding ourselves that our misbehaviour variables measure the
perceived frequency of misbehaviour according to the respondent, rather than actual
incidences of misbehaviour, and so respondent subjectivity in the reporting of
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misbehaviour frequency represents a source of error inherit to our methodological
approach. In addition, in the formation of our hypotheses and the presentation of our
findings, we often assume that others in the respondent’s workplace are similar to the
respondent on key variables (for example, the employee misbehaviour reported by nonmanagerial respondents is assumed to be engaged in by an individual or individuals with
a similar level of autonomy as the respondent themselves). We cannot be sure whether
respondents are reporting the frequency of their own misbehaviour, the misbehaviour of
others or perhaps both, and this represents a key limitation to our work.
In this study, we made the decision to use a general measure of organizational
misbehaviour. This methodology provides us with representative results generalizable to
the Canadian working population but restricts us from drawing conclusions in connection
to any one form of misbehaviour. In our examination of employee misbehaviour (chapter
2), this is barely a limitation as there are a wealth of qualitative studies available which
fill in these gaps (Ambrose et al., 2002; Brock et al., 2013; DiBattista, 1996; Giacalone &
Rosenfeld, 1987; Muholland, 2004; Shkoler & Tziner, 2017; Skarlicki et al., 1999;
Skarlicki et al., 2008; Sprouse, 1992). However, as our exploration of employer
misbehaviour (chapter 3) represents a new direction in the study of organizational
misbehaviour – and there are few studies which feature any treatment of the topic – the
drawbacks of our methodological approach are more evident there. In future research
into the different forms of employer misbehaviour, we expect this limitation will be
addressed: More nuanced measures of employer misbehaviour in further studies that
identify specific actions would surely be useful. Future qualitative studies to deepen our
understanding of employer misbehaviour would also be incredibly helpful – we note here
that recognition of how ideological narratives can shape perceptions of what
misbehaviour entails and who most often engages in it should be included in future
research in this area.
Another limitation of our study is to be found in our coverage of managerial
misbehaviour. In paper 1 (chapter 2), we conducted a supplementary analysis concerning
managers reporting of employee misbehaviour. The corresponding results may include
some element of managerial misbehaviour – or none, if managers interpreted the question
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as inquiring after only the frequency of misbehaviour by non-managerial workers – but
we have no specific measure of this unique form of organizational misbehaviour. While
managerial misbehaviour can take forms similar to either employee or employer
misbehaviour, we know that there are also interesting elements of managers misbehaving
which are not captured by our two misbehaviour measures. This limitation should
provide an intriguing avenue for future research into the character of managerial
misbehaviour. In particular, it would be valuable to explore three very different
perspectives on managerial misbehaviour: (1) as an extension of employer misbehaviour,
(2) as an extension of general employee misbehaviour and (3) as misbehaviour
demonstrating unique dimensions dissimilar from both employer and non-managerial
misbehaviour.
The results of our third paper (chapter 4) uncovered some indication of demographic
differences in the reported frequency of misbehaviour. Older respondents and those with
an advanced degree (professional or graduate) reported significantly less employee
misbehaviour than other respondents, while older and female respondents reported less
employer misbehaviour. On the other hand, employer misbehaviour was reported as
more frequent by non-white respondents and those without a high school diploma. We
have emphasized the role of ideological attitudes in relation to an individual’s perception
of misbehaviour, and so another avenue for future qualitative research might examine
whether conceptual definitions of misbehavior differ across social groups – it would be
particularly helpful to see whether certain activities are regarded as misbehaviour by one
group and as acceptable or even admirable behaviour by another.
Our study also leaves room for alternative explanations concerning organizational
misbehaviour. Other as-yet-unaccounted-for structural factors might have an impact on
the frequency of employee misbehaviour within a work organization: for example, low
levels of monitoring, poor management, frequent downtime or overdeveloped
bureaucratic regulations. In the present study, our dataset did not afford us the ability to
look at these relationships, but future research should endeavour to explore these
relationships. Additionally, while the focus of this study was to illuminate the structural
factors related to organizational misbehaviour – in contrast to popular pathological
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explanations of the phenomenon – it would be a mistake to suggest that individual
characteristics do not also play a role here. We believe that future research that accounts
for both individual and structural motivators towards misbehaviour – and compares their
relative influence – would be incredibly informative and bridge a notable gap within the
literature.
It should also be noted here that the overall frequency of employee misbehaviour
reported in our results – 36.7% of all our respondents believed it to be a common
occurrence – appears to be considerably lower than the figures provided by several
previous studies (Harris & Ogbonna, 2002, 2006; Lee & Ok, 2014; Slora, 1989) though
still in-line with the lower-end of more conservative estimates (Harper, 1990; Lawrence
et al., 2007). It is quite possible that the lower amount of misbehaviour we report is a
result of our use of a general measure of misbehaviour and asking respondents about
specific forms of misbehaviour would see the reported frequency increase. Of course,
this lower reporting might also be connected with our reliance on respondents’
perceptions of misbehaviour frequency, rather than an objective count, if the individuals
surveyed are consistently underestimating the actual incidence of employee
misbehaviour. While we think it reasonable that either – or both – of these explanations
may account for the observed difference between our figures and those documented
within the literature, we are unable to demonstrate this conclusively.
Finally, while our conclusions are based upon numerous significant relationships, the
explanatory power of our models remains limited. In Appendix 9 and 10, we conducted
supplementary multivariate analyses of non-managerial employees’ perceptions of the
frequency of misbehaviour, incorporating explanatory variables from chapter 2, 3 and 4,
and these combined models still provide us with low r-squared values (R2= .12 and .15;
adjusted R2= .10 and .14). There is still a considerable amount of unexplained variation
in the amount of organizational misbehaviour and – while this does not invalidate our
findings – it does suggest that there is still much work to be done (particularly with
concern to expanding our understanding of the phenomena of employer and managerial
misbehaviour).
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5.4 Concluding Thoughts
Drawing upon Marxist theoretical principles, this dissertation demonstrates the
importance of occupational class and other structural factors that predict greater
organizational misbehaviour. Rather than framing misbehaviour as resulting from
personal deficiencies on the part of the individual, this dissertation argues that
misbehaviour can be a rational reaction to the conditions under which work takes place.
The experience of degraded work – typical for both industrial and service workers –
appears to reliably predict greater organizational misbehaviour by employees and
interested policy-makers should look to strategies for the improvement of working
conditions as a means by which to reduce incidences of misbehaviour within the
workplace.
Second, while employer misbehaviour is often assumed to be a rare phenomenon, the
potential impact of misbehaviour by private owners is vast and surely deserving of
greater study than it has received up to this point. This dissertation advances an
exploratory study of the phenomenon of employer misbehaviour, but adequate treatment
of this topic will require further research. In particular, future inquiry should aim to
incorporate a greater diversity of employers: Our sample was dominated by private
employers with ten or fewer paid employees and it is possible that important dimensions
of employer misbehaviour remain to be discovered.
Third, perceptions of the frequency of misbehaviour are very clearly affected by
individuals’ support for/opposition to the prevailing capitalist system of economic
production, demanding we acknowledge the interests of various stake-holders in defining
misbehaviour, estimating its prevalence and making policy decisions concerning how it
should be dealt with. Moving beyond simplistic pathological explanations of
organizational misbehaviour requires a challenging of dominant ideological narratives of
– not only this specific phenomenon – but also other “common sense” assumptions about
the nature of contemporary work.
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Finally, our findings indicate that class is a primary explanatory factor related to
organizational misbehaviour. We suggest that reconnecting with Marxist class analysis
can improve our theoretical understanding of organizational misbehaviour in several key
ways: (1) Lack of autonomy and injustice (key motivators towards employee
misbehaviour) are not distributed evenly across the social hierarchy and those occupying
less-desirable positions within the relations of production – industrial and service workers
– are those who are most likely to experience these aspects of degraded work that
motivate greater employee misbehaviour; (2) The absence of inquiry into employer
misbehaviour (and only limited efforts at studying managerial misbehaviour) indicates
our theoretical understanding of organizational misbehaviour is still seriously
underdeveloped with the primary thrust of the literature concerning only the
misbehaviour of workers; (3) Ideological attitudes shape our understanding of
organizational misbehaviour – how it is defined, how frequently it takes place, whose
misbehaviour is most worthy of study and whose misbehaviour should be excused or
even celebrated. The influence of capitalist hegemony in this process must be
acknowledged if we are to move towards a fuller understanding of misbehaviour within
the contemporary workplace.
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Appendices
Appendix 1 Technical Report on Response Rate of Canada-wide Sample for the
CWKE Survey
Response Rate
There are numerous ways to calculate response rates in survey.
The response rate for the random phone survey was defined as follows:
Response Rate = Completes/[( Eligibility Rate*Unknown) + Completes+ Eligible]
Eligibility Rate ER= (Completes+Eligible)/(Completes+Eligible+Ineligible)
For the telephone survey, the response rate was 33% using the above calculation.
For the Leger Web panel, 2731 clicked on the link, resulting in a 65% response rate.
The overall response rate was therefore 52%.
NOTE: The preceding information was provided to the author by the Leger research group who gathered
the survey data for this study.

201

Appendix 2 Non-Response Analysis of Key Misbehaviour Variables
Employer Misbehaviour Employee Misbehaviour
(0=valid response;
(0=valid response;
1=non-response)
1=non-response)
Odds Ratio Standard Odds Ratio
Standard
(exp B)
Error
(exp B)
Error
Occupational Large employer
.00
11258.03 .00
11291.52
Class
Small employer
1.44
.45
.20
1.27
Self-employed
2.10**
.27
3.38***
.30
Upper manager
.26
1.16
.36
1.30
Middle manager
.68
.32
.59
.40
Supervisor
.96
.39
.95
.46
Professional
.83
.27
.89
.31
employee
Service worker
----(ref.)
Industrial worker .58
.30
.57
.37
Net Wealth (15
.93*
.03
.95
.04
categories)
Highest
No diploma
1.36
.31
2.02
.38
Level of
High school (ref.) ----Education
Non-university
.60*
.22
.88
.27
post-secondary
certificate
Bachelor’s degree .58*
.27
.94
.31
Professional or
.56
.34
.69
.42
graduate degree
Age
1.02*
.01
1.00
.01
Gender
Male (ref.)
----Female
1.13
.18
1.64*
.21
Race
White
.68
.23
.62
.26
(binary)
Non-white (ref.)
----Union or
Member
1.27
.18
1.19
.21
professional Non-member
----association
(ref.)
member
N
1900
1900
R2
.026
.030
NOTE: * Significant at .05; ** Significant at .01; *** Significant at .001
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Appendix 3 Construction Logic for Occupational Class
1) The respondents’ occupations were coded into CCDO (SOC, Statistics Canada,
1981). The 1981 CCDO codes (Canadian Classification and Dictionary of
Occupations) can be examined in the 1980 Standard Occupation Classification
published by Statistics Canada (catalogue 12-565E, ISBN 0-660-10673-6).
2) Respondents’ 4-digit CCDO numbers were than coded into one of the following
Porter-Pineo categories belonging to a well-known socio-economic index
developed by Pineo, Porter and McRoberts (1977), based on the 1971 Canadian
Census and updated in 1985 to reflect the 1981 Census.
3) The initial coding of our occupational class variable involved allocating each of
the 16 porter-pineo categories to one of our occupational class categories (see
below):
Porter-Pineo Categories
1 Self-employed professionals
2 Employed professionals
3 Hi-level managers
4 Semi-professionals
5 Technicians
6 Middle managers
7 Supervisors
8 Foremen/women
9 Skilled clerical/Sales
10 Skilled crafts
11 Farmers
12 Semi-skilled clerical/Sales
13 Semi-skilled manual
14 Unskilled clerical/Sales
15 Unskilled manual
16 Farm labourers

→
→
→
→
→
→
→
→
→
→
→
→
→
→
→
→

WALL Class Categories
3 Self-employed
6 Professional employee
4 Manager
6 Professional employee
6 Professional employee
4 Manager
5 Supervisors
5 Supervisors
7 Service worker
8 Industrial worker
3 Self-employed
7 Service worker
8 Industrial worker
7 Service worker
8 Industrial worker
8 Industrial worker

4) If respondent reported their employment status as self-employed and was
presently in another occupational class category, they were recoded as category
3 Self-employed.
5) Self-employed respondents who had at least one paid employee (aside from
themselves) were recoded as either category 1 (Large employer) or category 2
(Small employer) based on the number of employees working for them (1 to 10
employees → small employer; 11 or more employees → large employer).
6) Manager and Supervisor category coding was double-checked using the
following managerial-level variable and a number of managers were demoted
to the category of supervisor:
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Which of the following best describes the managerial role you have at your place
of work?
1 Top manager of a plant, branch or division of an organization
2 Upper level manager
3 Middle level manager
4 Lower managerial position
5 Supervisor
6 Foreperson
7) The first two categories of the managerial-level variable above were utilized to
promote some of the managerial respondents to a new occupational class
category: upper manager
8) With some reordering of categories, the final version of our occupational class
variable comprises 9 categories:
1 Large employer
2 Small employer
3 Self-employed
4 Upper manager
5 Midmanager
6 Supervisor
7 Professional employee
8 Service worker
9 Industrial worker
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Appendix 4 Correlation Matrix for Chapter 2 Independent Variables and Controls
(non-managerial employee analysis)
Part 1 of Correlation Matrix (Pearson’s r)
OC1
OC2
OC3
Wealth ClassID Auto1 Auto2 Injus1 Injus2
OC1
1
0.57** -.44**
.17**
OC2
-.57** 1
-.49**
-.16**
OC3
-.44** -.49**
1
-.01
Wealth
.17** -.16**
-.01
1
ClassID
.18** -.11**
-.07*
.32**
Auto1
.11** -.04
-.08**
.12**
Auto2
.03
.01
-.03
-.06*
Injus1
.01
-.05*
.04
.13
Injus2
-.01
.02
-.01
-.11**
Injus3
.10** .14**
-.26**
.00
Injus4
.06*
-.03
-.03
.10**
Org.Size .22** -.13**
-.09**
.14**
Indus1
-.18** -.21**
.42**
.05
Indus2
-.12** -.02
.15**
.03
Indus3
.23** .18**
-.43**
-.06*
Sector1
-.25** .08**
.18**
-.06*
Sector2
.25** -.11**
-.15**
.10**
Sector3
.02
.05*
-.08**
-.06*
NOTE: * Significant at .05; ** Significant at .01

.18**
-.11**
-.07*
.32**
1
.09**
-.04
.15
-.10**
.09**
.12**
.07*
.02
-.05
.02
-.04
.08**
-.07*

.11**
-.04
-.08**
.12**
.09**
1
-.00
.07
.01
-.02
-.01
-.06*
-.03
-.05*
.05*
-.05*
.05*
.02

Legend:
OC1: Professional Worker
OC2: Service Worker
OC3: Industrial Worker
Wealth: Total Net Wealth
ClassID: Personal Class Identification
Auto1: Allowance to plan or design own work
Auto2: Want more say in organizational decisions
Injus1: Appropriateness of compensation compared to value produced
Injus2: Experienced discrimination at work
Injus3: Safety at work
Injus4: Job security
Org.Size: Number of employees
Indus1: Goods-producing organization
Indus2: Mixed industry organization
Indus3: Service organization
Sector1: Private sector
Sector2: Public sector
Sector3: Non-profit sector

.03
.01
-.03
-.06*
-.04
-.00
1
-.17
.23**
-.18**
-.03
.11**
-.02
.03
.00
-.03
.05*
-.03

.01
-.05*
.04
.13**
.15**
.07**
-.17**
1
-.11**
.15**
.05*
.03
.03
.02
-.02
.00
.01
-.01

-.01
.02
-.01
-.11**
-.10**
.01
.23**
-.11
1
-.19**
-.16**
.02
-.04
-.01
.02
-.01
.02
-.00
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Part 2 of Correlation Matrix (Pearson’s r)
Injus3 Injus4
Org.
Indus Indus
Size
1
2
OC1
.10** .06*
.22** -.18** -.12**
OC2
.14** -.03
-.13** -.21** -.02
OC3
-.26** -.03
-.09** .42** .15**
Wealth
.00
.10**
.14** .05
.03
ClassID
.09** .12**
.07*
.02
-.05
Auto1
-.02
-.01
-.06* -.03
-.05*
Auto2
-.18** -.03
.11** -.02
.03
Injus1
.15
.05
.03
.03
.02
Injus2
-.19** -.16**
.02
-.04
-.01
Injus3
1
.09**
-.08** -.08** -.13**
Injus4
.09** 1
.07** -.06* -.01
Org.Size -.08** .07**
1
-.07** .10**
Indus1
-.08** -.06*
-.07** 1
-.15**
Indus2
-.13** -.01
.10** -.15** 1
Indus3
.15** .08**
-.01
-.68** -.56**
Sector1
.07** -.09**
-.27** .24** .12**
Sector2
-.09** .07**
.35** -.21** -.09**
Sector3
.02
.04
-.11** -.06* -.06**
NOTE: * Significant at .05; ** Significant at .01

Indus
3
.23**
.18**
-.43**
-.06*
.02
.05
.00
-.02
.02
.15**
.08**
-.01
-.68**
-.56**
1
-.28**
.24**
.09**

Sector1

Sector2

Sector3

-.25**
.08**
.18**
-.06*
-.04
-.05*
-.03
.00
-.01
.07**
-.09**
-.27**
.24**
.12**
-.28**
1
-.87**
-.34**

.25**
-.11**
-.15**
.10**
.08**
.05*
.05*
.01
.02
-.09**
.07**
.35**
-.21**
-.09**
.24**
-.87**
1
-.18**

.02
.05*
-.08**
-.06*
-.07*
.02
-.03
-.01
-.00
.02
.04
-.11**
-.06*
-.06**
.09**
-.34**
-.18**
1
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Appendix 5 Correlation Matrix for Chapter 2 Independent Variables and Controls
(managerial employee analysis)
Part 1 of Correlation Matrix (Pearson’s r)
OC1
OC2
OC3
Wealth ClassID Auto1 Auto2 Injus1 Injus2
OC1
1
-.47** -.20** .21**
.15**
OC2
-.47** 1
-.77** -.03
.03
OC3
-.20** -.77** 1
-.11*
-.15**
Wealth
.21** -.03
-.11* 1
.37**
ClassID
.15** .03
-.15** .37**
1
Auto1
.13** -.06
-.03
.15**
.09
Auto2
-.13** .00
.09*
-.09
-.02
Injus1
.01
.07
-.09* .10*
.19**
Injus2
-.04
.03
-.00
-.07
-.11*
Injus3
-.03
.08*
-.07
.04
.04
Injus4
.02
.00
-.02
.00
-.01
Org.Size -.12** .08
-.00
.09
.16**
Indus1
-.06
-.11* .16** .06
.05
Indus2
.01
.03
-.03
.05
-.01
Indus3
.06
.09*
-.15** -.06
-.05
Sector1
.04
-.16** .15** -.07
-.03
Sector2
-.10* .18** -.13** .08
.03
Sector3
.10*
-.02
-.05
-.02
.00
NOTE: * Significant at .05; ** Significant at .01

.13**
-.06
-.03
.15**
.09
1
-.10
-.03
-.06
.06
.09*
-.13**
.06
-.02
-.06
.03
-.06
.04

-.13**
.00
.09*
-.09
-.02
-.10*
1
-.28**
.19**
-.19**
-.18**
.16**
.06
.06
-.09*
.04
-.03
-.03

Legend:
OC1: Upper Manager
OC2: Middle Manager
OC3: Supervisor
Wealth: Total Net Wealth
ClassID: Personal Class Identification
Auto1: Allowance to plan or design own work
Auto2: Want more say in organizational decisions
Injus1: Appropriateness of compensation compared to value produced
Injus2: Experienced discrimination at work
Injus3: Safety at work
Injus4: Job security
Org.Size: Number of employees
Indus1: Goods-producing organization
Indus2: Mixed industry organization
Indus3: Service organization
Sector1: Private sector
Sector2: Public sector
Sector3: Non-profit sector

.01
.07
-.09*
.10*
.19**
-.03
-.28**
1
-.14**
.19**
.15**
.13**
.02
-.04
.03
-.07
.12**
-.07

-.04
.03
-.00
-.07
-.11*
-.06
.19**
-.14**
1
-.16**
-.05
.02
-.03
.00
.02
-.06
.04
.05
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Part 2 of Correlation Matrix (Pearson’s r)
Injus3 Injus4 Org.
Indus1 Indus2
Size
OC1
-.03
.02
-.12** -.06
.01
OC2
.08*
.00
.08
-.11*
.03
OC3
-.07
-.02
-.00
.16**
-.03
Wealth
.04
.00
.09
.06
.05
ClassID
.04
-.01
.16** .05
-.01
Auto1
.06
.09*
-.13** .06
-.02
Auto2
-.19** -.18** .16** .06
.06
Injus1
.19** .15** .13** .02
-.04
Injus2
-.16** -.05
.02
-.03
.00
Injus3
1
.13** -.03
-.18** -.05
Injus4
.13** 1
-.03
-.04
-.01
Org.Size -.03
-.03
1
-.09*
.07
Indus1
-.18** -.04
-.09*
1
-.13**
Indus2
-.05
-.01
.07
-.13** 1
Indus3
.18** .04
.05
-.78** -.43**
Sector1
-.09* -.08
-.21** .33**
.09*
Sector2
.08
.05
.34** -.26** -.06
Sector3
.02
.04
-.16** -.14** -.06
NOTE: * Significant at .05; ** Significant at .01

Indus3

Sector1

Sector2

Sector3

.06
.09*
-.15**
-.06
-.05
-.06
-.09*
.03
.02
.18**
.04
.05
-.78**
-.43**
1
-.33**
.25**
.16**

.04
-.16**
.15**
-.07
-.03
.03
.04
-.07
-.06
-.09*
-.08
-.21**
.33**
.09*
-.33**
1
-.79**
-.43**

-.10*
.18**
-.13**
.08
.03
-.06
-.03
.12**
.04
.08
.05
.34**
-.26**
-.06
.25**
-.79**
1
-.20**

.10*
-.02
-.05
-.02
.00
.04
-.03
-.07
.05
.02
.04
-.16**
-.14**
-.06
.16**
-.43**
-.20**
1
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Appendix 6 Correlation Matrix for Chapter 3 Independent Variables and Controls
(employer analysis)
Part 1 of Correlation Matrix (Pearson’s r)
Wealth
Subj. Comp Busi. Loss
Union
Non-perm.
Wealth
1
.27*
-.24*
-.30**
.05
Subj. Comp
.27*
1
-.20
-.19
-.12
Busi. Loss
-.24*
-.20
1
.02
-.25
Union
-.30**
-.19
.02
1
.23
Non-perm.
.05
-.12
-.25
.23
1
#employees
.05
.08
-.11
-.05
-.01
Private
-.12
.15
-.03
-.13
-.13
Public
.13
-.19
.04
.20*
.18
Non-profit
.02
.02
-.01
-.04
-.01
Industry
.14
.02
-.12
-.30**
-.08
Decide
.25*
.15
-.11
-.03
-.07
NOTE: * Significant at .05; ** Significant at .01
Legend:
Wealth=Total net wealth
Subj. Comp=Appropriateness of compensation
Busi. Loss=Likelihood of business loss
Union=Trade union present in workplace
Non-perm.=Greater reliance on non-permanent workers
#employees=Number of Employees
Private=Private sector
Public=Public sector
Non-profit=Non-profit sector
Industry=Service-providing industry (1), Goods-producing industry (0)
Decide=Employer participates in workplace decision-making
Part 2 of Correlation Matrix (Pearson’s r)
#employees Private
Public
Wealth
.05
-.12
.12
Subj. Comp
.08
.15
-.19
Busi. Loss
-.11
-.03
.04
Union
-.05
-.13
.20*
Non-perm.
-.01
-.13
.18
#employees
1
.01
.02
Private
.01
1
-.75*
Public
.02
-.75**
1
Non-profit
-.04
-.64**
-.03
Industry
.12
-.06
-.02
Decide
-.21*
.05
-.12
NOTE: * Significant at .05; ** Significant at .01

Non-profit
.02
.02
-.01
-.04
-.01
-.04
-.64**
-.03
1
.11
.06

Industry
.14
.02
-.12
-.30**
-.08
.12
-.06
-.02
.11
1
.01

Decide
.25*
.15
-.11
-.03
-.07
-.21*
.05
-.12
.06
.01
1
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Appendix 7 Correlation Matrix for Chapter 4 Independent Variables and Controls
(all employed individuals)
Part 1 of Correlation Matrix (Pearson’s r)
Low
LowMid Mid
Upper Strike Owners NonProfit NoBosses
Low
1
-.22**
-.44** -.25** .04*
.10**
.07**
.10**
LowMid
-.22**
1
-.39** -.22** .03
.04*
.05*
.04
Mid
-.44**
-.39**
1
-.44** -.00
-.05*
-.03
-.03
Upper
-.25**
-.22**
-.44** 1
-.07** -.08**
-.07**
-.10**
Strike
.04*
.03
-.00
-.07** 1
.30**
.23**
.20**
Owners
.10**
.04*
-.05* -.08** .30** 1
.17**
.20**
NonProfit .07**
.05*
-.03
-.07** .23** .17**
1
.30**
NoBosses .10**
.04
-.03
-.10** .20** .20**
.30**
1
Female
.02
.05**
.01
-.07** .10** -.02
.09**
.05**
Nodiplo
.06**
.03
-.06** -.02
.03
.01
-.04*
-.03
HS
.09**
.01
-.03
-.06** .02
.02
.02
.03
Non-uni
.04*
.03
.02
-.09** -.01
.04*
-.01
.03
BA
-.13**
-.01
.03
.10** -.01
-.03
.01
-.04*
Advanced -.08**
-.08**
.03
.11** -.04
-.06**
.00
-.02
Age
-.02
-.07**
.04
.03
-.11** -.03
-.11**
-.02
White
-.05**
-.01
.01
.04*
.01
-.03
-.04*
-.04
NOTE: * Significant at .05; ** Significant at .01
Legend:
Low=Respondent identifies as working or lower-class
LowMid=Respondent identifies as lower-middle class
Mid=Respondent identifies as middleclass
Upper=Respondent identifies as upper or upper-middle class
Strike=Agreement that strike-breaking should be prohibited by law
Owners=Agreement that owners of corporations make gains at the expense of their workers
NonProfit=Agreement that it is possible for a modern economy to run effectively without the
profit motive
NoBosses=Agreement that non-management could run things without bosses
Female=Female respondent (male is comparison category)
Nodiplo=Respondent’s highest education level: no diploma
HS=Respondent’s highest education level: high school diploma
Non-uni=Respondent’s highest education level: non-university post-secondary certificate
BA=Respondent’s highest education level: bachelor degree
Advanced=Respondent’s highest education level: professional/graduate degree
Age=Respondent Age
White=Respondent identified as white (non-white is comparison category)
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Part 2 of Correlation Matrix (Pearson’s r)
Female NoDiplo HS
Nonuni
Low
.02
.06**
.09
.04*
LowMid
.05**
.03
.01
.03
Mid
.01
-.06**
-.03
.02
Upper
-.07**
-.02
-.06**
-.09**
Strike
.10**
.03
.02
-.01
Owners
-.02
.01
.02
.04*
NonProfit .09**
-.04*
.02
-.01
NoBosses .05**
-.03
.03
.03
Female
1
-.06**
-.03
.02
Nodiplo
-.06**
1
-.16**
-.21**
HS
-.03
-.16**
1
-.44**
Non-uni
.02
-.21**
-.44**
1
BA
.04*
-.14**
-.30**
-.39**
Advanced .00
-.09**
-.19**
-.25**
Age
-.06**
.07**
-.07**
.02
White
.04*
.02
.04
.07**
NOTE: * Significant at .05; ** Significant at .01

BA

Advanced

Age

White

-.13**
-.01
.03
.10**
-.01
-.03
.01
-.04*
.04*
-.14**
-.30**
-.39**
1
-.17**
-.05**
-.07**

-.08**
-.08**
.03
.11**
-.04
-.06**
.00
-.02
.00
-.09**
-.19**
-.25**
-.17**
1
.08**
-.06**

-.02
-.07**
.04
.03
-.11**
-.03
-.11**
-.02
-.06**
.07**
-.07**
.02
-.05**
.08**
1
.16**

-.05**
-.01
.01
.04*
.01
-.03
-.04*
-.04
.04*
.02
.04
.07**
-.07**
-.06**
.16
1

Appendix 8 Work Sector by Gender
Gender of
Respondent
Male
Female
Total
Chi2= 254.380

Goodsproducing
N
%
396
27.1
107
7.8
503
17.8

Sector of Work
Service
Mixed (transport, storage,
communication)
N
%
N
%
873
59.8
190
13.0
1181
86.3
80
5.8
2054
72.7
270
9.6
Significance= .000

Total
N
1459
1368
2827

%
100.0
100.0
100.0
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Appendix 9 Combined Models of Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour
(Non-Managerial Workers)
β Coefficient
Complete Partial Partial
Partial Partial Partial
Model Model Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model
1
5
Occupational Class Employee Occupational
Class
Professional (ref.)
------Service
.042
.101***
Industrial
.065
.131***
Autonomy
Allowance to plan or
-.063*
-.081***
design own work
Want more say in
.031
.136***
organizational decisions
Injustice
Appropriateness of
-.049
-.088***
compensation compared
to value produced
Experienced
.144***
.150***
discrimination at work
Threat to health/safety
.151***
.155***
Job insecurity
.024
.059*
Class
Class Identity
Consciousness
Upper Class/upper-.038
-.062*
middle class
Middle class (ref.)
--Lower-middle class
.021
.032
Working/Lower-class
-.008
.036
Strike-breaking should
-.019
-.008
be prohibited by law
Owners of corporations .115***
.169***
make gains at the
expense of their workers
Possible for a modern
-.011
.001
economy to run
effectively without the
profit motive
Non-management could
.073*
.066*
run things without
bosses
Worker
Union Member
-.029
.026
Power/Vulnerability Permanent
.014
.013
R-squared
.117
.015
.025
.079
.048
.001
Adjusted R-squared
.104
.013
.024
.076
.043
.000
Notes. *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001. Regression coefficients represent standardized slopes.
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Appendix 10 Combined Models of Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour
(Non-Managerial Workers)
β Coefficient
Complete Partial Partial Partial Partial Partial
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model Model 5
4
Occupational Class Employee Occupational
Class
Professional (ref.)
------Service
.095** .119***
Industrial
.035
.116***
Autonomy
Allowance to plan or
.079**
.012
design own work
Want more say in
-.004
.101***
organizational decisions
Injustice
Appropriateness of
-.038
-.093***
compensation compared
to value produced
Experienced
.139***
.173***
discrimination at work
Threat to health/safety
.201***
.167***
Job insecurity
.093***
.154***
Class
Class Identity
Consciousness
Upper Class/upper-.021
-.036
middle class
Middle class (ref.)
--Lower-middle class
.001
.020
Working/Lower-class
.029
.075**
Strike-breaking should be .078**
.056*
prohibited by law
Owners of corporations
.061*
.110***
make gains at the expense
of their workers
Possible for a modern
-.053
-.020
economy to run
effectively without the
profit motive
Non-management could
.094***
.116***
run things without bosses
Worker
Union Member
-.083**
-.009
Power/Vulnerability Permanent
-.029
-.057*
R-squared
.148
.015
.010
.126
.050
.003
Adjusted R-squared
.136
.013
.009
.124
.045
.002
Notes. *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001. Regression coefficients represent standardized slopes.
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Appendix 11 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Union
Membership (non-managerial workers)
Union
N
% who report
Employee Class Gamma Significance
Membership
employee
(γ)
(p-value)
misbehaviour as
fairly or extremely
common
Professional
.120
.067
Non-member
667
36.0
Service
.054
.435
Union member 292
38.3
Industrial
-.046
.524
Total
959
36.6
All Non.030
.442
Managerial
Employees

Appendix 12 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Union
Membership (non-managerial workers)
Union
N
% who report
Employee Class Gamma Significance
Membership
employer
(γ)
(p-value)
misbehaviour as
fairly or extremely
common
Professional
.019
.821
Non-member
267
14.8
Service
-.150
.062
Union member 123
16.6
Industrial
.042
.610
Total
390
15.3
All Non-.040
.292
Managerial
Employees

Appendix 13 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Employment
Status (non-managerial workers)
Employment
N
% who report
Employee Class Gamma Significance
Status
employee
(γ)
(p-value)
misbehaviour as
fairly or extremely
common
Professional
.162
.100
Non148
41.5
Service
.025
.787
permanent
Permanent
811
36.0
Industrial
-.087
.398
Total
959
36.8
All Non.032
.569
Managerial
Employees
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Appendix 14 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Employment
Status (non-managerial workers)
Employment
N
% who report
Employee Class Gamma Significance
Status
employer
(γ)
(p-value)
misbehaviour as
fairly or extremely
common
Professional
-.002
.988
Non82
22.9
Service
-.168
.102
permanent
Permanent
307
14.1
Industrial
-.110
.350
Total
389
15.4
All Non-.102
.117
Managerial
Employees
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